



Daily Report

Soviet Union

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Reportage on Vienna Military Doctrine Meeting

Naval Arms Debate

PM0702174990 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Feb 90 Single Edition p 3

[Colonel V. Markushin report: "For Equilibrium and Stability. At the International Seminar on Disarmament on the Seas and Oceans"]

[Text] Representatives of approximately 45 states have gathered at the Center for International Trade and Scientific and Technical Ties with Foreign Countries in Moscow. They are scientists, diplomats, military men, parliament deputies, church figures, and businessmen. They have gathered to discuss one of the most difficult problems of the present disarmament process—the problem of limiting the naval arms race and reducing naval activity in the world ocean.

The dominant theme of the debate quickly became apparent. The situation in the world today is such that the risk of military confrontation is equally great both on land and at sea. However, whereas talks on land arms are proceeding between NATO and the Warsaw Pact and a certain trend toward their reduction has already become apparent, in the sphere of naval arms the situation is different and creates alarm. The world ocean, the cradle of terrestrial civilization, is now being turned into a source of very great danger to mankind. If measures to build confidence and reduce military activeness are not extended to it, then the greatest threat of war will stem precisely from the marine expanses.

The peoples' security cannot be imagined without stability, without equilibrium. Is it possible to judge the equilibrium of forces by considering just a section of the armed forces? Obviously not. It is extremely important for everyone to be aware of this thought. Under the conditions of a radical reduction in ground troops and air forces, superiority at sea can be turned into overall military superiority. For the potential of arms sited on ships and submarines is by no means such that it is possible to speak only of "defense of marine lines of communication." The U.S. Tomahawks, for example, are capable of strafing territory to the Urals from neutral waters.

Unfortunately, U.S. official circles are so far refusing to hold talks on reducing naval arms. As Admiral V. Ponikarovskiy, chief of the Naval Academy, pointed out in his speech, the Americans cite the following argument to justify their position. The whole point, they say, is that the United States is a sea power, whereas the Soviet Union is a land power. A dubious argument. It turns out that it is necessary to strive for parity in terms of land arms with a land power, but in terms of naval arms—no point. Where is the logic?

So, the first international seminar on disarmament on the seas has begun its work. It promises to be acute and packed. Greetings from N. Ryzhkov, chairman of the

USSR Council of Ministers, and UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar were read out at the opening.

USSR, U.S. Opinions

LD0702192390 Moscow TASS in English 1907 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—Despite their unanimous opinion on the main issue, participants in the international seminar on the limitation of naval arms race and reduction of naval activities, which continues in Moscow today, sometimes differ in their assessment of the current situation and in approaches to the problem.

Generals, experts and representatives of public organizations from the USSR, the United States, major Western naval powers and third countries agree that naval forces should even now be involved in the process of arms control.

In the opinion of retired Rear Admiral Richard James from the U.S. Center for Defence Information, much work has to be done to cut the naval might not only of the USSR and the U.S. but also all over the world.

However, in contrast to the Soviet position envisaging the dismantling of naval bases in third countries, James believes that the U.S. Navy protects not only American interests but has definite commitments to its allies where the bases are situated.

It took ten years for the Soviet Union to change its approach to military problems, he noted. This process is also in progress in the United States, and it cannot evidently be shorter.

British expert Eric Grove representing the Foundation for International Security, told TASS that it is always useful to discuss questions at a forum. However, "broad debate" often lapses into redundant rhetoric.

It is more useful to hold small-scale meetings to achieve real progress, meetings of experts who are really involved in drafting policy, he noted.

This is exactly what his foundation is doing, Grove stressed. It is a research organisation sponsoring high-level unofficial consultations to discuss questions of naval strategy.

Indonesia welcomes the holding of this seminar, said Captain Hussein Ibrahim [name as received], member of the Indonesian delegation and representative of the Indonesian General Staff.

The Association of South East Asian Nations has already held such a forum on lessening tension in Southeast Asia, he added. Indonesia favours the development of the process with the participation of interested sides.

Soviet and American warships use straits in that part of the world, open for international shipping, he noted.

Seminar participants will break into three working groups on Thursday.

Akhromeyev Report

*LD0802110790 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0850 GMT 8 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow, 8 Feb (TASS)—The international seminar on problems of disarmament on the seas continues in Moscow. Today, after a brief plenary session, the participants are splitting up into working groups and are continuing discussion of more specific issues.

At Wednesday evening's session, a report on the significance of the state of the naval forces of the USSR and United States for the whole complex of Soviet-U.S. relations and invigoration of the talks process on problems of reduction of armed forces and armaments was delivered by Marshal of the Soviet Union Sergey Akhromeyev, adviser to the chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Improvement of Soviet-U.S. relations depends on the solution of four main military problems, Marshal Akhromeyev stressed. These are reduction of the sides' strategic offensive weapons, reduction of the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty and NATO in Europe, the start of talks on reduction of the sides' naval forces, and gradual liquidation of U.S. military (primarily naval) bases around the Soviet Union. The first two of them are being tackled. But the fact that the third and fourth, which are closely interlocked, remain unsolved, is impeding the whole complex of talks on reduction of conventional weapons.

The radical change in the USSR's foreign policy after the spring of 1985 led to the coming into force in 1987 of the new Soviet military doctrine. This consolidated the commitments of the countries of the Warsaw Treaty Organization not to be first to attack and use nuclear weapons, and their lack of territorial claims on anyone whatsoever. These steps promoted the growth of trust in Soviet-U.S. relations and the invigoration of the talks process, which predetermined the conclusion of the treaty on intermediate and lesser-range missiles by the USSR and United States, the major advances at the talks on strategic offensive weapons, on the reduction of armed forces in Europe, and on the liquidation of chemical weapons.

However, Akhromeyev noted, there remain serious points in U.S. policy which put one on one's guard; things are not progressing any further than political statements about cooperation with the Soviet Union. Evidently, this is happening because of the U.S. desire to pursue the old policy from a position of strength, that is, to obtain as many concessions as possible on a unilateral basis, and also out of fear of major structural advances in the economy and the construction of armed forces of the United States and its allies in NATO. [as received]

The U.S. side is as yet declining to conduct talks on reduction of naval forces. In this attitude one can discern the U.S. desire to maintain superiority in forces and facilities on the seas, he stressed. This policy will be perceived with mistrust by the Soviet Union.

In conclusion Marshal Akhromeyev expressed the hope that the rapid changes taking place in the world will convince the U.S. Administration of the objective necessity of starting talks on reduction of naval forces and of the fact that such talks are in the interests of the United States.

Patsyuk Commentary

*LD0602111890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1600 GMT 5 Feb 90*

[Text] A seminar on military doctrines ended today in Vienna, the Austrian capital. This was a very remarkable event. Representatives of the highest military leadership of the European states, the United States, and Canada took part in the seminar. Over to my colleague, commentator Konstantin Patsyuk:

Not long ago, there were probably few people who would have believed that Soviet military chiefs would meet their Western colleagues for virtually the first time since the historic meeting on the Elbe, and would not only meet—although in itself this fact is already significant—but would also hold a committed and businesslike discussion on their military and military-political doctrines and concepts, compare them, and discuss issues related to the use of conventional and nuclear armaments.

Less than three years have passed since the publication of their military doctrine by the countries of the Warsaw Pact. Proclaiming to all humanity its essence—the principle of reasonable defense sufficiency—they suggested to the world that it should judge the sincerity of their intentions and that there was no more urgent and vital task for them than the task of preventing a new war, nuclear or conventional. These years have shown that this is indeed so. The allied states have said that they will never, under any circumstances, be the first to use their nuclear weapons. They are unilaterally reducing their armed forces, giving them a non-offensive structure, and are cutting their military budget. The defensive tasks of the Warsaw Pact remain in force, but at the same time, it will to all intents and purposes develop from being a military-political alliance to becoming a political-military alliance. It is now simply impermissible to resolve international problems by military means. There is only one way to resolve them—the political way. Will the NATO countries accept this? I must say that they, too, are beginning to become aware of the destructiveness of resolving problems militarily, but this by no means applies to everyone and everywhere. There are still circles there that cling to the concepts of flexible response and forward basing which lie at the basis of NATO's activity. You see, these proceed from the premise of the possibility of waging various kinds of wars in Europe, using conventional and nuclear weapons.

Moreover, in a number of countries of the North Atlantic bloc, military programs are being adopted, military potential is being stepped up, a high level of military activity is being displayed, and large-scale exercises are being held.

The supporters of the old dogmas and stereotypes in military matters are still strong in NATO. It is precisely they who are attempting to slow down the arrival of a new stage not just in political relations, but also in military relations between East and West. The fears and hostility, which for decades have been dominant, must finally give way to dialogue in this area, too. And the forum in Vienna on military doctrines is evidence that this time is coming.

Chervov Comments on Military Doctrines Exchange

PM0702172190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

["IZVESTIYA Interview" with Colonel General N.F. Chervov, member of the Soviet delegation to the Vienna seminar on military doctrines, by own correspondent S. Tosunyan; date of interview not specified; first three paragraphs are editorial introduction: "Overcoming Suspicion and Mistrust"]

[Text] The three-week seminar on military doctrines has finished its work in Vienna's Hofburg Palace. It took place within the framework of the talks on confidence-building and security measures in Europe.

In the unanimous assessment of its participants, the seminar was a unique event in East-West relations. Chiefs of general staffs and other high-ranking military officials, along with diplomats and scientists from virtually all European countries, the United States, and Canada took part in it. Postwar history has no record of an event like it.

Your correspondent asked Colonel General N.F. Chervov, member of the Soviet delegation, to comment on the seminar's work.

[Chervov] Our delegation is satisfied on the whole with the seminar. It is clearly advisable to consider the question of holding similar meetings in the future.

Some NATO countries' representatives spoke about Warsaw Pact military superiority at the seminar, saying that this superiority will, in their opinion, be maintained even after our unilateral reduction in armed forces. We could not, of course, agree with such statements and explained to our partners that it is necessary to take a broader and more realistic view of the two alliances' military potentials rather than selectively pick individual categories of arms or individual branches of armed forces.

Military potential represents the sum total of all branches of armed forces that make up the military might of a state or alliance of states. In terms of structure the alliances' military potentials are asymmetrical. The

Warsaw Pact has the advantage in some components while NATO has the advantage in others. NATO has substantial advantages in a number of indicators—for instance, in terms of the number of its strategic nuclear charges, the overall numerical strength of its armed forces, including reserve units, and warships. NATO has the edge in military-industry production capacities, in overall military expending, and qualitative characteristics and the state of the infrastructure are also in NATO's favor.

For some reason the Western participants in the seminar failed to mention all these NATO advantages. While the so-called "Warsaw Pact advantage" has been created artificially by excluding naval systems and other elements of military potential from the correlation of forces.

We will regard NATO's agreement to talks on naval forces as a readiness also to take our concerns into consideration. In the course of the seminar the Soviet delegation tried to prove, using concrete data, that our perestroika fully extends to the practice of military building.

The world is entering a new band of development characterized by an increase in mutual understanding and cooperation. The enemy image is being destroyed, military contacts are being broadened at all levels, and a treaty basis is being created for preventing dangerous military incidents between USSR and U.S. or NATO and Warsaw Pact armed forces. We are obviously on the verge of a qualitatively new phase in the development of civilization and the construction of a fundamentally new model of security. Figuratively speaking, West and East have moved to meet one another. Still, more trust is required to speed up this movement.

Until recently, this did not exist in our relations. Take, for instance, the "nuclear deterrence" doctrine. It is surely based above all on mutual suspicion built up over the long cold war years and false notions, sometimes even caricatures of one another. Only now have we begun to overcome these wrong ideas, to which we were effectively hostage in the recent past.

Arms Reductions Needed To Avoid 'War Threat'

LD0702142690 Moscow in English to North America
2300 GMT 6 Feb 90

[Text] Addressing the party plenum on Monday, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev described the need for further disarmament, dialogue, and understanding as one of the overriding priorities of Soviet foreign policy. Here is what commentator Vladislav Kozyakov writes:

Arms reductions at the focus of East-West, and particularly superpower, relations was high on the agenda of the informal summit off Malta between President Gorbachev and President Bush. The issue will also have priority when their foreign ministers meet in Moscow

this week to discuss the state of draft agreements on disarmament on the eve of a new summit in June.

It seems to be highly important that the Soviet side should reaffirm its commitment to seeking accommodation in the area of disarmament. However, further progress in that sensitive area is difficult. Despite critical changes for the better in Europe and in superpower relations, America's and NATO's military doctrines have remained intact over the post-war years. Many in the Soviet Union fear lest current and future reductions of conventional forces should lead to lower national security. To assuage these apprehensions, President Gorbachev reiterated that conventional cuts were being embraced on the principle of defense sufficiency. This approach is also at the core of the Soviet position at any arms talks, including the INF agreement under which the Soviet Union (?had) to scrap more than twice as many missiles than the Americans. At talks to cut conventional forces in Europe, the Warsaw Pact countries have agreed to remove their superiority of 30,000 tanks.

Other countries would do well by adopting the same principle of easing concerns by their counterparts. Sadly, the Americans at times are guided by different concepts. Under Washington's new offer, the Soviet Union is to cut its troop numbers in East Europe by 400,000 and the United States in Europe by 100,000. But America is not moving to open talks on navies and is less than willing to place restrictions on sea-based missiles, although it enjoys more than enough superiority in both types.

Hard as the arms reduction issue may be, resolving it is the only way of warding off a war threat. Some encouraging signs are already there and this year carries the promise of becoming a year of disarmament. Work is due to be finalized on long-awaited agreements to reduce nuclear, conventional, and chemical weapons. The Soviet Union will do its best for success because reaching progress at arms talks is part and parcel of its reform, new thinking, and the party's short-range strategy, as outlined at the full meeting by its Central Committee in Moscow.

E. Europe Changes Prompt NATO Army Cuts

PM0702154590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 4 Feb 90 First Edition p 3

[Colonel V. Markushin article under the "Military Commentator's Viewpoint" rubric: "A Trend Which Must Be Consolidated"]

[Text] In recent days the sensitive political barometer has registered favorable signs in the international atmosphere. It can even be said that a tendency to rethink military policy has definitely appeared in the West. That tendency did not appear suddenly. It was the consequence of the new realities, new attitudes, and new political thinking born in the Soviet Union. The transformations in the East European countries made possible by Soviet perestroika have caused an answering movement from the West and accelerated the fall in tension between the two military potentials. At the same time, the burden of military budgets and their ruinous effect on the economies of the countries concerned, however rich they are, is becoming felt increasingly keenly.

The news from Washington last week was further confirmation of this trend. During the debates on Capitol Hill on the administration's fiscal 1991 draft budget, the predominant opinion of the U.S. legislators was clearly in favor of a more rational military policy in the era of diminishing confrontation. Naturally, neither the White House nor the Pentagon can ignore that opinion.

Last Wednesday President Bush presented the traditional "State of the Union" address to representatives and senators. Noting that the "Soviet military threat in Europe is declining" and supporting the further development of "new relations" with the Soviet Union, he proposed that the U.S. and Soviet troops stationed in central and East Europe be reduced to 195,000 men per side. That is far lower than the level of 275,000 proposed by Bush himself in June last year. There is a condition here that the U.S. side will be able to keep a further 30,000 servicemen in Britain, Italy, and Turkey. It also emerges from the message that Washington remains loyal to SDI and its nuclear programs, which it will pursue intensively, allegedly because of the Soviet efforts in this direction.

Two days earlier Defense Secretary Cheney delivered a speech in the Pentagon. He described to journalists some details of the military budget for next fiscal year, which begins in the United States 1 October. If one takes into account such a constant U.S. phenomenon as inflation, one can talk about a planned real reduction in military appropriations of 2.6 percent compared with this year.

What is the implication of this figure? In Cheney's own words, the movements in the military budget are connected with "the first responses to the phenomenal changes in East Europe and the Soviet Union." In particular, this means the cessation of U.S. military

activity at a number of bases and installations located outside the country. The secretary's list named 12 bases in six countries.

For example, by the end of this year it is planned to cease military activity at the Fairford airbase and next year at the Greenham Common and Wethersfield airbases in Britain. In 1991 operations may be terminated at the Arok [name as transliterated] air base and the Eskishehir [name as transliterated] arsenal in Turkey, the Hellenikon base and the Nea Makri communications station in Greece, the Comiso airbase in Italy, and the Kwangju and Taegu airbases in South Korea. The Suwon airbase in South Korea is due to close in 1992 and the Zweibruecken airbase in the FRG in 1993.

Thus 12 military bases out of approximately 270 in Europe alone and 370 worldwide. Not a great deal. But not so few, either, if you go beyond the arithmetic of simple figures to the higher mathematics of political relations.

The change of emphasis in the distribution of military spending under the future U.S. budget doesn't just affect military bases. It follows from the explanations of the Pentagon leader that certain programs for the creation of new armaments are not going to be implemented. But work to improve all three components of the U.S. strategic triad—ground-based ICBM's, strategic aviation, and sea-launched strategic missiles—will continue. Because, as the Pentagon believes, the United States should be ready to continue the long-term rivalry with the Soviet Union for which it will be necessary to master crucial technologies, weapons systems, and operational concepts in conditions of increasingly limited resources.

Even if the Soviet threat disappears completely, the Pentagon chief said, U.S. military might will still be needed to respond to different circumstances in the world.

What conclusion emerges from the contents of the two speeches—the President's and the defense secretary's? On the one hand, Washington's more flexible approach to the military spending problem and to its more rational distribution in keeping with the political changes in the world is increasingly clear. On the other hand, the persistent desire to go on acting from a position of strength is also very clearly displayed. As is the desire to improve nuclear and space technology and squander intellectual and material resources on strategic armaments.

The question is: Why? It is not only we in the Soviet Union who are asking this question. People in America are bewildered by it too, and U.S. senators have their doubts. I think it appropriate at this point to quote what S. Nunn, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said recently: "Of course I would like the Air Force to have a new fighter and the Navy to have a new ground-attack plane, a new submarine. But I think that we should ask ourselves: Can we allow ourselves all this and do we need it?"

Let us look now at how this trend is manifested in Europe. Let us take Belgium, for example. The recent statement by Belgian National Defense Minister Guy Coeme on the planned withdrawal of the Belgian corps from the FRG made a great impact and came as a great surprise to NATO headquarters. This is not the first time that Belgium has dared to make its own move in military policy without checking what the "senior" bloc partners are doing. On this occasion, however, its "liberty-taking" provoked a whole stream of rebukes and warnings, mainly about undermining "Atlantic solidarity."

Next door, The Netherlands is currently discussing the 1991-1994 draft military program. Under the program, defense spending is to be cut by 2.2 billion guilders. It is planned to use the money thus saved on environmental protection as well as on spending which could result from the signing of a conventional arms reduction treaty in Vienna. When presenting the draft program in parliament, Defense Minister R. ter Beek stated that in 1991-1992 the Dutch army will lose 3,500 officers and men from a total of 110,000, including 1,500 workers from the General Staff and other leading military organs. This figure includes 750 servicemen who are to be withdrawn from the 7,200 Dutch soldiers stationed in the FRG.

The Federal Republic has also adopted a decision on reducing the size of the Bundeswehr, which now has 495,000 men. If the decision is implemented, the personnel will be reduced to 420,000 (297,000 Ground Forces, 91,200 in the Air Force, and 31,800 in the Navy). As far as Bonn is concerned this step is not so much a display of altruism as an enforced measure necessitated by a shortage of financial resources and a complex demographic situation. Nor, of course, should one forget the influence that the democratic public is having in this regard on the Bonn Government.

Official London regards the possible renewal of military policy with far less enthusiasm. According to THE TIMES, leading members of the Thatcher cabinet are resisting attempts by the Treasury to make substantial reductions in the military budget in response to changes in the East. Citing "officials," the newspaper reports that such reductions cannot be significant.

Incidentally, London, which, as a rule, expresses its unconditional support for all the transatlantic ally's ventures, also reacted coolly with a show of "healthy conservatism" toward the U.S. Government's latest proposals. Great changes also mean great uncertainty, British cabinet representatives are fond of saying, expressing caution on the need for real steps in the disarmament sphere.

Generally speaking, those thoughts and actions are typical not just of the British conservatives but also all those whose plans and actions have still not abandoned the habit of using terms from a past era. Like everyone else, they claim to welcome the changes and give assurances of their best intentions. In fact, however, they try to prevent the question of radically reducing military

spending and achieving a really appreciable relief from the burden of army spending from being placed on the agenda at all. But this question has long been urgent. And it needs bold political decisions from the heads of the leading world powers to make the switch from word to deed. It needs realism of ideas and actions coupled with strict calculation of the balance of interests.

Baker's Talk With France's Dumas Noted

*PM0702170990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Feb 90 Single Edition p 1*

[TASS report under the rubric "From Abroad": "Agreement Expressed"]

[Text] Dublin, 6 Feb—A working meeting took place today at Ireland's Shannon International Airport between R. Dumas, French minister of state and foreign minister, and U.S. Secretary of State J. Baker, on his way to Moscow and Prague. The heads of the U.S. and French diplomatic departments discussed a broad range of problems, including East-West relations, U.S. ties with the EEC, and some others.

In an interview with AFP, R. Dumas said that J. Baker had expressed agreement at the meeting to hold a summit level Helsinki-2 conference in 1990. M.S. Gorbachev put forward this initiative to assemble the leaders of the CSCE participant countries. According to the French minister, this meeting could be organized in October or November, possibly in Paris.

The head of French diplomacy added that the German question had also been touched on during his conversation with J. Baker. They had agreed that it is necessary "to find a new basis for stability" in Europe. They also discussed what the rights of the victorious powers—the Soviet Union, United States, Britain, and France—will be in this context. According to him, the secretary of state assured him that the United States intends to keep U.S. troops in Europe for as long as its allies want this, even if Soviet troops are withdrawn. Touching on the subject of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development now in the process of formation, R. Dumas confirmed France's stand on this matter: that the Soviet Union must be one of the founders and one of the recipients of credit provided by this new financial center.

'Human Dimension' Meeting Stresses People's Role

*PM0702191590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6*

[A. Lopukhin, A. Lyutyy report: "Lively Dialogue"]

[Excerpt] An international meeting of representatives of the public from CSCE countries has come to a close in Moscow.

"The Human Dimension of the All-European Process: The Role of the Public"—this was the subject of the discussions, in the course of which different views were

expressed, reflecting the general desire to develop contacts between people for the sake of mutual understanding and cooperation.

In the intervals between the discussions we spoke to participants in the meeting. Here is the opinion of one of the most influential and best known guests—R. Schifter, U.S. assistant secretary of state for human rights and humanitarian affairs:

"It is very important that human rights problems are discussed not only by governments but by ordinary people. This is the only way that the Helsinki process will make real progress. Here I cannot fail to emphasize the role played by Mikhail Gorbachev in changing the attitude of a vast number of people in the world to human rights questions." [passage omitted]

Future Links With EC Single Market Viewed

PM0802092990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[V. Matveyev report: "The European Community Looks Into the Future"]

[Excerpts] There are now 12 countries in the EC. And they are setting themselves increasingly ambitious tasks. If they carry out everything that they have conceived of and planned, then in the near future a superpower in the form of the EC will appear, with a great potential in the sphere of foreign trade as well as a considerably coordinated foreign policy.

Radical steps to reorganize key spheres of life have been put on the agenda. The removal of internal state borders in EC countries will lead to the creation of a single market of those countries (Britain, Belgium, Holland, Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Luxemburg, Portugal, France, and the FRG), the substantial unification of their internal legislation and taxation, the introduction of a single currency, and the establishment of a Central Bank. Goods, capital, services, and people will move around within the community without hindrance. [passage omitted]

Following the EC's example, the United States and Canada have agreed on a number of measures aimed at creating a single North American market. In Asia, Japan is acting as a motivating force with a view to forming a similar sphere, with the participation of the ASEAN member countries.

The big question is will these three large economic groupings become rivals or partners? One thing is clear: All the other countries in the world will have to take the

this process into consideration one way or another and adapt to it so that they are not relegated to sidelines of world economic changes.

Those who can operate within the largest and most integrated markets have the greatest advantages. Our country, with its enormous market, natural resources, and industrial, scientific, and technical potential—although it does not yet have developed market relations—has at its disposal the potential necessary to keep abreast of these changes.

It will be possible to say the same about the market of the CEMA member states, if CEMA develops to meet the challenge of the times.

"The world economy is quickly moving in the direction of the composing large regional formations not confined to national boundaries," Peter Drucker, one of the leading authorities on the U.S. business world, said in the columns of TIME (22 January). [passage omitted]

We, all the countries in CEMA, (after its radical reorganization as agreed at the Sofia meeting) will see the emergence in the West of the continent, of an economic and political grouping, with which mutual relations will be of paramount importance for the entire situation on the continent. Our country, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia have already signed agreements with the EC, which lay down the foundations for equitable, mutually advantageous cooperation. This is just the beginning. I am bound to draw attention to the fact that while on the one hand, it is individual governments and individual states that are participating in such agreements at the moment, on the other hand, it is a community that is already in operation, speaking on behalf of the 12 countries that it comprises. The elaboration of a mechanism for implementing links and cooperation between CEMA and the EC on a multilateral basis depends on how quickly CEMA reforms itself in accordance with today's needs. We do not and should not be a side that is aiming for some kind of unilateral advantages and privileges for itself.

Great interest on the part of EC countries in the markets of the Soviet Union and East Europe is not a myth but an indisputable fact. The same is true for a question that is topical for West Europe, namely a number of joint economic projects and the protection of the environment, the realization of which is important for the whole continent. Finally, sources of energy. As it is still in a situation of dynamic economic development, West Europe will have not a smaller, but a greater need for supplies of these raw materials.

All this points to good prospects for all-European cooperation, when the "single market" in the West becomes a reality. These possibilities must be exploited to a maximum degree.

United States & Canada

Secretary of State Baker Begins Moscow Visit

'Important Step' for Summit

LD0702142290 Moscow World Service in English
1200 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Today is the first day of a visit to the Soviet Union of U.S. Secretary of State James Baker. He will be having talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. The visit is seen in the Soviet political circles as an important step in preparing the Soviet-American summit coming in June. The present talks are to touch upon the outstanding points of the agreement on a 50 percent cut in strategic weapons.

On Wednesday, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker called for greater cooperation among central European states and less secrecy on defense spending and military deployment. Speaking in Prague, Mr. Baker said we need to develop measures that would impede an assertion of military might by any European nation against another.

Baker congratulated the Soviet leadership just before his three-day visit to Moscow and said by word and deed this new Soviet leadership seems to agree that legitimacy, not force, is the only way to ensure European stability. [passage omitted]

Bessmertnykh Greets Baker

LD0702160690 Moscow TASS in English 1513 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—U.S. Secretary of State James Baker arrived in Moscow today on an official visit. At the Sheremetyevo International Airport, he was welcomed by First Deputy Foreign Minister Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR Jack Matlock and other officials.

After the welcoming ceremony, Baker went to the USSR Foreign Ministry mansion where he will have his first meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The official Soviet-American talks will begin on February 9.

It is planned that Baker will also meet Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev during the visit. The secretary of state will speak before representatives of the USSR Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee.

During the talks Shevardnadze and Baker will discuss in detail the forthcoming Soviet-American summit in Washington next June.

The ministers will examine military and political questions on ending the work this year to draft an agreement on a 50 per cent reduction in Soviet and American strategic offensive weapons.

The agenda also includes regional conflicts, Soviet-American interaction in the humanitarian sphere, transnational problems and bilateral cooperation.

Meeting Held With Shevardnadze

LD0702200190 Moscow TASS in English 1905 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Excerpt] Moscow February 7 TASS—A one-to-one meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker started this evening in Moscow. Baker arrived in the Soviet Union earlier today.

Important Soviet-American negotiations on a wide range of questions of bilateral relations, as well as problems of disarmament, world and regional problems will be held during the visit.

Before the talks, Shevardnadze answered questions from Soviet and foreign correspondents about the results of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee plenum.

"The Soviet Union is living through a very interesting period of renewal, and everybody will be able to ascertain this soon," the minister said. [passage omitted]

Shevardnadze Answers Questions

LD0702215290 Moscow TASS in English 2122 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and visiting U.S. Secretary of State James Baker began their one-to-one meeting Wednesday night in a Foreign Ministry mansion in the centre of the Soviet capital.

Before the meeting, they answered questions of Soviet and foreign correspondents.

Asked to comment on the plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, which had been going on in Moscow for three days, Shevardnadze said: "Everything that leads to humanism and democracy is in the interests of all mankind. I can say that we have finally determined our stand and approved the party platform."

The Soviet minister pointed out that the issues discussed by the plenum were yet to be discussed by all Communists of the country. He expressed conviction that the major provisions of the platform will remain unchanged.

Asked about a possible transition to a multi-party system and possible changes in the country in this connection, Shevardnadze said that "hardly anyone can now predict anything, but apparently this will be a very interesting society."

Baker emphasised the importance and timeliness of the changes in the Soviet Union and said he expected to receive firsthand information about them.

Shevardnadze then spoke about the agenda of the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. talks. He said major changes had taken place in the world since the Malta summit and that they should be discussed with the U.S. secretary of state.

He said the talks will focus on regional problems, specifically on the situation in Afghanistan, Central America, Cambodia, the Middle East and Europe.

Shevardnadze said the discussion of the Afghan problem will be "thorough" and that the sides "perhaps will manage to draw their positions closer together and to broaden mutual understanding on the issue."

Commenting on the developments in Eastern Europe, including the issue of German reunification, the minister expressed hope that this issue could be discussed in detail during a visit to Moscow by West Germany's chancellor and foreign minister, scheduled for February 10.

"This is a very topical problem for us," Shevardnadze said.

Asked by TASS about the Soviet reaction to U.S. President George Bush's recent proposal to cut Soviet and U.S. troops in central and Eastern Europe, Shevardnadze said the proposal was "on the whole positive" and said the Soviet side will also submit a "corresponding proposal."

Meeting With Gorbachev Awaited

LD0702185790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1800 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] By prior agreement, U.S. Secretary of State James Baker arrived in Moscow today on an official visit.

Later in the day, there was a one-on-one conversation between Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, and James Baker.

Soviet-U.S. talks will commence tomorrow, and on Friday a meeting is scheduled between Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev and Baker. On the same day, the heads of the USSR and U.S. foreign policy departments will hold a press conference for journalists.

On Saturday, the U.S. secretary of state will address Soviet parliamentarians in the Supreme Soviet's Foreign Affairs Committee.

'Official' Talks Under Way

LD0802075590 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 0738 GMT 8 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 8 Feb (TASS)—Official Soviet-U.S. talks have just begun in a USSR Foreign Ministry residence in the center of Moscow. The delegations of the sides are headed by USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, who is in the Soviet Union on an official visit.

Replying to questions from journalists just prior to the beginning of the talks, Eduard Shevardnadze and James Baker stressed that in the course of today's conversations, prime attention will be devoted to disarmament matters: cutting strategic offensive weapons and banning chemical weapons.

Glazunov Outlines Prospects for Baker Visit

LD0702183690 Moscow World Service in English
1610 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] As you might have heard in the news, the U.S. secretary of state, Mr. James Baker, is in Moscow for talks with his Soviet counterpart, Eduard Shevardnadze, and he is also to have a meeting with President Gorbachev. Radio Moscow's Viktor Glazunov considers the background to the visit:

[Begin Glazunov recording in Russian fading to superimposed English translation] The purpose of the visit is to prepare an agenda for the Soviet-American summit in June. The state of Soviet-American relations in the future will depend upon the outcome of that summit, and if it is a success, one has every reason to expect an improvement in international relations as a whole. The main issue on the agenda is whether there will be a new Soviet-American treaty on disarmament before this year's end. The treaty will cut in half the strategic arsenals of the two countries. Certain points of the draft treaty are yet to be agreed upon, and the Moscow talks are aimed at the clearing them up.

This year may also see the start of chemical disarmament and the conclusion of a treaty of the reduction of conventional armed forces in Europe. The prospects for that treaty are good. President Bush has proposed that Soviet and American troops in central and Eastern Europe be reduced to 195,000 on each side. The USSR and its allies have been reducing their armed forces unilaterally. This country is conducting a partial withdrawal of its troops from Eastern Europe, and it is prepared to withdraw all of them if the United States and its allies withdraw their forces from Western Europe.

Disarmament tops the agenda of the Soviet-American dialogue, but another point high on the agenda is the issue of the reunification of the two German states. That issue has implications that go far beyond both German states. The most important aspect of it is that a unified German state must not pose a threat to its neighbors. The Soviet Union and the United States, as members of the anti-Hitler coalition, bear special responsibility for the German question. Above all, German revenge-seeking elements must be prevented from emerging as a political force. European guarantees are called for in this connection, and much depends here on the mutual understanding and concerted action by the United States and the Soviet Union. [end recording]

It is hard to forecast the outcome of the U.S. secretary of state's talks in Moscow, continues Viktor Glazunov. On the eve of his visit, James Baker said that the United

States is seeking to establish mutually beneficial areas of contact in order to be able to turn areas of conflict into areas of cooperation. That approach will no doubt meet with understanding in Moscow, and there is good reason to hope for the success of another round of the Soviet-American dialogue.

Supreme Soviet Delegation Opens Visit to U.S.

Chief Delegate Previews Agenda

PM0702162390 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 7 Feb 90 Single Edition p 3

[Interview with V.L. Lapygin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee, by correspondent A. Golts; date and place not given: "To Strengthen Trust"]

[Text] A delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Defense and State Security Committee begins a visit to the United States 7 February. On the eve of the visit, committee Chairman V.L. Lapygin answered questions put by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent A. Golts.

[Golts] Vladimir Lavrentyevich, I wish first of all to ask you about the agenda of your visit.

[Lapygin] It is very full. Judge for yourself. Our delegation will have thorough talks with members of the U.S. Congress House Armed Services Committee. Meetings are planned with U.S. Defense Secretary R. Cheney and with leaders of the State Department.

So that the people's deputies working on the Defense and State Security Committee can get a better idea of what the U.S. Armed Forces are like, we will be afforded an opportunity to visit a number of military installations. It is proposed that they will include ICBM launch positions, an air base, and a naval base. We hope to visit the NORAD command center, the headquarters of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, and the space center at Cape Canaveral. The plan also includes arms-manufacturing enterprises.

[Golts] What do you see as the chief aims of this trip?

[Lapygin] I wish to point out first of all that ours is a reciprocal visit. A representative delegation of the U.S. Congress Armed Services Committee visited the USSR last August. I will not say that we at once reached a mutual understanding with our U.S. colleagues. There were heated debates and, as is natural, different approaches were manifested. But positions began to draw closer as a result of those debates. Purely human contact emerged. Now, I hope, we will go still further, developing this dialogue that is essential for both countries.

The trip also will be useful on a purely practical level. Of course, it is difficult to compare the activity of the U.S. Armed Services Committee, which has been honed over decades, and the work of our committee, which is only beginning to be developed. But I still think that we will

succeed in finding rational approaches in the work of our U.S. colleagues which are applicable to us too.

Of course, we are interested in seeing for ourselves what the U.S. Armed Forces are like, how their activities are organized and what kind of people serve in them, and, in the future, try to utilize everything useful in the USSR.

[Golts] The itinerary of the visit attests that the delegation will visit installations where no Soviet person has been before. To what, in your view, does the openness displayed by the U.S. side attest?

[Lapygin] I believe that this is a serious and, most importantly, a far-reaching decision. For we too showed the U.S. congressmen quite a lot. Last year they visited several of our military units, boarded the cruiser "Slava," and saw an installation designed for the destruction of chemical weapons. They, in turn, are also acting from positions of openness, reckoning on the further development of glasnost. It is only in this way, by taking one practical step after another, that it is possible to move toward each other on the path of strengthening trust.

[Golts] Vladimir Lavrentyevich, the problem of conversion now faces both countries. Will the upcoming visit provide the Soviet side with new experience on this level?

[Lapygin] It is necessary to take a realistic look at things. Possessing data on the U.S. military budget for the current fiscal year and the drafts for the next one, I do not believe the Americans have made much progress in the sphere of practical conversion. However, there is every reason to consider that the United States is very carefully working out conversion plans on the conceptual, theoretical level. And this will, of course, be an object of our very close interest.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize that the upcoming meetings are not just protocol measures. When our two countries' parliamentarians seek a common language, this strengthens trust between our peoples and enhances mutual security.

Delegates Depart for U.S. 7 Feb

LD0702103790 Moscow TASS in English 1011 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—A delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defence and State Security Issues led by its chairman Vladimir Lapygin left Moscow for Washington today at the invitation of the U.S. House Committee on Armed Services.

Aspin, Dickinson Greet Soviets

LD0802091790 Moscow TASS in English 0821 GMT
8 Feb 90

[Text] Washington February 8 TASS—By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Lunev:

A delegation from the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defence and State Security Issues arrived on Wednesday at the Andrews Air Force Base, near Washington D.C. The delegation is led by Vladimir Lapygin, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on Defence and State Security Issues and general designer and director of an automation and instrument-making production amalgamation.

The Soviet deputies were cordially welcomed at the Andrews Air Force Base by Les Aspin, chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services, William Dickinson, deputy chairman of the committee, other American legislators and representatives of local government bodies, the Washington public and diplomatic circles.

During their stay in Washington the Soviet delegation will visit the U.S. Congress, where they will attend sessions of the House Committee on Armed Services, and the U.S. Defence Department. They will meet representatives of the U.S. Administration, U.S. Congress and the American public.

The delegation will also tour the country, visiting the national nuclear laboratory in Los Alamos, New Mexico, the San Diego naval base, California, the headquarters of the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) at the Peterson Air Force Base, Colorado, and the headquarters of the Strategic Air Command of the U.S. Armed Forces at the Offut Air Force Base, Nebraska, as well as other U.S. military facilities.

Aspin told TASS that the Soviet deputies' visit to the United States is important for the development of contacts between the U.S. Congress and the USSR Supreme Soviet and for the establishment of greater mutual understanding between the two nations. The visit is the first of its kind in the history of Soviet-American relations. It became possible as a result of the overall improvement in these relations.

Northeast Asia

Seoul Diplomat Interviewed on Moscow Posting

PM0702192590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[A. Shalnev dispatch: "Seoul Diplomats Prepare for Trip to Moscow"]

[Text] Seoul—Hidden away in a quiet street which has miraculously survived in the very heart of Seoul—which bristles with noisy construction sites—is a building which does not seem very attractive and is not particularly interesting to tourists.

But it is a historic building. Many years ago it was the home of the Russian mission (in 1896, incidentally, King Kojong and his son, the crown prince, found refuge there from Japanese intrigue). The mission was closed early in the century, soon after Russia lost the war with Japan, which then annexed Korea. But the Russian—and, after

a certain interval, the Soviet (from 1925)—Consulate General continued its activity in that same building until 1946.

People are now starting to discuss this house on the quiet Seoul street more and more often. And these people are not tourists, but diplomats and politicians. They are talking, first, so as to vividly remember how many decades ago diplomatic relations between Russian and Korea were suspended, and, second, so as to draw attention to an undoubtedly important event—the forthcoming exchange of diplomatic missions between South Korea and the Soviet Union.

Let me make one thing clear straightaway: As has already been reported, it is not a question of establishing diplomatic relations between Seoul and Moscow, it is not even a question of organizing full consular relations. It is merely a question of giving consular functions to the two countries' trade missions which opened earlier in Moscow and Seoul. A corresponding agreement was reached and signed last December.

But in essence, if not in form, these will be diplomatic missions headed by ranking and responsible staffers from the two countries' foreign ministries. The head of the South Korean Consular Department will be Kong No-myong, until recently consul general in New York. I spoke with him Friday at the Foreign Ministry in Seoul.

[Shalnev] When are you expected in Moscow?

[Kong] Our advance party, which is specifically involved with all kinds of technical matters associated with the opening of the department, went there literally the other day. I'm waiting for their report.

[Shalnev] Have you already been officially appointed?

[Kong] Not yet. That will happen this month, I think, and, following that, I will try to go to Moscow as soon as possible.

[Shalnev] Why is it you who is being appointed to this post?

[Kong] That's probably a question for my minister and my president. But I think that one reason is the great importance which my government attaches to the development of relations with the Soviet Union. I am a career diplomat of 32 years' standing. I have served in Washington, Brasilia, and New York, and have been assistant foreign minister for political questions.

[Shalnev] And what's it like to be the first official South Korean representative of such high rank to work permanently in Moscow?

[Kong] I'm very proud about it and consider the forthcoming appointment to be a great honor for me. Relations with the Soviet Union are very important for us, particularly in the context of our relations with North Korea. After all, the USSR is the North's biggest ally. I

am going to Moscow in a period of change. It is unusually interesting to be working there at this time. I would like to recall that Russia and Korea had very intensive relations in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Now we would like to resume those relations and I very much hope that full diplomatic relations will be established as soon as possible. [Kong ends]

Kong No-myong, as a diplomat, refrained from specifically forecasting when this might happen, but according to the monthly *BUSINESS KOREA*, it will happen within the next four years. "It will take a year or two," the magazine stated in its January issue, "to organize full-scale consular relations. And another year or two to raise them to a higher level."

[Shalnev] I once read somewhere that you will not be allowed to raise your flag over the building where your department will be located in Moscow and that there will other restrictions applying equally to our consular workers in Seoul. Is that so?

[Kong] Not quite. There won't be any national flags, but there will be a nameplate at the entrance and all our staffers will enjoy the same privileges and rights stipulated by the Vienna Convention, with one exception: We will not be entitled to use radio communications, but we can use a telex. That is a mutual restriction.

[Shalnev] And what will your functions be?

[Kong] Dealing with passport and visa issues, protecting our citizens' interests, and so forth. We have agreed with the Soviet side that the consular departments will arrange their activities in such a way as to promote the development of trade, economic, scientific, cultural, and other links between our countries. The scale of possible cooperation in these spheres is colossal, we can substantially complement each other's economies.

[Shalnev] Tell me, how do you see political relations between our countries?

[Kong] The progress has been swift. I hope that this will lead to full diplomatic relations which, in turn, will lead to progress on economic ties.

[Shalnev] Will you travel around the USSR—for instance, to places where there are large Korean communities?

[Kong] Yes. But not often. But my first concern at the moment will be to arrange businesslike and working relations in Moscow. [Kong ends]

I would like to supplement what Ambassador Kong No-myong—that is his diplomatic title—said with a few figures quoted to me in a discussion by Li San Chul [name as transliterated], director of the South Korean Foreign Ministry's First East European Department: In 1986 just 153 people traveled between South Korea and the Soviet Union. But last year, according to calculations at the end of October, the figure was 3,314.

Ambassador Kong No-myong and his three colleagues will have a lot of work to do.

ROK Lawmaker Discusses Korean Question

SK0702120490 Moscow International Service
in Korean 1100 GMT 4 Feb 90

[From the "Focus on Asia" program]

[Text] Soviet magazine *ISTORIYA SSSR*, (?in its January edition), carried an article by ROK National Assemblyman (?Yi Haeng-ku). In the article, the author pondered mutual relations with neighboring nations and the question of the Korean peninsula.

In the article, the author said: In my opinion, (?relations) between the ROK and the Soviet Union will (?improve) in 1992. This is because I think Moscow's perestroika and glasnost policy will have become (?fruitful) by that time and Moscow will become able to decide (?what to do) with Pyongyang so that the friendly relations between our two countries may start to develop in a natural manner.

Frankly speaking, I think that the prevailing international situation calls for the normalization of ROK-Soviet relations. This is because the perestroika and glasnost policy pursued by Mikhail Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is political and [words indistinct] and because the Soviet Union is said to (?unfailing acknowledge) the existence of such a neighbor as the ROK.

Moreover, the ROK is a sovereign state with its own territory and economic system and with its own legislative, administrative and judicial branches [words indistinct]. At the same time, the ROK is an objective reality, regardless of what the Soviet Union feels about the (?existence) of the ROK and about its policy.

Mr. (?Yi Haeng-ku) expressed his hope for the establishment of friendly ROK-Soviet relations. He was also sure that the United States and Japan as well would recognize North Korea before long and establish favorable relations with it.

This is because, he reasoned, at a time when the era of peaceful coexistence is opening in Northeast Asia, the Soviet Union and the PRC must recognize the ROK. On the one hand, relations between these countries must be normalized, and on the other, the United States and Japan must recognize North Korea. Then a mutual nonaggression treaty will be concluded between the North and South.

I would like to speak about the question of UN membership. As is known, neither South Korea nor North Korea is a UN member nation. This is because of the North Korea's dogged stand that the division of the Korean peninsula will be perpetuated, in case either of the two enters the United Nations. Such a view on the part of North Korea is supported by some socialist countries and developing nations.

I would like to conclude by saying that (?no objective conditions should obstruct the UN entry by either of the two sovereign states), under the prevailing international situation in which the (?cold war is being brought to an end, the confrontation between the two superpowers is being alleviated, and the state of confrontation between two Koreas is diminishing).

Adulation of DPRK Leader's 'Heir'

PM0702090990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS correspondent Aleksandr Zhebin dispatch:
"KCNA on Slogans on Trees"]

[Text] Pyongyang, 5 Feb—"Bright Star," "Great Man," and "Genius": That was what the people started calling Kim Chong-il—son of current DPRK leader Kim Il-song, whom the latter has officially declared his heir—immediately after his birth in 1942, so KCNA has reported. The 48th birthday of "dear leader Comrade Kim Chong-il," member of the WPK [Workers Party of Korea] Central Committee Politburo Presidium and a secretary of the WPK Central Committee, will be celebrated in the republic as one of the "greatest national holidays."

KCNA reports that slogans carved on old trees are currently being discovered. They relate to the period of the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle, which ended in 1945 with Korea's liberation from Japanese colonial domination. More than 200 inscriptions devoted to Kim Chong-il have so far been found. The agency notes that these include many describing his birth as a "historic event" and proudly assessing the "appearance of a great guiding star" as a "great happiness for Korea" and a "national festival."

Moreover, "numerous slogans" have been discovered reflecting the "Korean people's desire from generation to generation to treat dear Comrade Kim Chong-il—who from childhood, blessed with exceptional gifts and overcoming the severe trials of the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle, fostered a far-reaching plan to continue the revolutionary cause—with deep respect."

"A bright star has risen under whose great name Korea will be glorified," "Korea's future is bright under the bright star of Paektu," "We will always revere the bright star of Paektu—1942," and other slogans talk of the people's resolve to follow Comrade Kim Chong-il as a "beacon of hope and travel tens of thousands of li [unit of distance] along the path of the bloody struggle." These slogans show that "our people's deep respect for and confidence in dear Comrade Kim Chong-il has developed from roots in the past."

Southeast Asia & Pacific

U.S. Cutback of Military Aid to Philippines

Aleksandrov Commentary

HK0802040390 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines
1300 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Commentary by Anatoliy Aleksandrov]

[Text] The Philippine Government has condemned the decision of the United States Congress to reduce by \$96 million its payment for the use of its military bases in the country. This decision has placed the Aquino government in a difficult position. Not only does this mean the loss of some \$100 million which is badly needed by Manila to help pay its foreign debt, but it shows Washington going back on its word, and violating the terms of the Memorandum of Agreement signed in 1988 by former U.S. Secretary of State George Shultz and Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus. The Americans point to their country's financial problems as the reason for the cutback, but Manila cannot accept this.

Recently President Aquino told newsmen that the Philippines might consider an early end to the agreement which allows the military bases to remain. All the Philippine Government needs to do is advise Washington in September that the agreement is at an end.

The financial issue was the topic of discussion during the recent visit [as heard] to Manila by Richard Cheney, U.S. secretary of defense. His visit served to lay the basis for the talks between Manila and Washington, which are scheduled in March and April. Hence, it is only natural for Manila to uphold its interests, particularly in the face of Washington's turnabout on the matter of granting the Philippines an allocation of up to \$40 million, under the terms of the mini-Marshall Plan. The reason given by the Americans for the change in plans is their disappointment over the Aquino government's inability to end rampant graft and corruption in the government. However Filipinos cannot understand such a reason, especially since they think the United States is in no position to dictate on how they could prevent another coup d'etat in the country.

In this connection, the Philippine Lower House recently aired its objections to meddling by the Americans in the country's internal affairs. Such objections come from a large segment of politicians as well as from groups opposing the retention of the military bases.

All this is being seen in the context of moves made by the Soviet Union to reduce its forces in Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, as well as the removal of over 50 Soviet warships and submarines from the Pacific Ocean.

Therefore it is not unusual for a review to be made on the matter of the peaceful uses of Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base by a commission created by President Aquino. The committee is due to submit its review in

September. The question is: Will its recommendation be followed? In the light of the present situation, many Filipinos are in favor of converting the military bases into civilian facilities.

U.S. Accused of Delaying World Bank Loan

*HK0802040190 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines
1300 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Text] Philippine Finance Secretary Jesus Estanislao has criticized the United States for its refusal to grant Manila's request for a \$390 million loan. He said the United States has been setting conditions before granting the expected loan to the Philippines for its economic program. Estanislao said the United States is tying the loan to the issue of the retention of the American military bases in the Philippines.

TASS Interviews Thai Prime Minister

*LD0702144690 Moscow TASS in English 0809 GMT
7 Feb 90*

[Text] Bangkok February 7 TASS—Political climate on the earth, our small world, is getting warmer from one day to the next. The "cold war" has retreated to the past, and people have sighed with relief. Much credit for it goes to the great powers, primarily the Soviet Union. This is why the government and people of Thailand welcome most cordially the forthcoming visit to Thailand of Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, Thai Prime Minister Chatchai Chunhawan said in an interview with the TASS correspondent Boris Chekhonin.

He described the visit as historic and explained that it would be the first visit of this kind in the history of Soviet-Thai relations. Besides, it will sum up what has been accomplished, and the two countries have accomplished a great deal. The Thai prime minister described the present relations between the two countries as cordial and stressed the importance of the fact that they are getting closer.

Speaking about the Cambodian problem which is topical for Thailand, Chatchai Chunhawan welcomed the recent agreement reached by five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, which is aimed at its peaceful settlement, and pointed to the constructive stand of the USSR and its understanding of the situation in South-East Asia.

Pointing out that he himself supported new approaches to complicated problems, Chatchai Chunhawan told TASS about the efforts he had exerted for gathering all warring Khmer forces at a negotiating table. He expressed hope that they all would take part in the Jakarta meeting and that peace would soon be restored in Cambodia.

The Thai prime minister believes that the main way to stopping the conflict as soon as possible is the reduction

to the minimum of military assistance rendered by great powers to the warring parties. Without it the conflict will not die out.

He told TASS about his recent meetings with Vietnamese, Cambodian and Lao politicians. All of them are no longer speaking about war. Ways of economic development and the struggle against poverty are the main topic of all conversations. Thailand can do much in this respect. It has an advantageous geographical situation, in the center of South-East Asia. It is a major exporter, characterized by political stability. For these reasons Thailand can become a foundation of a trade bridge connecting the ASEAN countries, Indochina and Burma.

According to Chatchai Chunhawan, the Thai Government's policy is aimed at turning the zone of war into a zone of peace. In this connection it is pinning much hope on the visit of the head of the Soviet Government, which can open up new prospects of economic cooperation and enhance mutual understanding of nations.

In his opinion, the visit of the Soviet prime minister is inseparable from perestroika processes in the USSR. He said that he personally was impressed by President Gorbachev's ideas. He said that this policy could be described with every reason as far-sighted. It has managed to become a new political factor, a force in the modern world. Taking advantage of the opportunity, the Thai prime minister wished success to Soviet people on this difficult path which opens up new horizons, specifically, in the sphere of East-West cooperation.

Pointing out that the Malta summit opened up new opportunities of which one should take advantage, the Thai prime minister expressed hope that his talks with the honored Soviet guest would make it modest, but still appreciable contribution to the creation of a climate of trust, equitable trade and versatile cooperation in the world.

Lao Party, Government Plans Outlined

*PM0702170390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Feb 90 Second Edition p 7*

[Own correspondent P. Tsvetov dispatch: "Toward People's Democracy. At the LPRP Central Committee Plenum"]

[Text] Vientiane, 6 Feb—Mass media in Laos have carried a report on the Ninth Lao People's Revolutionary Party [LPRP] Central Committee Plenum, which was held in Vientiane at the end of January. Its agenda included a summing up of last year's results and discussion of 1990 plans.

The documents of the plenum and of the Lao People's Democratic Republic Council of Ministers sitting held after it testify that the republic scored good results last year. The food crop harvests were larger than in previous years. There was a substantial increase in the gross social

product. The market was galvanized and the sphere of distribution and circulation is better satisfied—a highly important development for a country which has set itself the task of ending the domination of the physical economy and switching to a commodity economy. It was noted that the new economic management mechanism is yielding positive results.

Problems were also discussed at the plenum. Lao industry marked time last year, just as it has in the past, with consumer goods production remaining at a low level. Living conditions for the inhabitants of mountain regions, state employees, and the military remained hard.

Both the plenum and the Council of Ministers sitting discussed in detail ways to overcome the difficulties and bottlenecks. It was deemed necessary to render the party line of renewal more specific, to translate it into the language of special programs and measures, to step up the monitoring of decision fulfillment, and to enhance the responsibility of leaders at all levels. The LPRP Central Committee plenum laid down that the main feature of the party's and the country's life in 1990 should be the gradual development of people's democracy and preparations for the Fifth Party Congress.

Vietnam Seeks Democratization in One-Party System

PM0502153990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 3 Feb 90 p 3

[Interview with Tran Xuan Bach, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Communist Party of Vietnam Central Committee by correspondent A. Romashko: "Real Socialism Is Still Ahead"]

[Excerpt] Hanoi—[passage omitted] [Romashko] I may be wrong, but it seems to me that economic reform in Vietnam is proceeding more successfully than renewal in the political sphere.

[Tran Xuan Bach] That is your view. I shall express mine. Economic reform and democratization seem to me to be the two wheels of the same bicycle. Both must turn, otherwise you stand still. The experience of other socialist countries shows that a lag in one sphere sooner or later leads to crisis situations. That prospect does not appeal to us, of course, and we are trying to ensure that changes in the economy and politics supplement each other harmoniously.

[Romashko] Can it be said that Vietnam has chosen its own model of socialism?

[Tran Xuan Bach] We say this: We have abandoned the dogmatic understanding of socialism as something rigid and uniform. Since one country is different from another, why should the socialism in those countries be identical?

[Romashko] In the history of the Communist Party of Vietnam [CPV] there has surely never been a time when

its theory and practice were viewed from such a critical standpoint as now. But what is the arrangement of forces within the party now?

[Tran Xuan Bach] I can tell you that one-third of CPV members actively support renewal. They are our vanguard. Around 10 percent do not want any changes. These are people who cannot and often do not want to imagine themselves outside the administrative-command system.

The remaining communists, over half of our members, sincerely approve the new course of sociopolitical and economic reforms. But for various reasons they are failing to restructure themselves. The burden of the past and the obsolete stereotypes born of dogmatism have taken deep root. This must be taken into account if we want the support of the party majority, which is a buttress on our path toward renewal. As you can see, healthy, progressive forces and tendencies predominate in the CPV on the whole.

[Romashko] Does Vietnam need a multiparty system?

[Tran Xuan Bach] Not necessarily. We see a real opportunity for the democratization of society in the one-party system, too. A system of people's power must be formed in the country, based on democratic elections and able to influence the activity of the party and state leadership.

[Romashko] There is much debate now about the party's place and role in society. What are your thoughts on that?

[Tran Xuan Bach] Ideally I would compare the party to the conductor of a symphony orchestra. It is not an administrator but an intellectual leader. Its leading role is accepted by all the musicians not just because it stands on the podium and wields the baton. The conductor is the person who by his abilities can unite people, carry them along with him, and at the same time not stifle people's individuality.

[Romashko] Vietnam has entered the final decade of the 20th century. What awaits it?

[Tran Xuan Bach] A difficult and very crucial period of giving birth to real socialism. When the child is born we shall need good midwives in the form of a strong economy and true democracy. In beginning renewal we have taken only the first step toward that future.

Near East & South Asia

Najibullah Views Shevardnadze-Baker Moscow Talks

TA0702200290 Moscow in Dari to Afghanistan
1500 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Report on interview with Afghan President Najibullah by Aleksandr Shkirando in Kabul; date not given]

[Text] Dear listeners: Great interest is being shown in Afghanistan over the meeting between Soviet Foreign

Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker, during which the Afghan problem is to be discussed. In his interview with Aleksandr Shkirando, our Kabul-based correspondent, Afghan President Najibullah said:

We, of course, favor the Shevardnadze-Baker meeting, especially if the meeting paves the way for a quicker settlement of the Afghan problem. We believe that the plan for a peaceful society proposed recently by the Afghan leadership can be considered as a basis or a mechanism for such a settlement.

The president of Afghanistan said: We hope that the issue of negative symmetry, which in practice should mean not only a halt of arms deliveries by the United States and the Soviet Union but also by all other countries until a cease-fire and cessation of military operations can actually and clearly take effect, will also be discussed during the meeting.

Najibullah said: Since a large quantity of weapons has been stockpiled on Afghan territory, we have proposed that the process of the country's demilitarization be launched under UN supervision. In short, we support Afghanistan's demilitarization provided there is international support for it.

The president added: At present talks are under way with representatives of the government's opponents at all levels, including with local commanders both inside and outside the country. Altogether some 45,000 people from the opposition have taken part in the talks. As a result, following the withdrawal of Soviet forces, about 40,000 armed opponents have switched to the government's side. This means that two-thirds of the commanders have in effect given up military operations.

In conclusion, Afghan President Najibullah said: A positive trend can clearly be observed, but the establishment of a stable peace also depends on many other international factors. It is for this very reason that the Afghan people are pinning high hopes on the meeting between Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and U.S. Secretary of State James Baker.

Hawtimeh on Soviet Jews Emigrating to Israel

*LD0402234790 Moscow International Service in Arabic
1600 GMT 4 Feb 90*

[Interview with Nayif Hawatimeh, secretary general of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, by Moscow Radio Damascus correspondent Igor Rastov, in Damascus; date of interview not specified—recorded]

[Excerpts] Comments are being made in several countries in the world, including Arab countries, on the issue of Soviet Jews emigrating to Israel. There are differing viewpoints on this matter. Here is a recording of an interview with Nayif Hawatimah, secretary general of the

Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, by our correspondent, on matters which cause concern to a large number of people.

[Begin recording] [Rastov] Several Arab countries have recently voiced their dissatisfaction with the escalating emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel. What is your viewpoint on this pressing topic?

[Hawatimeh] This information and these voices are right. The Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union creates new difficulties for us. We live in unnatural conditions; Israel occupies the Palestinian West Bank, Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip, and insists on continuing this occupation toward a Greater Israel. Shamir aspires to transfer this emigration to the Palestinian regions which were occupied in 1967 for the sake of the Israeli-Zionist expansion in the Palestinian territories. It is from here that the sufferings of the Palestinian people and other Arab peoples derive.

[Rastov] The ideas which you put forward are completely convincing. However, we must not forget that at one time thousands of Jews emigrated from the Arab countries to Israel and this emigration did not cause an uproar like now. Is this not right?

[Hawatimeh] The uproar at that time was not huge because of reasons which are completely different, and the emigration also had completely different reasons. At that time a group of Arab countries were ruled by a series of feudal reactionary regimes linked to international colonialism, and with the joint planning between these reactionary regimes, colonialism, and the Zionist movement, the emigration of Arab Jews to Israel was organized. The Arab masses did not forget this and punished all these regimes for their criminal acts against the Palestinian people. Many Arab regimes fell under the pressure of the Arab masses because of their wrong policy toward the Palestinian question, which was established through conspiracies with colonialism and the Zionist movement. [passage omitted]

[Rastov] I completely agree with your viewpoint. However, some people in the Arab countries believe that the way must be barred for the travel of Soviet Jews to Israel. This measure is, however, in complete contradiction with the democratic principles which guide the Soviet state and is also in contradiction with international legitimacy. Remember the resolutions of the Geneva conference on human rights. The consequences of this would mean using the same methods which are used by Israel against Palestinian citizens in the occupied territories. These measures are wrong, are they not?

[Hawatimeh] We are for the implementation of the Helsinki Agreements, the Geneva Convention, and all conventions on human rights, on condition that this takes place in accordance with the principle of democratic and free choice. Thus we are not saying a categorical no to emigration from this country or that, or from

the Soviet Union to other countries of the world. However, what we are saying is: Let these agreements be implemented in a way which provides a democratic free choice for all emigrants.

When the Soviet Jews go to Vienna, as was previously the case, all the conventions on human rights of Helsinki and Geneva are implemented for them and they choose where to go in a free and democratic way. However, when they are transported by aircraft or ships directly from the Soviet Union to Israel, this is not a free and democratic choice. They are put on a single obligatory route and they have to take that route and not another.

There is a large flaw here in the implementation of human rights, because it is in contradiction with the free and democratic choice. Where does this emigrant go? Let us give him the opportunity of numerous choices and not force him to go through one single obligatory emigration route. From here derives the big flaw in the emigration of Soviet Jews. Correcting the operation would mean implementing all these conventions so that they would go to a third country, and in the latter they would choose in a free and democratic way where to go. Then the human rights would be implemented meticulously and in complete trust. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Crossings at USSR-Iran Border

LD0202185490 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1604 GMT 2 Feb 90

[Excerpts] Baku, 2 Feb (TASS)—TASS special correspondents Pavel Sinyakov and Vladimir Fomin report: [passage omitted]

It was very difficult for the border guards in those January days, for it was impossible to count on anyone's support: the party and soviet bodies of Astara were not functioning, they simply were not there. Today people are returning home: by 1 February, 1,638 people had returned from Iran to the USSR, and 2,600 had returned from the USSR to Iran. Over the period from the beginning of events to the end of January, 417 people who had violated the border were detained, of whom two were going to Iran. You would not get such a "catch," as the border guards told us, in 10 years; and this was just over not quite two weeks.

When we were getting ready to leave, the border point reopened after the lunch break and Iranians were once again let out to return home.

Goals of Iranian Cultural Organization Questioned

NC0302114090 Moscow Radio Peace and Progress
in Persian to Iran 1530 GMT 30 Jan 90

[Sergey Salgirov commentary]

[Excerpts] A new cultural organization has been established in Iran to cater to the cultural needs of (?Azerbaijani) Muslims. This was announced by Ayatollah Ahmad Jannati, head of the Islamic Propagation Organization.

The issue of the propagation and protection of culture, particularly Islamic culture, has a long and difficult road ahead in Iran itself. Many cultural artifacts have been left (?unattended to) or were damaged in the recent war. [passage omitted]

Cultural problems do exist in the Muslim-inhabited areas of the Soviet Union, but it is far-fetched to imagine that Soviet Muslims would (?enlist) the help of Iranian fundamentalists in resolving them. Both countries, however, benefit from cultural exchanges held on the basis of equal rights and goodneighborliness and from contacts between cultural and religious personalities and tourists. The advantages accruing from such exchanges are certainly (?fruitful) for the Soviet and Iranian people, including Muslims.

It is clear that the cultural organization which has been set up in Iran has other objectives. Fundamentalists [words indistinct] and to (?seek) ways and means of intervening in these Soviet regions, which have long been considered a center of the lofty civilization of Islam. They hope to intervene in particular in Soviet Azerbaijan, where the situation is unstable as a result of the escalation of nationalist and separatist activities.

Soviet and Iranian border officials recently halted border crossings over the Aras River. The fundamentalists are using this to fan anti-Sovietism among Azerbaijanis and to carry out other provocative acts. It appears that the aim of setting up such a cultural organization for [words indistinct] of Soviet Muslims is to pave the way for continued and permanent anti-Soviet activity and provocations. [passage omitted]

Sub-Saharan Africa

Commentary Discusses Relations With Lesotho

MB0602230490 Moscow in Zulu to Southern Africa
1930 GMT 1 Feb 90

[Mikhail Tsirilov commentary—read by announcer]

[Text] Ten years ago on 1 February, diplomatic relations were initiated between Lesotho and the USSR. In February 1980, PRAVDA published the following announcement: The Governments of the USSR and Lesotho have undertaken to foster ties of friendship and cooperation between the two countries; pledged to uphold the principles of equality, mutual respect, and noninterference in each others' internal affairs; and to acknowledge and respect the independence and sovereignty of each other's countries.

As from 1 February 1980 the two countries had agreed to establish diplomatic relations and to exchange diplomats. The two countries would cooperate in the political and educational fields. Other areas of cooperation would be considered in the future.

Sometimes such a statement is taken amiss. The year 1980 was the first in a decade of notable political changes. It was a year of changes for the Brezhnev government, a particularly cold year and one when Soviet troops occupied Afghanistan, a year when Washington organized a boycott of the Olympic games in Moscow, a year of economic and trade sanctions against the Soviet Union. The international situation was grim, and southern Africa was no exception. The civil wars in Angola and Mozambique were blazing, and it was the year that Zimbabwe's independence was announced.

It is obvious, in the wake of such world events, that when the Soviet Union and Lesotho decided to exchange diplomats, South Africa took this step as Moscow's attempt to get close enough to interfere in the Pretoria Government's affairs.

The Soviet Embassy in Lesotho was seen as a base for terrorist activity against South Africa. It was again the old story of the so-called long hand of communist expansionism constantly being guarded against. It took many years to disprove this unwarranted assertion. By opening an embassy in Lesotho, the Soviet Union was not planning to create a pool of, or a haven for criminals, spies, and terrorists bent on infiltrating South Africa.

Relations between the Soviet Union and Lesotho have thrived, based on international rules and regulations governing relations between states. Agreements have been signed on economic and technical cooperation. Many Basotho students have received their education in the Soviet Union, with their studies being based on the developmental needs of their country. Even today the same agreements in the economic, social, cultural, and technical fields still exist between the two nations.

Obviously, Lesotho and the Soviet Union cannot ignore the effect South Africa has on Lesotho's way of life due to geographic considerations. Lesotho's international friends are concerned about any form of interference by South Africa in Lesotho's internal affairs, especially in instances of armed South African incursions against Lesotho. The Soviet Union has time and again protested against such interference in Lesotho's internal affairs, stating its solidarity with the people of Lesotho.

Today the state of affairs in the southern African region is gradually improving, even though admittedly the solution to all its problems is yet far off. Wisdom dictates that reform should take place in South Africa to avert disaster. The eradication of apartheid in South Africa would mean a better life, even for the people of Lesotho, who would then be able to breathe freely. The relations between Lesotho and the Soviet Union would obviously be given a fresh impetus in the pursuit of development.

Commentary on Resolving Apartheid Problems

*MB0702230490 Moscow in Zulu to Southern Africa
1930 GMT 1 Feb 90*

[Commentary by (Sergey Diedrin), Supreme Soviet International Affairs Committee representative, in Russian fading into Zulu translation—read by announcer]

[Text] Things have changed somewhat in South Africa. Today President de Klerk and his ministers say that apartheid must go. A similar view was expressed in a U.S. newspaper, the (DAILY INQUIRER), by (De Lange), the leader of the Broederbond [Afrikaner Brotherhood], a powerful underground Afrikaner movement. In other words, it is obvious to all the leaders in the South African Government that apartheid rule has become obsolete.

Measures have already been taken to ease apartheid within the country. Discriminatory practices against blacks in the job market have been eased. A group of ANC [African National Congress] political prisoners has been released, and a ban on protest marches and meetings has been lifted. In many parts of South Africa, public amenities are open to all races, and many apartheid signs have been removed.

However, the reform process is still slow. The state of emergency is still in effect, and although Frederik de Klerk says ANC leader Nelson Mandela will be released soon, he stops short of naming the date. As is well known, Nelson Mandela has for his part stated the conditions under which he will accept his release. So far the government has not come up with an appropriate answer.

The government has not fulfilled the conditions required to facilitate the opening of talks with the ANC, even though the government is aware that without such talks, the problems facing the country can never be resolved. Instead, President de Klerk has set his own conditions before talks can be held. He says the ANC should renounce the armed struggle.

At a meeting in Lusaka, the ANC leadership said they were in favor of a political settlement in South Africa. But the ANC, as in the past, is banned in South Africa, and it is obvious that the armed struggle remains an option. However, that is not the point just now. The government's stand differs from that of the ANC. The government has political power and its police force. What is so difficult about setting a date for talks with the ANC and the lifting of the state of emergency? If that were to be the case, the ANC would lay down its arms and South Africa would be on its way to solving its problems.

There are several other measures the government has to take to facilitate talks with the ANC. The government has yet to decide on the issue of Mandela's release. Releasing him would definitely accelerate the pace of reform in the country, for he is a man of influence with

all of South Africa's population groups. When he will actually be released is a point of conjecture.

It is obvious that the government is, even at this late stage, still seeking ways of putting spokes in the anti-apartheid struggle, but it is doubtful if it will succeed. The situation in South Africa is critical and is affecting stability in the region. The South African Government will very soon have to take measures needed to solve the country's problems.

Comparison—Commentary on ANC Leadership

MB2501152890

Moscow in English to Southern Africa at 1900 GMT on 22 January rebroadcasts the item headlined "Commentary Discusses ANC Leadership Issue," published in the 23 January Soviet Union DAILY REPORT, page 3. The rebroadcast has been compared with the initial broadcast, allowing for the following clarifications:

Column one, sixth full paragraph begins: [Text] Last week, Nelson Mandela was mentioned in the mass media more than anyone else. The impression is that the media are trying to make up for what they lost in the time when neither the famous prison inmate nor the African National Congress could be mentioned because of the threat of prosecution. But, it's not (?records that were) behind them that matter. Nearly all arguments boil down to the following: Now, as South African radio commentators argue, there are differences over Oliver Tambo's successor and the tactics of struggle Mr. Mandela could create a climate conducive to negotiation. Another commentary stresses that Mr. Mandela could persuade the ANC, which (?are seeking) to suit all, to calm down dialogue seekers and (?coalition) advocates. What conclusion... (clearing indistinct passage)

Seventh full paragraph, sentence two reads: ...reasons for rumors. It's being alleged, for one, that the... (clearing indistinct words)

Same paragraph, final sentence reads: ...National Congress] chairman.

REUTERS quotes well-informed antiracist... (clearing indistinct word)

Column two, paragraph five, sentence one reads: ...the armed struggle are possible only through... (clearing indistinct word)

East Europe

Press Reports on Soviet Troops in CSSR

AU3001084090

[Editorial Report] Prague ZEMEDEL'SKE NOVINY in Czech on 23 January on pages 1 and 2 and on 24 January on page 1 publishes in two installments a 1,300-word interview with two commanders of Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia. Prague LIDOVA

DEMOKRACIE and Prague ZEMEDEL'SKE NOVINY in Czech on 24 January both publish correspondents' reports on a demonstration by Vysoke Myto residents held on 23 January, demanding the withdrawal of Soviet troops from the city.

The ZEMEDEL'SKE NOVINY interview with the Soviet commanders was conducted by Frantisek Lauer in Milovice, the headquarters of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in Czechoslovakia, on 22 January. Lauer's interview partners are Major General Gennadiy Proposhev, first deputy chief of staff of the Central Group of Soviet Forces in the CSSR, and Colonel Yuriy Arskiy, the group's "political worker."

In the interview, Proposhev first "fully supports" the recent Soviet Government statement on the Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 and says that the situation should have been dealt with by political means. He assesses as "positive" the recently opened talks on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia, emphasizing that the Soviet side "is not opposed" to a withdrawal. Asked whether he believes that the withdrawal can be completed this year, as demanded by the Czechoslovak side, Proposhev says: "We realize that the aim of the talks is the withdrawal of our troops. We understand this. We will hand over to you, the Czechoslovak people, everything that we have acquired and built here. We will hand it over intact. We will leave as friends. Although the deadlines of the withdrawal have yet to be negotiated, it needs to be considered that, if the whole [central] group is to be withdrawn, it must happen in a humane way, taking account of the fact that entire families with children are here. My opinion is that everything should run its course in one and one-half or two years. This is necessary to head off unnecessary damage." Speaking about apartments occupied by Soviet soldiers, Proposhev reiterates that all of them will be handed over to the Czechoslovak side, including those "built from our own resources, which is the case of roughly one-half of our housing stock." In his concluding statement, Proposhev stresses that the Soviet troops stationed in Czechoslovakia never interfered in Czechoslovak affairs; in this context he also denies rumors about Soviet troops being in "heightened combat alert" in the period immediately after 17 November. He says: "We have never placed the troops on combat alert. I am saying this with full responsibility as a member of the supreme command."

Colonel Arskiy's statements concern the relationship between the Soviet troops and Czechoslovak citizens. He assures the Czechoslovak public that the Soviet troops will do everything "to leave a good impression." In this context he observes that "some of the information about us is not exactly friendly. The Soviet Army and our entire country are being attacked, often unobjectively. It seems that it suits someone fine when seeds of contention are sown.... I believe that in this situation one should not forget that it was the Soviet soldier who liberated Czechoslovakia in 1945 and that 145,000 of them died here."

Prague LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE in Czech on 24 January on page 5 carries a 1,000-word article by Jan Kastanek entitled "Protest Action by Vysoke Myto Citizens," dealing with a demonstration staged by residents of that East Bohemian city the preceding day against the presence of the Soviet garrison there. On the basis of a news conference with representatives of the local authorities which preceded the demonstration, Kastanek summarizes the local population's grievances about the Soviet troops. According to the LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE reporter, the locals complain about "the increasing number of traffic accidents, house burglaries, and other offenses caused by Soviet troops in the city." They also blame them for the housing shortage in the city because "besides three Army barracks, one hospital, and other property, Soviet troops occupy 262 city apartments, plus an additional 500 housing units that were built for their officers." Furthermore, the reporter writes, the Soviet troops are being accused of maintaining an unguarded fuel depot in a protected water zone, of having destroyed 400 hectares of forests, and of being responsible for the "catastrophic condition" of the Lucna river. In connection with the expected departure of the troops, the city is also said to be faced with "raids" on its shops, during which "Soviet soldiers and members of their families buy up, above all, articles which are in short supply."

Similar charges are raised also in a 400-word "La"-signed report on the Vysoke Myto demonstration, published in Prague ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY in Czech on 24 January on page 2. According to the ZEMEDELSKE NOVINY report, the "Soviet Army has willfully preempted more than 50 hectares of high-quality agricultural land," has erected a number of buildings without applying for a building permit, and is responsible for "large-scale poaching in rivers and forests." The reporter mentions that, although the exact number of Soviet soldiers stationed in Vysoke Myto is a "military secret," locals say that the "number of soldiers is at least as high as the number of Vysoke Myto residents"—that is, 12,000.

Talks on Pullout From CSSR Resume 7 Feb

LD0702145390 Moscow TASS in English 1411 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—The second round of Soviet-Czechoslovak talks on a Soviet troop withdrawal from Czechoslovakia opened in Moscow today.

The Soviet delegation is led by Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov, the Czechoslovak delegation—by Deputy Foreign Minister Evcen Vacek.

The talks are expected to set dates and a schedule for the withdrawal of Soviet troops as well as draft an appropriate bilateral agreement.

Protests Make Aboimov 'Wonder'

LD0702173290 Prague CTK in English 1454 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow Feb 7 (CTK correspondent)—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Ivan Aboimov expressed his "sincere wonder" today in connection with the demonstrations in Prague and other Czechoslovak towns for the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

Ivan Aboimov is the head of the Soviet delegation participating in the second round of negotiations on the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia.

He told CTK he is surprised at the form of expressing emotions at a time when these very important talks have been opened. When the Soviet Government expressed its agreement with the negotiations, it has in fact taken the decision to withdraw the troops, he added.

"The form of oppression is not the best attitude for the creation of a corresponding atmosphere during the negotiations... We are sincerely willing not to postpone the deadline of the withdrawal. At the same time we believe that the Czechoslovak side will accept with understanding the difficulties we are facing."

The key problem during the negotiations has been so far the question of the timetable for the withdrawal because deadlines suggested by the Czechoslovak side seem to be "excessively hard." The withdrawal requires the creation of corresponding infrastructure on the territory of the Soviet Union and moreover there are also technical problems, he said.

Not only an effort at finding mutually acceptable solutions but also the care for the future relations is evident on both sides, Aboimov stressed.

Organization of Czechoslovak Army Revamped

PM3001144790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 26 Jan 90 First Edition p 3

[Report by own correspondent Colonel P. Chernenko: "Czechoslovakia: What Will the Army Be Like?"]

[Text] Following the disbandment of the Political Directorate (now the Directorate of Education and Culture) and the replacement of political workers by officers in charge of education and culture who are being introduced into line battalions and individual companies, new changes are under way in the Czechoslovak People's Army. The CSSR Government decided the other day to reduce the period of compulsory service to 18 months, and to 9 months for graduates of higher educational institutions. The law also applies to servicemen on active military service at the present time. Moreover, it was reported that the Czechoslovak People's Army will be cut by 30,000 men in the first half of 1990.

The CSSR Federal Assembly will soon examine a new defense law under which Czechoslovak People's Army

servicemen will be able to serve close to home. Alternative community service is being introduced for those who do not wish to serve in the Army for religious or other reasons. It is planned to extend soldiers' leave to 30 days.

The draft defense law is currently being actively discussed by servicemen and students. As the newspaper *MLADA FRONTA* reported, a statewide conference of the parliament of the students' strike union has stated that the existence of "any form of military departments in higher educational institutions is unjustified, and students will not therefore attend military departments in the summer semester." Many rallies and demonstrations have demanded that the Czechoslovak People's Army be cut to its prewar level and that Czechoslovakia be militarily neutral.

On 19 January a union of cadre military personnel designed to defend military servicemen's rights and interests was set up. The union's inaugural meeting was addressed by Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel, who said: "It is necessary for our Army to become a really effective combat force capable, if need be, of fighting rather than letting others ruin our land on the pretext of defending it."

A change in the name of the Czechoslovak People's Army is also planned. At a session of the Federal Assembly the country's president proposed that the word "People's" be removed from the title.

Panel Suggests CP Expel Indra, Fojtik, Kempny

PM3001113590 Moscow *IZVESTIYA* in Russian
30 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Own correspondent L. Kornilov dispatch: "Executive Committee Recommendations"]

[Text] Prague—A session of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee Executive Committee was held in Prague Saturday. The party's position on the holding of free general elections was formulated.

A draft of the basic CPCZ territorial organization in the Czech Socialist Republic was ratified. It will be submitted for discussion by the Central Committee plenum scheduled for 17 February.

The executive committee also recommended to the plenum that A. Indra, J. Fojtik, and J. Kempny should be expelled from the party. This decision was made on the basis of the conclusions of the Central Committee Commission, at whose Friday session seven of the 32 former major CPCZ functionaries whose party membership was suspended by the extraordinary December congress were required to appear. Aside from the three aforementioned persons, G. Husak, L. Strougal, K. Hoffmann, and M. Hruskovic appeared before the commission.

CSSR Minister Dismisses Rumors of Coup d'Etat

PM3001110990 Moscow *KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA* in Russian 27 Jan 90 p 1

[Own correspondent Ye. Chernykh dispatch: "Lay Down Arms!"]

[Text] Prague—On Thursday evening, there was a "Civic Forum" report on Czechoslovak radio stating that unverified information was coming in from various sources indicating that a coup d'etat is being prepared for late January-early February. It will allegedly be staged by a number of staffers from the security service, the former people's militia, and the Communist Party apparatus. In the first few hours of the putsch, People's Army officers—85 percent of whom are members of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia—would have to prevent servicemen from opposing the insurgents.

Richard Sacher, CSSR minister of internal affairs, reported in an interview with *RUDE PRAVO*, the newspaper of Czechoslovak Communists, that he had been receiving similar warnings. But they have not yet been confirmed. He believes that it is a question of a provocation.

At the same time, by agreement with the Czech and Slovak internal affairs ministers, R. Sacher rescinded as of 2 February all permits for citizens to keep and carry combat firearms. This also applies to staffers in abolished state security departments.

"The last straw," the minister told a correspondent from the newspaper *MLADA FRONTA*, "was an incident at a morning session of the Federal Assembly when one of the deputies told me that an assault rifle can be had for 4,000 korunas (R400)."

The CSSR is actively involved in arms exports to Arab countries and other trouble spots around the world. According to Western sources, it is seventh in the world in this type of trade. Weapons have sometimes reached warring parties. In an interview with *THE NEW YORK TIMES*, CSSR Foreign Minister J. Dienstbier stated that, despite serious financial losses, the new government had decided to end these exports.

CSSR Communists Suffer Election Losses

LD3101073590 Moscow *TASS* in English 0708 GMT
31 Jan 90

[Text] Prague January 31 *TASS*—The Czechoslovak Communist Party lost about 40 per cent of its seats at the Federal Assembly.

As a result of Tuesday elections held on the basis of the recently-adopted law on the recall and election of new deputies to the bicameral Czechoslovak parliament, the Communist Party now has about 10 per cent of seats.

There are only eight communists among the 120 newly-elected deputies. Most of the new deputies are independents. There are also representatives of other parties.

Communists now have 138 out of the 350 seats in the Federal Assembly. Independents hold 152 seats. The rest belong to the Freedom Party, Democratic Party, Czechoslovak Social Democratic Party, Czechoslovak Democratic Initiative, Christian Democratic Party, the Greens Party and Hungarian Independent Initiative. Six seats are vacant.

The "reconstruction of parliament" was carried out by the election of deputies by parliament itself.

The forthcoming free elections are expected to advance the country along the road to democracy.

President Havel Cited on Relations With USSR

PM3101101190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent L. Kornilov dispatch: "Czechoslovakia: President Answers Questions"]

[Text] Prague—On 29 January, exactly one month after his election as CSSR president, V. Havel gave a press conference in Prague Castle. "I work very hard," the president said in particular. "For 18 hours a day. I try to do everything quickly, but I feel that so far I have not done enough. Maybe because I have never before been president, and maybe because it is hard to solve within a month problems that have been accumulating for decades."

"What will you discuss with Gorbachev during your forthcoming visit to Moscow," someone asked, "and what will be the relations between new independent Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union?"

"I have already been asked many times what I will say at the talks in Moscow, but I do not want Mr Gorbachev to find that out from the newspapers. About Czechoslovak-Soviet relations: They must be the same as with other countries—friendly, peaceful, and mutually advantageous in economic terms."

Someone among the Western journalists asked:

"Today, in conversation with the Palestinian ambassador, you conveyed an invitation to Y. 'Arafat to visit Czechoslovakia. How come, seeing that 'Arafat supported the intervention in 1968 and the Soviet Union's Brezhnevite policy in general?"

"I have talks," V. Havel replied, "not only with those who supported the introduction of troops in Czechoslovakia in 1968 but also with those who implemented that introduction—like General Jaruzelski, for example. We had very businesslike and frank talks. He himself raised this question and offered apologies. It is necessary to think of the future, not of the past."

"Yes, but you have Palestine on one side, Israel on the other.... Does this mean that you want to have diplomatic relations with both these states?"

"I do not see," was the ensuing answer, "why it should be impossible to have diplomatic relations with Israel and Palestine simultaneously."

"What would you say about the PRC Government's reaction to the Dalai Lama's expected arrival in Czechoslovakia?"

"I have already told the Chinese ambassador that this is in no way an attack on the PRC, with which we are striving to maintain friendly ties in the future. For a long time now, even before I became president, I have wanted to invite the Dalai Lama, and this will be a private visit by my personal guest. We will devote our time in conversation to Lamaism and will meditate together. I will be very annoyed if the PRC Government is not satisfied with this explanation, but the Dalai Lama will come!"

Question by a TASS correspondent: Does the president intend to meet with writers and representatives of the creative intelligentsia during his visit to the Soviet Union?

This is what V. Havel replied:

"I still do not know how much time I will have in Moscow. The main point will be, of course, the conversations with Gorbachev. But I would very much like to meet Yuriy Lyubimov, who is rehearsing one of my plays at the Taganka Theater, and, of course, other intellectuals."

"A month has already passed, and there are about five months of your presidency left. You already said that there is too much work. So what remains to be done?"

"My main objective is to lead the country to free elections in an atmosphere of calm and order, so as not to lose the high prestige we have gained during our peaceful revolution. There have been no free elections in this country for too long a time, and people are not sufficiently ready for them; a certain amount of education will be needed. I also want to restore the gravity and dignity of the president's office, which until recently was something like an appendage to the office of member of the Czechoslovak Communist Party Central Committee Presidium."

Newspaper Profiles CSSR's President Havel

90U10307A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 23 Jan 90 p 3

[Article by TASS correspondent V. Rzhnevskiy: "From Dissident to President"]

[Text] First mention of this ancient German family goes back to the year 1237. From Lemberg, in today's northern Bohemia, the Havels were mentioned in biographies over the course of many centuries. Last century the Havel family was listed among the noble aristocracy of the City of Prague. In 1912 the Havels built their own palace in Prague, which is today famous under the name

"Lucerne." It was reported in the Czech press that the father of the current president, Vaclav Havel Sr, was a member of the "Rotary Club" founded in 1905 by an American lawyer by the name of Harris. This was the international Masonic Lodge, which had its own club in Czechoslovakia beginning in 1925. Its members included prominent industrialists, commercial figures, and intellectuals. Until 1936 the club was headed by President Benes of Czechoslovakia. It was then headed by V. Havel Sr.

At the end of last year, V. Havel was elected president of Czechoslovakia.

Just a few months ago I do not know if you could have found an astrologer or fortune teller who would predict a house-warming celebration for him in the city of Prague—at the residence of the president of Czechoslovakia. The likelihood of such a prediction was ruled out by the mundane side of life, not predisposed to the influence of distant celestial bodies. These were stars of the earth, whose emanation permeated events in the country, and the light was refracted in the destiny of millions of people, including his own.

Vaclav Havel is a well-known writer and playwright, but not a single line of his works appeared in Czechoslovakia over the past 20 years. His plays were not presented in a single theater in the republic and he could not be seen on the television screen. The prohibitions were many, but one thing they did not include: Czechoslovak journalists were permitted to write about Havel as a "mercenary conspirator," a "dissident."

The swift ascent of the recent dissident to the highest state post in Czechoslovakia took place in literally a month's time. It still remains for historians to paint an objective picture of the "Prague autumn" whose wave swept Havel to the presidency, and his closest supporters to leadership positions in the new sociopolitical structure which is today shaping the face of modern Czechoslovakia. The November Revolution, as the events of the past autumn are sometimes referred to, was preceded by processes and events which ripened into an explosion of indignation and discontent with the pseudo-perestroika. Under slogans of democracy, glasnost, and social dialogue, the repressive, dictatorial mechanism of state rule was reinforced. Any kind of alternative thinking was severely suppressed. We recall the events of January last year in Vaclav Square, mindful in those days of a combat operations arena in which public security forces were pitted against the people, primarily against the youth. Under the sound of police sirens and gray clouds of tear gas, police truncheons "cleansed" people's consciousness, water cannons "washed out" the ideas of perestroika. When even these measures failed to work, they brought out armored personnel carriers and police dogs. "These demonstrators are not the people," the former leadership of the Czechoslovak Communist Party and the state asserted over and over again. That January Vaclav Havel too was arrested—again.

His trial was conducted in a disreputable kangaroo court, a fact which enhanced his authority among the overwhelming majority of the people. Just as definitive was the fall of confidence in the powers that be. I had occasion to see and hear how judicial arbitrariness was applied to Havel. A conspiracy between jurisprudence and power was hatched in the stuffy, crowded courtroom. The defendant understood this perfectly well, as did all who were present at the proceedings. So did the judge, who brought the case through to its previously determined sentence, without a jury. Observing that two foreign newsmen allowed to view the proceedings on an exception basis had opened up notebooks and turned on tape recorders, the judge prohibited recordings of any kind. Havel's sentence was handed down that same day. Immediately there began a wave of protest and solidarity with the convicted man. Havel was freed on 17 May, four months following his arrest. He himself characterized his release in the following manner: "It happened that people began to identify with 'Charter 77,' and with my name the ideas of free thought in society, which they had not been afforded any opportunity to openly formulate."

The insight came recently to society—just in 1989. Preceding it were long years of heavy confrontation between the out-of-favor playwright Havel, joined with the opposition, and the official authorities. His persecution began in 1975, for writing an open letter to the former president—whom 14 years later he would replace in this post, and for his participation in "Charter 77," which demanded observance of the law and human rights and called for a dialogue in society. The word "dialogue," now in fashion, was then equated with activities to undermine the foundations of the Republic. Prior to his second imprisonment, the authorities offered Havel the opportunity to travel to the United States. He replied: "I cannot take advantage of this opportunity. I stand together with my friends, convinced of my innocence. I do not wish to be an emigrant." Following release from prison, he again refused to go to a foreign land. "Look, aren't you bitter and blinded with hate?" his friends asked him. "You should go," they advised. "I am fortunate that I am unable to hate," Havel replied. "Hatred dulls vision and hampers the search for truth."

For almost five years he conducted this search for truth in places not very distant. And it was probably here the thought occurred to him which he would later state aloud: "My bourgeois origins are expressed in me through a social lack of receptivity to undeserved benefits, privileges, patrimonial services, any manifestation of degradation of human dignity. Every person should have equal chances in life."

For Havel himself, equal chances for living were taken away in socialist Czechoslovakia. The reason: social origins.

Postwar Czechoslovakia set out on a socialist path of development. Its model of construction was copied to a

great extent from the Stalinist model—and just as similar in those days were the fates of those who sprang from families who carried the bourgeois past. After several years of schooling, the future president went to work as a laboratory assistant and continued his studies through correspondence courses. He served in the Army, then came to the theater where he started out as a stage hand and ended up a playwright. Following the initial successes of his plays, presented in theaters up until 1968, a period began in which his works were forcibly consigned to oblivion.

During his years of excommunication from the theater and social life, the creative element in his destiny remained intact. He authored a number of works which received international recognition and awards. He transferred portions of his earned honoraria to a fund for assisting dissidents and to friends needing financial support. On 5 October 1989, all of Czechoslovakia tuned in illegally to the wave of Western radio broadcasts, waiting for news concerning the new Noble Peace Prize laureate. Among the candidates were two Czech dissidents—V. Havel and I. Hajek (former Czechoslovakia minister of foreign affairs in 1968). The Peace Prize was awarded to the Tibetan spiritual leader, the Dalai Lama. Havel calmly heard the news and went for a modest dinner at an inn, celebrating his birthday. On this day he turned 53.

Almost a month and a half remained until 17 November. Students at Prague's institutions of higher education were preparing to observe International Students' Day, established in memory of their predecessors, victims of the Hitler terror exactly 50 years before—on 17 November 1939. No one even dreamed that a severe suppression of the student demonstration on National Prospekt would flow into a new revolution. At the head of the spontaneous mass movement was V. Havel. And just over a month later he would be unanimously elected the new president of the Republic.

"When did you finally accept the proposal to be nominated as president?"

"Three hours before the 'Civil Forum' and 'Community Against Violence' proposed my candidacy during the rally in Vaclav Square. I decided this based on the consideration of always putting the interests of society ahead of personal interests."

In his numerous interviews prior to being elected president, Havel spoke tirelessly about his desire to avoid disturbances, violence, and intrigue during the course of transformation in the country. "Within the framework of my authority, I will strive to the maximum extent possible to see that no one in this country is persecuted. There must not be any 'hunting' of communists. We must celebrate justice, not revenge," Havel declared in an interview with the newspaper LIDOVA DEMOKRACIE. With respect to how he sees his role as president, he stated: "This is a temporary, working president, a guarantor of democracy and free elections." In an interview

with the Czechoslovak Telegraph Agency [name as published], Havel emphasized that "the task of the Communist Party is to swiftly be born again, to place the best people at its head—enemies of the old order and advocates of renewal."

At one of his press conferences Havel was asked: "What did you say to M.S. Gorbachev?" Without a moment's thought, he replied: "The Soviet Union need not fear the new Czechoslovakia, even if the word 'socialist' does not appear in its full name."

"M.S. Gorbachev has a favorite saying: 'More socialism!' What are your aims and aspirations?" the journalists asked. "A better life!"

Havel has adopted a pithy saying: "Truth and love will conquer lies and violence." Millions of people support him. His simple words have a magical effect; they are not clichés but, rather, they come from the heart. He prefers paper for his literary ideas. Few people here are as yet familiar with his works, but these are already being presented to readers and viewers. His "Letters to Olga" are being published—a collection of correspondence with his wife Olga—and also the book "Interrogation By Correspondence." His play "The Audience" is being presented in the Prague Theater. There is a curious story connected with the main character of this play, Ferdinand Vanek, pertaining to that same 5 October of last year. On the playwright's birthday, his friends had a congratulatory message published on the advertisement page of RUDE PRAVO in celebration of F. Vanek's name-day along with a photograph of Havel. The censors failed to detect the trickery.

Following his election as president, Havel has not had time for literary creativity. Ahead are the free elections which will focus on Czechoslovakia's present sociopolitical structure. New political parties will meet in the struggle for power. Several days ago the list covered 22 parties but, as actuality shows, there are no limits. Many people are interested in the political inclinations of the president. The view has presently been established that he is a liberal humanist. His attachment to the spiritual ideals of the church is also well known. There is talk (but not in the open) of ties the president has with political circles in the FRG, where Havel conducted his first visit in his new role. It has been revealed that he keeps his personal archives in the so-called documentation center of independent literature in Scheinwald-Schwarzenberg (FRG), 40 km from the Czechoslovak border. The archives are tended by Vilem Prechan, a relative of the former Olomouc Archbishop Prechan. During his recent visit to Prague, the famous international human rights advocate and potential heir to major real estate in Czechoslovakia, K. Schwarzenberg, stated that "Havel's literary works, their manuscripts, will be kept in the archives some time longer."

Many perplexed people ask why the president is not hurrying to transfer the archives to Prague. Could it be that external forces oppose this?

Perhaps there is a some truth in the acknowledgment Havel made at a press conference on 19 December in the Laterna-Magika Theater: "I doubt that in future any political power will propose my candidacy to the post of president for a five-year term." Indeed, the aspirations of political circles and parties to seize the initiative in the new processes going on in Czechoslovakia is too great. Time will tell, as they say. The first wishes of success and happiness in the new year were extended by Prague chimney sweeps—and their words, according to tradition, are always the most sought after and likely to be fulfilled.

Adamec Article Deplores 'Score-Settling'

PM3001103990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Jan 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "For National Accord"]

[Text] Prague, 28 Jan—Communists are now facing the task of honestly examining their history, realistically appraising their position in society, and playing an active part in transformations for the country's benefit. We embarked on the solution of this task after the extraordinary party congress, according to an article by L. Adamec, chairman of the Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ], published in RUDE PRAVO.

The party is the target of sharp criticism and serious accusations. Attacks against the party and its individual members were to be expected, L. Adamec notes. They are attributable to the serious mistakes and blunders committed in the past. It is, however, impossible to overlook cases of personal score-settling and discrimination against communists. It has been officially declared on several occasions over the last few weeks that the criteria for appraising people ought to be their moral qualities, professionalism, and ability to work well. There are such people in the CPCZ and we want them to remain in the party.

Bratislava Committee Protests 'Discrimination'

PM0102142590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 28 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Dynamics of Change": "Czechoslovakia"]

[Text] The Bratislava Slovak Communist Party City Committee has issued a statement in which it resolutely condemns discrimination against communists during the general cadre reshuffles in the republic.

In the interests of satisfying their own personal ambitions, the city committee points out, some citizens are setting themselves up as self-styled judges, at the same time using the attractive ideas of "Civic Forum" and of the "Public Against Violence." The reshuffles taking place are not leading to an increase in leading cadres' professionalism and the nomination of capable leaders, but mean only a desire to seize power. The Communist

Party has drawn conclusions from its own mistakes and from where the monopoly of power led us, the statement stresses.

'Persecution' of CSSR Communists Viewed

PM0702092590 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA
PRAVDA in Russian 6 Feb 90 p 3

[Own correspondent Ye. Chernykh: "With a Party Card Heading for Nowhere?"]

[Text] Prague—I took a stroll through Prague one evening. On the way I met an old man with a white poodle. The dog rushed at me, barking loudly. The man picked him up and tried to calm him down: "Hush, the gentleman is not a communist." A yapping poodle, ridiculous, except...

"Frequently the only, albeit sufficient cause for being cursed is the once-coveted red booklet. Its owners, mostly respectable people not compromised in any way, are being shunned by their circle of acquaintances and colleagues. Suddenly, people with inadequate professional know-how are taking over the leadership of enterprises, agricultural cooperatives, and workshops. Stains are appearing on the robe of the "velvet revolution," MLADA FRONTA wrote a few days ago.

The newspaper LIDOVE NOVINY was banned under the communists. Now, having emerged from underground, it has become an independent publication close to the president. On 27 January the newspaper wrote that during the first days of the revolution the slogan "Us, not them!" was frequently heard at the big demonstrations. But as time goes by, we are increasingly witnessing how some people have already forgotten their good intentions. In the country's recent history there were two waves in which seasoned specialists and professionals were forced either to emigrate or to take menial jobs at home: after February 1948 and after August 1968. Could this happen again? Incidentally, the article's headline read: "The Third Wave!"

During the first days of the "velvet revolution" I saw the inhabitants of Prague carrying national flags gather in their thousands for the big demonstrations. The order that prevailed was exemplary. Activists with armbands directed ambulances swiftly through the crowds. Not a single lime tree was damaged, not a single window was broken. Universal enthusiasm. Everyone rejoiced at the rebirth of the country, democracy, and freedom.

I kept asking myself then what would happen when the euphoria subsided. Whether the slogan "Havel: president; Jakes: dissident!" would not be extended to all communists? After all, there are 1.7 million of them. What would happen to them and their families?

"We are a peaceful people," I was told. "There will be no civil war, no squaring of accounts."

M. Kusy, a prominent figure of the "Prague Spring" and a subsequent dissident, moved into the office of

chairman of the Federal Press and Information Bureau virtually from his prison cell.

"Are you not going to mete out the same treatment to journalists of different political persuasions?" I asked the chairman.

"That is fundamentally impossible," he said. "Our movement in Slovakia calls itself 'Public Against Violence.' It is not important whether a person is a Communist or not. The main thing is that he is honest, professional, and knows how to work."

A. Dubcek, new chairman of the CSSR Federal Assembly and leader of the "Prague Spring," speaking on television, rejected wholesale criticism of Communists.

Both Dubcek and Kusy, who themselves suffered enough over the past 20 years, speak sincerely, I am convinced. They are not seeking revenge. But as always, other people have also been washed up on the wave of revolution.

The "Red Berets," a special-purpose section of the CSSR Ministry of the Interior, have sent an open letter to the president. It is true that, after the events of 17 November, the section has acquired a bad reputation. But it has now emerged that the servicemen and their families have come under attack, that their lives have been threatened. On 20 January three unknown persons attacked a member of the section and brutally beat him up. The victim had to be hospitalized.

About 30 journalists were sacked from the Slovak television offices. They were reinstated only after a strike had been staged. The Bratislava party city committee issued a statement denouncing discrimination against Communists. And it advised all those dismissed from their jobs and unable to find work because of their membership of the Communist Party to join clubs for those unjustly persecuted. I. Heri, headmaster of a school in Olomouc, has declared a hunger strike. I was told at a district party committee in Prostějov that, after cutbacks in the apparatus, the only job a district committee secretary with higher education was able to find was as a waiter in a roadside cafe. However, shortly afterward he was forced to leave even that job. He is now serving beer in a bar. Another former district committee secretary is working as a fitter.

Is history repeating itself? A. Dubcek also worked as a fitter after 1968. Erstwhile Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee Secretary C. Cisar worked as a watchman. M. Kusy worked as a laborer. Some 465,000 Communists were forced to leave the party after August 1968. Who sows the wind shall reap the whirlwind. In November the whirlwind swept away the power of one party. However, as a result of the current methods, new malcontents are bound to emerge. And who knows whether another whirlwind will not arise as a consequence, and whether leaders and fitters, watchmen, and stokers will not switch places again.

The "gentle revolution" took place without a shot being fired. The shots rang out later. We have already reported the attempted suicide of A. Kapek, the former member of the CPCZ Presidium. Colonel I. Becvar in Prague and Lieutenant J. Petrcek at Teplice also shot themselves. A few days ago in Brno V. Kosicka, a staffer of the CPCZ regional committee, made an end of himself with a hunting rifle.

P. Pithart, the "Civic Forum" coordination center spokesman, made a statement on Czechoslovak Television in connection with the multiplying cases of persecution of communists. "We have freed society from the rule of one party," he said, "but I am afraid that we might have to free people of the fear that we ourselves inspire. It is true that all Communists and nonparty people who are compromised must be removed from responsible posts. The same goes for all the dilettantes who held high posts thanks to party cards or the favor of those in power. But how can we avoid paralyzing the day-to-day work of enterprises, schools, hospitals, and local organs of power? Charlatan methods of resolving cadre problems will not just rebound on the 'Civic Forum,' they will rebound on society as a whole."

CPCZ Issues Statement on 1948 Events

PM0502115190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA
in Russian 4 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "CPCZ Central Committee Statement"]

[Text] The Czechoslovak Communist Party [CPCZ] Central Committee Executive Committee has issued a statement giving a new assessment of the February 1948 events which were formerly celebrated as a victory for the Czechoslovak working people over the forces of bourgeois reaction.

"On behalf of hundreds of thousands of honest communists," the document says, "the CPCZ has already denounced the undemocratic system of power of one party which as a result led to the monopolization of power by a narrow group of party and state bureaucrats and to the manipulation of people, the abuse of official positions, and corruption."

In searching for its new face the party will have to retreat from lifeless clichés and views. It will also be necessary for it to rethink its own history. It is in this connection that we want to stress that the February events in Czechoslovakia 42 years ago were an inseparable component of the complex postwar development in Europe, the CPCZ Central Committee Executive Committee points out. Under specific Czechoslovak conditions when the Communist Party was able to obtain 40 percent of the votes at free democratic elections, it tried to find its own national approach toward the socialist revolution whose thrust was to take political power and establish the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Despite the various ideological and international problems, the Czechoslovak February of 1948 passed without

an eruption of political struggle for power. The CPCZ's leadership at the time was able to win over the majority of workers, peasants, small businessmen, figures of culture and science, and other representatives of the intelligentsia and young people. We are convinced that all without exception were seeking social progress and wanted to build in Czechoslovakia socialism as a historically just and free society.

Moscow Reports on Dalai Lama's CSSR Visit

OW0702140590 Moscow International Service
in Mandarin 0100 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Report by station reporter (Fanmaylin) in Bratislava; from the "World Today" program]

[Text] Dear listeners, the Dalai Lama wound up his visit to Czechoslovakia on 6 February. Following is a report by our station reporter (Fanmaylin) from Bratislava.

The Dalai Lama's visit to Czechoslovakia visit at the invitation of Czechoslovak President Havel has stirred up a strong reaction. Although it is an unofficial visit, it has caused quite a few diplomatic problems related to China's protest.

It should be pointed out that in recent years, Czechoslovak-Chinese relations have advanced greatly, especially in the economic field. In Czechoslovakia, many people are concerned that the Dalai Lama's visit might have a negative effect on the development of cooperative relations between the two countries.

At the present, it is difficult to assess the extent of the Chinese leaders' dissatisfaction with the Dalai Lama's visit to Czechoslovakia. So far, we have learned that the Chinese side has cancelled Czechoslovak Minister of Metallurgy, Engineering, and the Electrotechnical Industry (Vodrazka's) visit to China on 17 February.

As far as the Dalai Lama's visit is concerned, he has been given a warm reception from the mass organizations and religious circles. During a meeting, the Dalai Lama spoke highly of the peaceful development of reform in Czechoslovakia, pointing out the voluntary nature of reform. The Dalai Lama met with Czechoslovak Buddhists and gave a press conference.

Bulgarian CP Holds Extraordinary Congress

Party Faces 'Renewal or Defeat'

PM3101103190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
31 Jan 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Special correspondents V. Vasilyev and A. Kapralov dispatch: "Bulgaria: Eradicating Stalinism and Zhivkovism"]

[Text] Sofia—30 January is a historic date in the 100-year history of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP]. It convened its first extraordinary congress ever.

A BCP Central Committee political report, delivered by Petur Mladenov, general secretary of the BCP Central Committee, was submitted for consideration by participants in the party forum.

The 14th BCP Congress, he noted, is being held in exceptional circumstances and for exceptional reasons. In most general terms, these reasons can be defined as follows: The crisis situation in the country, the crisis in politics, the economy, and morality. The party itself is in a serious condition. It has been seriously weakened. "It is not a question of laying it on thick or dramatizing the situation," the general secretary said. "It is necessary to take a sober look at events developing in our own country and to learn lessons from what happened in the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The experience of perestroika in the USSR is especially important for us. In terms of both positive results and difficulties."

Comrade Mladenov's speech was broadcast throughout the country by Bulgarian Television, but his words were, of course, primarily addressed to those inside the hall. Some 80 percent of them are participating in a party congress' work for the first time and they, the delegates, will have to decide the future shape of the BCP.

The congressional delegates, most of whom are under 50 years of age, represent 983,899 party members and 31,150 primary organizations. This considerable force, which had been in the grip of the "unanimity of disciplinary fear," started into motion after 10 November and it immediately became clear that there was no uniformity within the party ranks. There are reformers yearning for rapid change; there are also people who are doubtful and hesitant. On the one hand there are "restructurers" who are seizing the moment to struggle for power and, on the other hand, there are Communists prepared to work honestly and loyally for Bulgaria's good.

A complex mosaic... The party's renewal began even before the congress, during the report and election campaign in primary and municipal organizations. It was held on a truly democratic basis, with multiple candidacies. Some 90 percent of new party secretaries were elected in competitive struggle. In 60 percent of cases there were no lists of the composition of future party committees and bureaus prepared in advance. The main cutting edge of the criticism by speakers at meetings and conferences (they usually lasted two to three days until all who wished to speak had spoken) was aimed at the prevailing style and method of work of party bureaus and their apparatuses, corruption, abuse of office, and the inability to swiftly respond to changes in the political situation. There were differing appraisals of the work of the Central Committee Secretariat and its Politburo.

By way of mandates for the congress, the report and election campaign produced demands for the democratization of internal party life; the clarification of the meaning of the principle of democratic centralism,

which has in fact been replaced by bureaucratic centralism; the enhancement of the role of primary party organizations; the reappraisal of cadre policy; and the dismissal from office of leaders who have compromised themselves. In the process of evaluating the progress of perestroika, it was emphasized that the positive changes which have occurred in society since 10 November are not enough and do not match its objectives and tasks. Unless the party manages to quickly renew its activity, it will be squeezed out by other sociopolitical forces.

Pluralism of opinions is taking a firm hold within the party. The radical reformist minority is not threatened by any danger of persecution; henceforth everyone has the right to uphold his position even after decisions have been adopted. It looks as if the principle of democratic centralism will also be consigned to the "party archives." The alternative to it is the principle of democratic unity built on pluralism of opinions and ideological streams and of decentralization of the party's organizational work.

The BCP has no choice today: Either full and genuinely revolutionary renewal, or defeat. The latter is expected by certain political forces in Bulgaria calling for the immediate elimination of the existing structures of power, the government's resignation, and the dissolution of the National Assembly, and advocating domination by private ownership and a return to so-called "democratic capitalism." The existence of such extreme views objectively reflects the critical situation in which the country finds itself. This is why Bulgarian Communists are clearly aware that the only way to get out of the crisis is by overcoming all remnants of Stalinism and distortions of Zhivkovism.

T. Zhivkov's authoritarian regime, the report to the congress says, is a classic example of antidemocratic power. Zhivkov was distinguished by pathological suspicion and pride, by a manic ambition to be a theoretician despite his total lack of any intellectual abilities whatsoever. He was unprincipled and treacherous and was not averse to using any means to achieve his goals.

Commenting on events in Romania, the Bulgarian press repeatedly noted that Zhivkov and his entourage would not have hesitated to use extreme measures in their own country to remain in power. They failed... Until very recently his clan, consisting of relatives, friends, and corrupt favorites, used denunciations, slander, trials, and repressions to settle scores with those who dared criticize the regime of one-man power.

According to a report just received from the Bulgarian People's Republic Chief Prosecutor's Office, the necessary investigation steps—interrogations and searches—are being taken toward Zhivkov and members of his family. A commission of experts has been appointed to establish the value of his personal possessions and property and the family's income. I. Slavkov, husband of Zhivkov's late daughter Lyudmila, is now the subject of a preliminary investigation. A preliminary investigation

is also under way of Zhivkov's "gray eminence"—former Politburo member M. Balev—in connection with abuse of office and unlawful appropriation of public property.... The activities of former rulers are a stain on the entire party leadership and many of its members, who are not shirking their responsibility for the deformations of the last 30 years. Only a renewed party will be able to regain the people's trust, and the durability of this trust will be tested in the elections of a new Bulgarian parliament, due to be held in 3 months' time.

"On the eve of this harsh trial," A. Lukanov, member of the Politburo and secretary of the BCP Central Committee, declared during a meeting with journalists held before the congress started, "the party is seeking ways leading to a new image and a new policy which would enable it to play a substantial and leading role in Bulgaria's political life. This is the meaning of the congress both for us Communists and for the whole of Bulgarian society.... If not everyone, then at least the overwhelming majority of people in Bulgaria today realize that genuine restructuring in our country would have been impossible without profound restructuring within the Communist Party itself."

The congress is continuing its work.

Session Concludes 3 Feb

PM0502160590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
3 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Special correspondents B. Vasilyev and A. Kapralov dispatch: "Course of Democratic Socialism. Bulgarian Communists' Congress Has Ended"]

[Text] Sofia—It was the last day of the extraordinary Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Congress.... These hours and minutes seemed to make up for months and years of silence, ostentatious agreement, and sham activity within the framework of stillborn plans.

There is none of the "monolithic" party unity cemented by a "unanimity of fear" now. It has been replaced by unity in diversity of thought and ideas subordinate to the common goal of building a democratic and humane, socialist, civil society. Despite attacks from the party's conservative wing, a democratic, reformist spirit in favor of the genuine renewal of the party (whose name will be decided by a party-wide referendum) prevailed in the documents adopted at the congress—and acute debate revolved around them.

Before the first delegate took the floor on the new draft statute, the session moderator proposed that delegates illustrate their profound respect for National Defense Minister Dobri Dzhurov.

"There is a modest man in the hall," the chairman said, "who, while standing alongside Mladenov before 10 November, clearly indicated whose side the Bulgarian People's Army took.... Without his unequivocal support, our extraordinary congress could not have taken place at all...."

D. Dzhuurov was asked to take an honorary seat on the Presidium. He received an ovation from the hall.

The adoption of the "Manifesto of Democratic Socialism in Bulgaria" and the new BCP Statute are convincing confirmation that the process of change in Bulgaria is irreversible and that party unity, contrary to some pessimistic forecasts, has been preserved. The party has embarked on a thorough restructuring of its ranks.

"We are convinced," A. Lukanov, a leading party figure, said with regard to the new BCP Statute, "that it can fulfill its main purpose in this form—that it can be a resolute step toward the complete destalinization and resolute democratization of the BCP."

The statute says that the BCP is a Marxist political organization which acknowledges the supreme sovereignty of the people on questions of state power and the country's government. It carries out its activity within the framework of the Constitution and the laws in conditions of political pluralism and a multiparty system. One of the main principles in the party's structure and activity is equality of rights and obligations; this precludes any privileges or restrictions. The statute proclaims freedom for party members to organize themselves into ideological trends, initiatives, platforms, and associations while preserving the party's organizational unity. Decisions adopted by a majority vote are binding on the relevant elected bodies and on Communists who vote for them. Decisions on elections of leading bodies are binding on everyone. The minority has the right to defend its position, including within the mass media. No party member's tenure of a leadership post or a post within a party body can extend to more than two terms in succession. A Communist, the statute says, cannot obtain benefits and privileges by exploiting the fact that he is a party member or occupies any post within the party.

The congress, convened once every four years, is the BCP's supreme organ. However, where necessary, brief sessions of congress delegates may be convened once a year. The party congress elects the Supreme Party Council, which directs the party's work between congresses. The council elects the party chairmanship (Presidium), which comprises a chairman, his deputies, and the secretary of the Supreme Party Council.

The statute defines a new procedure for membership dues. Those whose income is lower than the minimum wage pays membership dues of 10 stotinki a month. Other party members independently determine the size of their membership dues, but they must pay at least 1 percent of their net income.

Late in the evening of 1 February, guests of the congress and journalists were asked to leave the hall in the People's Palace of Culture. A closed session to elect the Supreme Party Council, the Central Commission on Party Ethics, and the Central Finance and Auditing Commission began.

The television monitors in the congress press center in the Moskva Hotel went dead. Journalists did not leave the press center until late into the night. They brought themselves to do so only after it became clear that there would be no information about the elections. However, one report did nonetheless arrive: G. Atanasov, chairman of the Council of Ministers, who was subjected to considerable criticism at the congress, handed the chairman of the National Assembly the government's resignation. This was justified by the need to form a government on a broad national basis.

Significance of Congress

PM0502174390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
4 Feb 90 Second Edition p6

[PRAVDA special correspondents L. Zhmyrev, A. Krushinskiy dispatch: "Right To Be Trusted"]

[Text] Sofia, 3 Feb—These days you can see signs of Bulgarians' great political activity everywhere. Even today, a Saturday, increasingly long lines formed by newspaper kiosks while it was still dark.

"Could you please give me SELO, FRONT, and DELO," an elderly man gave the abbreviated names of the newspapers he required. He opened RABOT-NICHESKO DELO right there by the kiosk and commented aloud: "Just take a look at this: It is no longer the organ of the Central Committee!"

Yes, it is true. Today's issue no longer carries the line "Organ of the Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Central Committee," which people are used to seeing on the front page. First of all, the Central Committee no longer exists: The Supreme Party Council has been formed in its place, as we have reported. Second, under the new statute, henceforth the newspaper is going to be the organ of the BCP.

Naturally, Bulgarians are primarily scouring today's newspapers for details of the session—unprecedented in the history of BCP congresses—which began on 1 February at 1800 hours and ended... in the afternoon of the following day. It appears that the very first stage of this "marathon"—when the lists for the secret ballot were being drawn up—dragged on for a long time: New nominations, objections, and refusals to stand followed one after the other. Only by midnight was the list of 158 candidates for the originally intended 131 seats in the Supreme Party Council finally agreed on. This was followed by the printing of ballot papers, the vote, and the counting of votes. It was around 1100 on 2 February when the chairman was able to give the names of those elected to the central party bodies (including the name of Stefan Prodev, elected as chief editor of RABOT-NICHESKO DELO).

Then suddenly it was proposed to vote to include another 22 people in the Supreme Party Council—everyone who collected more than 50 percent of the votes during balloting. Thus the number of council

members would be increased to 153. A. Lukanov backed up this idea with one of the provisions in the new statute, under which representatives of all ideological trends and platforms must be fairly represented in the party leadership. The initial reaction was sharply negative.

But then, after a series of cogent speeches, the scales began to tip in favor of its supporters—people who believed that if the proposal were not adopted there would be a threat of the party being split. "Let us consider the unfortunate experience of communist parties in other European socialist countries," A. Lilov urged. It was also pointed out that this decision would help to enrich the party leadership with intellectual potential and assist the BCP's success in the free elections due to be held in May.

In the end, the proposal to increase the size of the Supreme Party Council by a further 22 people was adopted by an overwhelming majority. The audience chanted: "Unity! Unity!"

It is important that thousands of Bulgarians have been studying the list of Supreme Party Council members, published in the press this morning, with particular interest and attention. Even a cursory glance at this list makes you think that this body, with its present membership, is really capable of increasing the confidence of sufficiently broad strata of the population in the party leadership.

Veterans, some members of the previous leadership, people subjected to repressions under T. Zhivkov's regime, and representatives of factions and platforms which have recently appeared are all represented on the council. There are many representatives of the intelligentsia. PRAVDA readers will probably be interested to learn that the Supreme Party Council includes people like Yordan Radichkov (a well-known writer and playwright whose plays have been performed in many of our country's theaters); Boris Dimovski (it is his caricatures that illustrate every anthology of Gabrovo anecdotes); Gospodin Yordanov (construction worker and twice Bulgarian Hero of Socialist Labor); and Svetlin Rusev (a well-known artist who was expelled from the party two and a half years ago for his involvement in the ecology movement).

"Politics: Less Talk, More Action"; "The 14th Extraordinary Congress Made the Wisest Choice: Radical Renewal"; "A Party United and Renewed"; "Congress of Renewal": In many of today's newspapers, headlines large and small on articles about the end of the BCP Congress are filled with optimism. However, we would like our PRAVDA readers to have an idea of assessments "from the other side"—the opposition, whose influence is constantly growing in Bulgaria today.

"As far as I am concerned, the congress was an interesting event because it was out of the ordinary," Zhelyu Zhelev, secretary and coordinator of the opposition Union of Democratic Forces, said yesterday in an interview with the newspaper OTECHESTVEN FRONT.

"The BCP demonstrated its ideological evolution at the congress. The report by Petur Mladenov contained a number of ideas, particularly in its ideological section—something totally new and unusual for the BCP, which was always one of the most rigidly set Stalinist parties in Eastern Europe.... Most of them are our own ideas. They were first proclaimed in slogans at rallies, but we have no objections to the BCP taking up our democratic slogans, and we would be pleased if it were to put them into practice.... An impressive feature of the report was the idea that there must be political opposition: an extraordinary, very new concept in the BCP's political lexicon. At the same time, however, there are also ideas which show that this evolution still does not match the level of Bulgaria's general political development or the processes taking place in other East European countries."

The opinion of Nikolay Vasilev, chairman of the Alternative Socialist Association, is also of some interest. He handed us an issue—hot off the presses—of this BCP faction's newspaper and predicted that, if the party's renewal is held up, the possibility of "another extraordinary congress in two or three months' time" could not be ruled out.

...In any event, the 14th Extraordinary BCP Congress is, without doubt, an important step on the way to restoring the public's confidence in the party.

"I would like to begin with dogged work full of real action," A. Lilov, chairman of the BCP Supreme Party Council Presidium, said immediately after his election to this post, "so that our party can overcome the situation in which it now finds itself and is able to restructure in deed rather than word. So that it can regain its social prestige and the people's trust. So that it can be successful in the forthcoming elections and offer our people a new policy and new program for Bulgaria's development."

In conclusion, we now bring you the line-up of the BCP Supreme Party Council Presidium which emerged late yesterday evening at the first Supreme Party Council plenum:

A. Lilov, chairman; G. Pirinski and A. Strezov, deputy chairmen; R. Serbezov, secretary; and N. Asparukhova, F. Bokov, D. Dzhurov, P. Yordanova, S. Krustenova, Ch. Kyuranov, A. Lukanov, P. Mladenov, Y. Radichkov, I. Stanev, P.-E. Mitev, V. Nedev, and N. Temelkov, members.

The congress is over. A lot of work lies ahead.

Bulgarian CP Elects Leadership Body, Chairman

PM0702151090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Special correspondents B. Vasilyev and A. Kapralov report from Sofia: "New BCP Leadership Elected"]

[Text] Elections to the supreme party organ for the period between congresses lasted all night from

Thursday to Friday and only at 1300 hours 2 February did journalists, after an agonizing wait, learn that 131 people were elected to the Supreme Party Council on a competitive basis. Aleksandur Lilov was unanimously elected chairman of its Presidium. Of the 15 Presidium members only five were members of the former Bulgarian Communist Party [BCP] Central Committee Politburo, notably Petur Mladenov. Several clubs and platforms which have emerged within the ranks of the BCP are represented in the Presidium.

Supreme Party Council Chairman Aleksandur Lilov was born in 1933 into a poor peasant family. He has higher education and is a doctor of philosophical sciences, a professor, and a corresponding member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences. At the 10th BCP Congress he was elected candidate member and at the July 1972 Central Committee plenum full member of the BCP Central Committee and Central Committee secretary. In July 1974 he became a Central Committee Politburo member. In 1983 on T. Zhivkov's initiative he was removed from the Politburo and Secretariat, and became director of the Institute of Contemporary Social Theories.

He enjoys great prestige within the party and country.

At a press conference the Supreme Party Council chairman emphasized the significance of the Manifesto of Democratic Socialism in Bulgaria adopted by the congress, in which the BCP addresses all Communists and citizens of the country, stating that the party is starting its own perestroika in order to ensure society's perestroika. In the manifesto it proclaims itself a party of democratic socialism, renewed as regards ideology, policy, organization, and cadres. Our party, Lilov said, is looking ahead not to the distant future, but to immediate and imminent goals: the implementation of reforms necessary to build a democratic socialist society and a wealthy, modern, and civilized Bulgaria governed by the rule of law.

He noted that the new party statutes adopted by the congress rid the party of the accretions of obsolete principles and the burden of obsolete procedures, turning it into a new type of party which depends on the activity of its members and makes decisions on the basis of wide-ranging, democratic, free debate.

The BCP congress had still not ended when it became known that the Bulgarian Government had tendered its resignation. It is expected that this will be accepted at a National Assembly session Saturday, when a new Council of Ministers chairman will probably be elected. Journalists at the press conference naturally asked: What will the composition of the new government be? Answering this question, Supreme Party Council Presidium member Andrey Lukanov said that the government will be as representative as possible. It could include not only existing parties, but also nonparty people and representatives of other interested social forces who are really concerned about the current state of

Bulgaria's economy and prepared to make every effort to extract the country from its severe crisis situation. We see the realization of the basic goals of the anticrisis program as the reason for forming a government on a wide social base, a government of national consensus, he stressed.

The previous day the Union of Democratic Forces declared its unwillingness to participate in a coalition government. As regards this statement A. Lukanov said the following:

"I do not wish to comment on the Union of Democratic Forces statement, especially on the part of it which is patently of a preelection nature. All the same we hope that all social forces—and I do not mean only the Union of Democratic Forces—which really wish Bulgaria well at this crucial point will be able to put national interests above their own political ambitions."

Ministers Congratulate New Bulgarian Premier

PM0502173790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
5 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[USSR Council of Ministers undated message congratulating A. Lukanov on election as Bulgarian premier]

[Text] To Comrade Andrey Lukanov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the People's Republic of Bulgaria:

Accept our sincere congratulations on your election as chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers.

We are sure that during the present period of profound social transformations in the USSR and Bulgaria, the relations of fraternal friendship, interaction as allies, and all-around cooperation between our countries will enjoy further fruitful development and will continue to reliably serve the interests of the Soviet and Bulgarian peoples and to promote the strengthening of peace and stability in Europe.

We wish you successful activity in your high state post.

[Signed] The USSR Council of Ministers.

New Bulgarian Premier Addresses Parliament

PM0602165090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
6 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Own correspondent A. Kapralov report: "Prime Minister of the Republic Named"]

[Text] Sofia—The Bulgarian National Assembly session held in Sofia has elected Andrey Lukanov, member of the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] Supreme Party Council, to the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers. He replaces Georgi Atanasov, who submitted the government's resignation on Thursday.

In a brief speech at the National Assembly session the new Council of Ministers Chairman A. Lukanov stated

that the government will adhere to the line of democratization of society and the creation of a democratic rule-of-law state. The quest for a way out of the socio-economic crisis, he noted, is the most urgent task for the new government. As early as February of this year an anticrisis program must be submitted to parliament, containing essential measures to ensure social justice and protect the interests of all Bulgarian citizens. At the same time I am convinced, A. Lukanov said, that the government should also formulate the basic guidelines for a fundamental economic reform, which must be prepared and implemented slightly later, but without delay.

The new Bulgarian Government, A. Lukanov noted in conclusion, must be a government of the whole nation; it does not intend to implement and establish the ideas and opinions of a single party, but will seek real pluralism in all spheres of life.

And what is the opposition's attitude to the appointment of the new Council of Ministers chairman? After the end of the National Assembly session journalists put this question to P. Beron, a representative of the Union of Democratic Forces.

"All of us in the Union of Democratic Forces expected A. Lukanov to take this post. He is a man highly charged with energy. The choice is logical and acceptable, first and foremost, naturally, for the BCP."

We assume, P. Beron went on, that A. Lukanov will invite representatives of ours to join the cabinet. But we cannot accept this proposal, because in today's conditions decisions are still adopted not in parliament but in the Supreme Party Council, and that is a significant obstacle for us. In its present composition the National Assembly is not capable of adopting the decisions we seek.

The participation of the Union of Democratic Forces in a coalition government could be a trap that would eliminate us as an opposition, and therefore we will now seek to create a shadow cabinet, made up not of members of the Union of Democratic Forces coordinating council but of individuals, specialists who could draw up a platform of alternative views.

'Gorbachev-Style' Bulgarian Leader Profiled

*PM0502144190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
5 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5*

[Special correspondents L. Zhmyrev and A. Krushinskiy article under the rubric "Portrait Against a News Background": "Aleksandur Lilov"]

[Text] Sofia—Fate tripped this man in 1983 when, as a total surprise to everyone and by dint of some secret whim of T. Zhivkov, A. Lilov was expelled from the BCP [Bulgarian Communist Party] Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat under the formal excuse that he had supposedly "long expressed a wish to concentrate in depth on scientific work."

Perhaps nobody in Bulgaria would have believed at that time that this 57-year-old corresponding member of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, doctor of philosophy, and lecturer at Sofia University would head the BCP leadership six years later.

Let us recall that, following postgraduate studies at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences in Moscow, A. Lilov worked as deputy chief of the BCP Central Committee Art and Culture Department. He was elected candidate member of the BCP Central Committee in 1971, and full member and secretary of the BCP Central Committee in 1972. He was a member of the BCP Central Committee Politburo for nine years between 1974 and 1983. Between October 1983 and December 1989, while he was "released" from these positions, he worked as director of the Institute for Modern Social Theories. He was co-opted as a Central Committee member at the 8 December 1989 plenum and was elected member of the Politburo and secretary of the BCP Central Committee. A brief biographical sketch carried by the newspapers also points out that he was repeatedly elected deputy to the National Assembly and member of the State Council. He is married with two children.

A. Lilov is described as a "Gorbachev-style" leader. He had adopted new political thinking, based on nonviolent methods, equal dialogue, and priority of universal human values, as a profound personal belief long before perestroika. This is why, immediately following his return to the political arena, A. Lilov was able to make a considerable contribution to the cause of Bulgarian society's and the BCP's renewal.

A. Lilov's political portrait emerges from outlines of a vividly expressed intellect in his way of conducting debate and his ability to arrive at compromise. It was A. Lilov, together with other Politburo members, primarily P. Mladenov and A. Lukanov, who deserve the credit for achieving a political consensus with the opposition during the sittings of the Social Council for the Nationalities Question and the "roundtable" for renewal of the political system. A. Lilov is one of the initiators of preparations for the 29 December 1989 decision on the restoration of civil rights and freedoms to Bulgaria's Turkish-speaking and Muslim population—a decision which marked a sharp turnabout in the country's nationalities policy and its emergence from international isolation.

In a conversation with one of the authors of these lines, A. Lilov, speaking about relations with the intelligentsia, remarked that one of the most burdensome mistakes committed by T. Zhivkov and his regime was to set the party in opposition to the intelligentsia. And yet, ever since Blagoev's and Dimitrov's times, the best part of the Bulgarian intelligentsia has historically always been on the Communist Party's side.

A. Lilov is distinguished by an erudite manner and breadth of vision, and he writes his own articles and

speeches rather than leaving this to an apparatus of aides. He is capable of critically evaluating Eurocommunism, the achievements of social democrats, and the mistakes committed by his own party, emphasizing in the process the continuity of the cause of D. Blagoev who, almost 100 years ago, created one of the first social democratic parties in Europe.

Human affability and inbred tact are among this leader's other attractive features. "Sasha Lilov"—this was how a number of our acquaintances warmly spoke of him during his years of "disgrace" (and not only at that time, either). "Softness" does not prevent his being principled and taking a firm stance on political and social questions and in personal contacts. This was especially graphically manifested in his unreserved condemnation of Zhivkovism and the nationalist extremism it had generated, as well as in his upholding of the BCP's positions as a Marxist party of the new type, a party of democratic socialism.

It would seem that the BCP is headed by an experienced leader who is profoundly concerned with the future of the communist movement and takes an open and active stance against sectarianism and dogmatism.

Deputy Foreign Minister Meets Bulgarian Leaders

LD0702095490 Moscow TASS in English-0725 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Sofia February 7 TASS—Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky met Bulgarian President Petr Mladenov in Sofia on Tuesday to discuss Soviet-Bulgarian cooperation at international forums and talks. Petrovsky also met Bulgarian Foreign Minister B. Dimitrov.

During his stay in Sofia, Petrovsky met Bulgarian First Deputy Foreign Minister S. Staikov to discuss progress at international talks, including international environmental cooperation on a global and European scale and the advancement of Bulgarian and Soviet initiatives in the United Nations.

The sides vowed to expand cooperation in renewing the United Nations and bolstering its non-confrontational character.

Further on Petrovsky Visit

For Bulgarian reportage on the visit by Vladimir Petrovskiy, deputy minister of foreign affairs, including reports on his talks with Bulgarian State Council Chairman Petur Mladenov, please see the Bulgarian section of the 8 February East Europe DAILY REPORT and subsequent issues.

PRAVDA Reports on Rally in Bucharest

PM2901155990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
29 Jan 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "Romania: Rally in Bucharest"]

[Text] Bucharest, 28 Jan—More than 20,000 people gathered for a rally in Victory Square here. People split into two camps—opponents and supporters of the National Salvation Front [NSF]—chanted slogans, and waved banners outside the Foreign Ministry building, which was cordoned off by soldiers, tanks, and armored personnel carriers. Part of the square was occupied by supporters of the National Peasants Party, the National Liberal Party, and the Social Democratic Party. Columns of demonstrators representing a number of the capital's largest enterprises, as well as miners from Valya-Zhiuluy and Maramuresh [names as transliterated] and a workers' delegation from Turgovishte [Bulgaria], were also in the square. These demonstrators carried banners with the slogans "The Front Is the People!", "We Will Not Sell the Motherland!", and "Everything for the Front, Everything for Victory!"

We have come here to defend the front, which was born at the barricades of our revolution, from attacks by impostors and opportunists, Cornel Cazacu, representative of the capital's clothing and knitwear factory, declared in conversation with your TASS correspondent. We are convinced that the NSF represents the working people's interests. All the measures it has adopted so far conform with the interests of the country and the people.

A group of young people representing the Romanian Students League acted as kind of buffer between the two camps of demonstrators. Asked about the students' political stance today, League Chairman Marian Munteanu said that, in such a fluid situation, the movement's activists perceive their stance as being to ensure order and calm in the square and prevent possible clashes.

While passions were raging in Victory Square, Ioan Lup, general secretary of the National Peasants Party, spoke on Romanian television and categorically demanded the front's resignation and the formation of a Council of National Unity representing all political forces in the country.

NSF Council Chairman Ion Iliescu appeared on the screen right afterwards, noting that representatives of the parties which initiated the rally are actually refusing to maintain a constructive dialogue with the front. He called for unity of all healthy forces in Romanian society.

Roundtable Negotiations Held in Bucharest

LD0202105390 Moscow TASS in English 2109 GMT
1 Feb 90

[Text] Bucharest February 1 TASS—Roundtable negotiations between leaders of the National Salvation Front Council and political parties resumed here today.

National Salvation Front leaders announced the intention to separate the council from the front, which will become a political organization and nominate its candidates for elections. The council, opened to all parties,

will become a sort of a "mini-parliament," to be formed on the current meeting's principle, namely three representatives from each party.

Participation of representatives of political parties in the government was also discussed. It was said it was necessary to put forward specialists.

In their speeches, representatives of most parties, participating in the dialogue, favourably appraised the intention of the National Salvation Front Council and qualified the negotiations as civilised and constructive.

In line with the mutual accord, a provisional National Unity Council is being formed in Romania, says a communique passed at the roundtable meeting and circulated here. It was signed by representatives of the Front Council and political parties.

The National Unity Council will be formed through restructuring the National Salvation Front Council to ensure the representation of active participants in the revolution, a number of prominent scientists and cultural workers, as well as representatives from among industrial workers, peasants, intellectuals, youth, students, national minorities, and districts.

The National Salvation Front will become a political organisation with an independent structure, which will participate in elections on a par with other political forces.

Representatives of the parties and political forces participating in the meeting, stress that the forthcoming period should be free from manifestations which could lead to tension and clashes, the document stresses. They declare the desire to ensure a climate conducive to normal economic, social, political, and cultural activities in the country, and also a constructive dialogue between all the political forces.

The successful outcome of the negotiations is a historical event, said Ion Iliescu after the meeting. During six hours representatives of 30 parties, now existing in Romania, discussed ways to ensure a platform of cooperation and reached a consensus.

The discussions were heated but not rough. The dialogue proved to be possible even between political formations with the opposite viewpoints. We can surely say that a big volume of work has been done and an efficient fruitful dialogue held, Iliescu said.

Visa-Free Crossings to East Europe Proposed

LD0402175990 Moscow World Service in English
1600 GMT 4 Feb 90

[Text] The Soviet Union has proposed a visa-free border crossing to Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and Mongolia. Deputy Foreign Minister Boris Chaplin has said as much in an interview. He said the Soviet Foreign Ministry was outlining new rules for foreigners to move in

this country. The number of regions closed for them is to be reduced reasonably. On a law on entry and exit being prepared in this country, Boris Chaplin underlined the necessity to adopt acts that would ensure Soviet citizens social protection abroad.

West Europe

Medvedev Leads Delegation on Visit to London

IZVESTIYA Previews Visit

PM0702155790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
7 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unnamed TASS correspondent dispatch: "M. Marshall on Soviet Parliamentary Delegation Visit"]

[Text] London, 6 Feb—News from the USSR is the center of attention these days for the British public. All the newspapers are publishing front-page reports of the work of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, whose decisions are designed to play a crucial role in the development of political processes in the Soviet Union. The visit to Great Britain by a Soviet parliamentary delegation headed by V.A. Medvedev, USSR people's deputy, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, which begins Wednesday [7 February], is arousing particular interest here.

We consider this visit very important since it is part of the continuing interparliamentary exchanges between our countries, Michael Marshall, chairman of the British group of the Interparliamentary Union [IPU], said in an interview with TASS' correspondent.

We expect V.A. Medvedev, the head of the current Soviet delegation, to describe in detail the USSR's progress toward pluralism, Marshall continued. His stance, along with the views of other delegation members, will be of supreme interest and importance. In the course of the visit, there are plans for the delegation to meet British Prime Minister M. Thatcher, G. Howe, her deputy and leader of the House of Commons, and British members of parliament.

The IPU was set up to promote two highly important aims enshrined in its statute—the peaceful resolution of conflicts and the development of representative institutions. That is why it will be useful for both sides to exchange opinions on the changes in the world and find out how legislators could promote a broadening dialogue. There are things for us to discuss.

The discussion of the situation in East Europe promises to be interesting, Marshall pointed out. On Sunday, as part of an IPU delegation, I am going to Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the GDR, and it will of course be extremely useful to learn our Soviet colleagues' opinions of the changes taking place there. After that I will visit Cuba, and it is also important for me to find out what Soviet parliamentarians think about the situation in that country.

We are following attentively the establishment of Soviet democracy and the development of parliamentarianism in the USSR, Marshall said in conclusion.

Delegates Depart 7 Feb

*LD0702120190 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1118 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow, 7 Feb (TASS)—A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation headed by Vadim Medvedev, USSR people's deputy, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, left Moscow today for an official visit to London.

Medvedev Speaks Upon Arrival

*LD0702182390 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1635 GMT 7 Feb 90*

[Text] London, 7 Feb (TASS)—A USSR Supreme Soviet delegation led by V.A. Medvedev—USSR people's deputy, member of the Politburo, and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee—arrived in London today for an official visit.

The delegation was met at Heathrow Airport by M. Marshall, chairman of the British group of the Interparliamentary Union, P. Shert, deputy chairman of the House of Commons Committee on Foreign Affairs, and other officials. Among those meeting the delegation were L.M. Zamyatin, USSR ambassador to Great Britain, and R. Braithwaite, Great Britain's ambassador to the USSR.

Upon arrival, the head of the USSR Supreme Soviet delegation made a statement. He said, in part:

We hope that our trip will be yet another contribution to the development of Soviet-British parliamentary ties, which have rich traditions and a substantial history.

A new page in the development of these ties, and likewise, of Soviet-British relations as a whole, was opened with the visit by a Soviet parliamentary delegation led by M.S. Gorbachev, at the end of 1984. Let me remind you that it was during that trip that the words "new political thinking" were uttered for the first time.

I think that our present trip will take place precisely from the standpoint of the new political thinking. We hope for a fruitful and interesting exchange of views on present-day international relations. I think that European affairs and problems relating to joint work to create a common European home also will be an object of our attention, all the more so since serious shifts have been taking place in this region of our planet lately.

It is natural for this topic to be the object of mutual interest and discussion. I think, of course, that problems of our bilateral relations will be discussed, as well, including stepping up the development of our interparliamentary ties and making them more specific.

We highly value the fact that there will be a conversation with Mrs. Thatcher today, right at the very start of the

visit. This is a great sign of consideration. Evidently, this meeting also will determine the future course of our visit.

I hope for a fruitful exchange of views and that we will manage to satisfy the British public's great interest in what is happening in the USSR, and in the first instance, their interest in the CPSU Central Committee plenum.

"What comment would you make about the plenum vote on the draft party platform?" This question was asked by one of the journalists. "This vote was preceded by a serious and deep discussion in which about 60 speakers took part. A great amount of work was done in the commissions, and in general, such a unanimous adoption of the document bears witness to the resolve of the party and its Central Committee to move forward along the path of perestroika and its further deepening. At the moment, it may be a little premature to talk about this, but I am sure that when you become familiar with this document you will be convinced that it really opens up a new phase in our life and our work."

Message Delivered to Thatcher

*LD0702202690 Moscow TASS in English 2016 GMT
7 Feb 90*

[Text] London February 7 TASS—Vadim Medvedev, people's deputy, Politburo member and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, who heads a delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet, was received by British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher.

Medvedev handed over to Thatcher a message from Mikhail Gorbachev.

Questions of European structure were given priority among international problems during the conversation.

In light of the Soviet proposal to hold in 1990 a summit of representatives of countries participating in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, the sides declared for speeding up the processes which, in keeping with the Helsinki accords, lead to overcoming the division of Europe.

It was emphasised that the Soviet Union and Great Britain attach much importance to the successful conclusion of the Vienna talks in 1990.

The conversation showed that the parties have similar appraisals of the situation in Central Europe and regarding the two German states.

It was noted that the German people should implement their right to self-determination stage-by-stage, in keeping with the European process, with observance of the lawful interests of other European peoples and quadripartite responsibility.

Separate aspects of bilateral relations, above all in the areas of political dialogue, in the parliamentary relations and economy were discussed in a constructive spirit. Mutual interest in their development in various forms and at various levels was expressed.

Delegates Take Part in Debate

LD0802002990 Moscow TASS in English 2309 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] London February 8 TASS—A delegation of the USSR Supreme Soviet that arrived here on Wednesday took part on the same day in a debate at a round-table about the role of new political thinking in East-West relations now and in future. The delegation that came for an official visit is headed by Vadim Medvedev, people's deputy, member of the Politburo and secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee.

The debate was held at Elizabeth II Conference Centre. The Soviet delegation was met by members of the British groups of Inter-Parliamentary Union and the British-Soviet group of British Parliament.

Medvedev spoke in the debate. He said, specifically, that the Soviet Union arrived at new philosophy of East-West relations through the realisation of the need for radical revision of the views on the Soviet Union's development, in other words, through perestroika.

This led to the understanding of priority importance of common human values for the destinies of this process. This is the essence of new political thinking.

Dwelling on changes in a number of East European countries, Medvedev said that it would be wrong to view them, as in the past, through the prism of East-West confrontation, to believe that they play into the hands of one side and weaken the other, that they mean the "fiasco" of socialism and the triumph of the capitalist system. Such a view would be a relic of past thinking.

The failure of some or other specific models of a social system should not be mixed up with the very socialist idea. A correct and balanced approach to the events and changes in Eastern Europe is of fundamental importance for all countries participating in the Helsinki process.

Hence the need that changes in Eastern Europe take place in conditions of international political and strategic stability. It would be dangerous if some persons decide that a favourable situation is arising, which can be used in their interests.

Regarding the future structure of international relations, Medvedev emphasised the role of openness.

He said that apparently this notion is the key to a new understanding of the need for East-West interaction.

The openness of policy, the openness of the economy, and being open to information and contacts is the necessary triad which is increasingly to determine the character of this interaction.

In the final count it is the policy of openness that is now a guarantee of success, Medvedev said.

'Possible Revision' of British Military Policy

LD0702161490 Moscow TASS in English 0910 GMT
7 Feb 90

["British stand on NATO nuclear modernization changing"—TASS headline]

[Text] London February 7 TASS—By TASS correspondent Aleksandr Sisnev:

Speaking in the House of Commons on Tuesday, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Secretary of State for Defence Tom King for the first time spoke of a possible revision by Britain of its military policy and its approach towards the modernization of NATO nuclear arms in Europe.

Answering a question whether or not she wants to see modernized NATO nuclear arms in Europe when East European countries are progressing towards democracy, Thatcher said that current changes and negotiations will require a different approach towards the question what kind of arms they now need.

According to the British TIMES newspaper, Whitehall officials confirmed that the prime minister recognizes the need to revise the strategy and military programs in light of Political changes underway in Europe.

Parliament members described Thatcher's pronouncement as softening of her stand as regards the modernization of NATO tactical nuclear arms in Europe.

King also confirmed that the current situation in Europe opens a possibility to change their military preparations.

Until recently the British leadership has put out of the question a possibility of reduction of British military spending and insisted on the modernization of NATO nuclear arsenals.

However, taking into account mounting British calls for curbing military preparations due to a considerable warming of the international climate, the government seems to revise its stand on this issue.

Belgian Defense Minister Begins Six-Day Visit**Coeme's Itinerary Outlined**

LD0602092190 Moscow TASS in English 0858 GMT
6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS—By TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy:

Belgian National Defence Minister Guy Coeme arrives in the Soviet Union on Wednesday for an official six-day visit. He will meet the leadership of the Soviet Defence Ministry and specifically his Soviet counterpart Dmitriy Yazov.

Coeme will also meet Yevgeni Primakov, chairman of the Council of the Union of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The defence minister of a foreign country will be for the first time given an opportunity to speak before the members of the Soviet parliament's committees for defence, state security and international affairs.

The Belgian defence minister will tour a number of military facilities and and familiarise himself with modern air equipment in Kubinka garrison near Moscow adn with the life and combat training of the servicemen of the Kantemir armoured division.

Coeme will also go to the city of Ryazan in Central Russia to get acquainted with the training of the cadets of the higher airborne command school.

In Leningrad, the Belgian guest will visit the Baltic shipyards which has launched a defence industry conversion process and will tour the historical and cultural sights of the city in the Neva.

Yazov Welcomes Coeme 7 Feb

LD0702173190 Moscow TASS in English 1651 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—Soviet Defence Minister Dmitriy Yazov received his Belgian counterpart Guy Coeme who arrived in Moscow today on an official visit at Yazov's invitation.

The ministers discussed a wide range of issues of mutual interest, focusing on reductions in the armed forces and armaments in Europe, disarmament prospects and confidence-building measures.

It was pointed out that success at the Vienna talks on reductions in troops and conventional armaments would be an important step towards the lowering of military confrontation and towards stability in Europe.

Yazov and Coeme noted the great importance of military contacts for improving the situation in Europe and strengthening confidence and mutual understanding between countries participating in the all-European process.

Increased Radioactivity Near Sunken Sub Denied

LD0702163790 Moscow TASS in English 1626 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—Reports in the Canadian press, quoting "reliable sources," about the enhanced level of radioactivity in the Norwegian Sea south-west of Medvezhiy Island where a Soviet submarine sank on April 7, 1989 "do not correspond to reality," the press centre of the Soviet Defence Ministry announced today.

Constant monitoring conducted by Defence Ministry experts shows that the radiation level in that area does not exceed the natural background.

Soviet Navy Chief To Visit FRG Federal Navy

LD0802113190 Hamburg DPA in German 0836 GMT
8 Feb 90

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Admiral Vladimir Chernavin, Commander in Chief of the Soviet Navy, is to visit the Federal Navy next week. The Defense Ministry announced in Bonn today that Defense Minister Gerhard Stoltenberg will receive the Soviet admiral for talks at the Defense Ministry on 12 February following a reception for him with military honors. In the framework of his five-day visit, the Soviet visitor will inspect units of the German fleet in the Baltic area. A fleet unit of the Federal Navy visited Leningrad last October.

Delors Discusses Plans for Europe-Wide Links

PM0702100790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
4 Feb 90 Morning Edition p 5

[Report by Yu. Kovalenko: " 'Greater Europe' Plan"]

[Text] Addressing the European Parliament recently, EEC Commission Chairman Jacques Delors presented a long-term program of European development, involving both parts of our continent. He subsequently appeared on television and gave details of the program.

The main features are: Giving substantial aid to the states of East Europe, strengthening and widening the powers of the supranational institutions essential to the creation of a political alliance of the 12 EC countries, and devising a common foreign policy platform. Europe, J. Delors stressed, needs "institutional hardware" that will stand any test. He supported M.S. Gorbachev's initiative on convening the Helsinki-2 conference this year, to help create "new prospects" for the whole of Europe.

The East European countries, the Commission chairman said, should be given the kind of assistance that is currently granted to the least developed regions of the EC. According to his estimates, it would exceed 130 billion francs—which naturally would require a considerable increase in the community budget. Moreover, the recently concluded agreements on trade and cooperation with East European states should be replaced by "treaties of association," which would provide for the formation of proper bodies to conduct dialogue and for a policy of economic subsidies. In the next few months the Commission intends to put forward concrete proposals to that end.

J. Delors deems it necessary to "form a genuine federation of the 12 West European countries by 2000." This federation is a very important condition, he stressed, of the creation of a European confederation in terms of the initiative put forward by French President F. Mitterrand.

The creation of a "European federation of the Twelve," according to J. Delors, who is currently one of the most influential politicians in Europe, will require a stronger

Commission. It must become the genuine executive organ of the EC (effectively a government), making important decisions independently, without preliminary consultation with the Council of Ministers of the member countries. Democratically appointed Commission members would be responsible to the European Parliament, whose powers would be strengthened. "Unlike some idealistic federalists," J. Delors said, "I am not in favor of eliminating national sovereign states." On the contrary, in his view, national parliaments must participate actively in monitoring EC activity.

Why has the Commission chairman, who has always advocated a gradual, stage-by-stage approach to European development, suddenly, to many people's surprise, demanded an intensification of integration processes? It is, to use his words, due primarily to the rapid course of events in East Europe and the reaction to them in the West. In some capitals it is believed that the EC, which is an indirect result of the cold war, should cease to exist; in others, people believe that integration needs to be slowed down; there are yet others who advocate the admission of socialist countries to the EC. In these conditions, J. Delors notes, a plan is needed for building Europe. The EC and the members states must have the chance, in accordance with their interests, to influence the course of events and the future architecture of a "greater Europe."

Commenting on J. Delors' proposals, which have aroused great interest in the West, the Paris paper *LIBERATION* points out that the Commission chairman intends to play the role of architect in implementing the plans for Gorbachev's "common European home" and F. Mitterrand's "European confederation."

Latin America & Caribbean

Foreign Ministry Spokesman on Nicaraguan Elections

*LD0702145590 Moscow TASS in English 1342 GMT
7 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—By TASS diplomatic correspondent Aleksandr Kanishchev:

Preparations for elections in Nicaragua, set for February 25, are entering their final stage.

"On the whole, the elections campaign in the country is proceeding normally. This is also seen from a recent report by the U.N. observer mission, which says, in part, that the electoral bodies in Nicaragua continue to operate constructively," a Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman told TASS.

"Although earlier there were cases of violence from both sides, no significant incidents were recorded at the present stage of the election campaign after the developments in Masatepe. All indications are that this tendency will be preserved throughout the campaign."

The Soviet diplomat drew attention to the Nicaraguan police's contribution to preventing violence. He stressed that this was particularly noted by Elliot Richardson, a personal representative of the U.N. secretary-general, who visited Nicaragua.

At the same time, the contras have not halted combat operations in the country, the spokesman said. The report by the U.N. observer mission points out that these actions have serious implications for the election process. They drag out this process and are aimed at intimidating activists and candidates of the Sandinist National Liberation Front.

Actions by the opposition and some forces outside Nicaragua, which can be described as a bid to discredit the election process as a whole and its bodies, as well as international observers themselves, give rise to concern, the spokesman said.

The report by the U.N. mission points out that this "double effect" of discreditation is highly dangerous. In the Soviet Union they share these apprehensions, the spokesman stressed.

Lukyanov Receives Brazilian Legislators

*LD0702202190 Moscow TASS in English 1937 GMT
7 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—First Vice President Anatoliy Lukyanov received today a delegation of the Brazilian National Congress led by Antonio Paes de Andrade, president of the Chamber of Deputies. The delegation is on an official visit to the Soviet Union.

During a meeting held in a friendly and business-like atmosphere, Lukyanov described to the Brazilian lawmakers steps taken by the USSR to renew radically Soviet society.

The Brazilian lawmakers praised the Soviet contribution to the solution of major issues of our times and supported major Soviet peace initiatives aimed to eliminate nuclear and other types of mass destruction weapons.

They pointed to the importance of Soviet unilateral steps to cut armed forces and armaments and to implement the conversation of the munitions industry.

Expressing satisfaction with the present state of Soviet-Brazilian relations, the lawmakers of the two countries favoured broader cooperation between the USSR and Brazil.

Later in the day the delegation was received by Vitaliy Vorotnikov, president of the Russian Federation.

During the meeting, much attention was given to the role of the Soviet Communist Party in the current changes and its place in the political system as an ideological, political and moral vanguard of Soviet people.

When discussing the international situation, the sides stated with satisfaction that new political thinking

noticeably influences the general international climate and increases mutual understanding and confidence between nations, creating conditions for more active involvement of all states in a collective search for ways to settle key problems of our times.

Vice President Quayle's Tour Seen as 'Failure'

*PY0702214090 Moscow in Spanish to Latin America
2300 GMT 31 Jan 90*

[By Leonid Levchenko]

[Text] After the U.S. invasion of Panama, U.S. President George Bush instructed Vice President Dan Quayle to tour Latin America to remedy the deteriorating effects of the U.S. armed action in Panama. However, Quayle was only able to visit Honduras, Panama, and Jamaica.

Quayle was planning to visit several countries of the region, but during the planning the State Department ran into many problems when reports from several Latin American capitals indicated that his visit was undesirable. In addition, Caracas and Mexico clearly stated that the visit would be untimely while all the U.S. troops remain in Panama. The UN and OAS representatives of the Latin American countries unequivocally labeled the U.S. invasion of Panama as an outright violation of

international law and the sovereignty of an independent state. This is why an easy tour was chosen.

Honduras was chosen as a starting point due to the presidential inauguration that was attended by the presidents of several Latin American countries. Quayle wanted to take that opportunity to contact them. Despite the fact that meetings were held, Dan Quayle did not hear anything good.

Dan Quayle's stay in occupied Panama was not very successful either. Quayle started his visit in a well-rehearsed mass to honor the people killed during the U.S. military intervention. The Panamanians and the Latin Americans, however, did not hear any words of regret for the violation of the national dignity of a small country.

Quayle's visit to Jamaica was reduced to a minimum, but that was enough time for Prime Minister Michael Manley to reaffirm the negative effects of the U.S. invasion of Panama. Therefore, Quayle's tour has been a complete failure. When he talked with reporters on his return trip, Quayle admitted that there were no changes in the position of the Latin American countries regarding the U.S. action in Panama. Dan Quayle's report to President Bush is not known, but it is clear that the Panamanian wound continues to bleed and to remind Latin America of the U.S. threat.

CPSU Central Committee Plenum**7 Feb Reportage of Central Committee Plenum****Plenum Ends With Gorbachev Remarks**

*LD0702201590 Moscow TASS in English 2007 GMT
7 Feb 90*

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—The plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee today continued debating the draft platform of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee for the 28th party congress and the report of the Soviet Communist Party chief Mikhail Gorbachev on this question.

After a detailed discussion of the proposals of the Editorial Commission, the plenum endorsed the draft platform of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee for the 28th party congress, perfected with taking into account remarks and the debate, and adopted a resolution on this question. (The draft platform will be published).

The plenum continued to discuss questions connected with the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party. General Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee Mikhail Gorbachev spoke on this question.

The plenum adopted a resolution on this matter.

Mikhail Gorbachev made concluding remarks at the plenum.

The plenum of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee is over.

Gorbachev Wins 'Convincing Victory'

*LD0702143690 Hamburg DPA in German 1414 GMT
7 Feb 90*

[Excerpts] Moscow (DPA)—Soviet state and party leader Mikhail Gorbachev has apparently won a convincing victory in his reform efforts. According to a well-informed member of the PRAVDA staff, the CPSU Central Committee today approved by an overwhelming majority an abandonment of the party's power monopoly, which is established in the constitution.

The journalist said that 249 Central Committee members approved the discussion proposal for the coming congress, submitted by Gorbachev, in which the removal of Article 6 is called for. According to latest reports, the Central Committee has around 250 voting members.

According to unconfirmed reports, the radical reformer Boris Yeltsin voted against the party platform, one other Central Committee member abstained.

Plenum 'Information Report'

*LD0702214990 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1947 GMT 7 Feb 90*

["Information Report on Plenum of CPSU Central Committee"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 7 Feb (TASS)—Discussion of the CPSU Central Committee's draft platform for the 28th party congress and the report of M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, on this matter continued at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum today.

The plenum was addressed by: K. Makhkamov, first secretary of the Tajik Communist Party Central Committee; V.I. Mironenko, first secretary of the Komsomol Central Committee; A.M. Masaliyev, first secretary of the Kirghiz Communist Party Central Committee; G.S. Bashtanyuk, secretary of the AUCCTU; V.T. Saykin, chairman of the Executive Committee of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies; A.B. Shalyev, drillers' foreman at the "Turkmengazprom" production association; S.S. Alekseyev, chairman of the Constitutional Supervision Committee and director of the Institute of Philosophy and Law of the Urals branch of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

G.P. Razumovskiy spoke on behalf of the drafting commission that was set up at the plenum.

Following comprehensive consideration of the proposals of the Drafting Commission, the plenum approved the CPSU Central Committee's draft platform for the 28th party congress, which had been finalized to take into account remarks that had come in and the discussion that had taken place (the draft will be published in the press) and adopted a decision on this matter.

The plenum continued discussion of matters connected with the decisions of the 20th congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party.

M.S. Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee spoke on this issue.

The plenum was addressed by A.-M.K. Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee; M.M. Burokyavichyus, secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on a CPSU platform); V.A. Kuptsov, first secretary of the Vologda oblast CPSU Committee; A.P. Klautsen, first secretary of the Riga City Committee of the Latvian Communist Party; V.N. Shved, secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on a CPSU platform); N.M. Yerzhova, setter-up at the "F.E. Dzerzhinskiy" machine-building works production association in Perm; A.N. Yakovlev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Yu.D. Maslyukov, first deputy chairman of the USSR

Council of Ministers and chairman of the USSR Gosplan; Yu.-V.Yu.Paletsis, secretary of the Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist party; V.-Yu.Yu.Kardamevichyus, secretary of the Provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on a CPSU platform); and Ye.K.Ligachev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

The plenum adopted a decision on this matter which is being published in the press.

M.S.Gorbachev made the concluding speech at the CPSU Central Committee plenum.

With that, the CPSU Central Committee plenum completed its proceedings.

Summary of 7 Feb Morning Speeches

LD0702233990 Moscow TASS in English 2128 GMT
7 Feb 90

["Summary of speeches at Wednesday Morning Session"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—The full-scale meeting of the plenary meeting of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee continued, on the third day of its work, to discuss a new party platform for the 28th congress and Mikhail Gorbachev's report made on February 5.

The new platform is "a document of immense political significance," said Tajikistan party chief Kakhar Makhkamov. The draft is, according to Makhkamov, the very basis for the party to take to its congress, after it has been discussed and amended.

The party has no right to absolve itself of the responsibility for the errors committed under Stalin and in the period of stagnation, he said.

At the same time Makhkamov resolutely protested against attempts to declare everything the party did after the October revolution null and void and ignore everything that has been reached over the years of perestroika initiated by the party.

The Tajikistan party chief denounced effort to discredit and split the party, the guarantor of perestroika.

Viktor Mironenko, the first secretary of the Young Communist League Central Committee, spoke about interrelations of the party and the organisation he heads. He criticised the draft for failing to reflect and develop the basic principles of the party's youth policy under new conditions. It would be most irresponsible to leave the youth policy for other organisations to pick up, Mironenko said.

The problems amassed in the country should be resolved not through rallies, demonstrations or armed clashes but through highly productive labour efforts, a high sense of responsibility and the enhancement of the role and

responsibility of public organisations, Kirghizia party chief Absamat Masaliyev stressed in his address.

He voiced concern over the mushrooming of public movements, associations, and societies, most of which make political claims. Their activity, Masaliyev said, aims to destabilise society, undermine the country's economy and political system. The speaker called on the Central Committee and the government to make their principled viewpoint upon these matters better felt.

Gennadiy Bashtanyuk, secretary of the national trade union headquarters, noted that recent strikes by miners showed that trade unions lacked not only persistence but also skills in defending the working people's vital interests.

Stressing the need to go over from administrative to political methods of work with public organisations, the speaker proposed that the following formulation be included in the party platform: "The party views trade unions as an independent public organisation of working people that acts in their interests, protects their labor, social and economic rights and expresses the desire of the working people to unite for the sake of a better life. The party renounces its former idea of trade union as the drive belt, a link between the party and the broad masses of working people, it resolutely rejects the power-and-pressure approach in interrelations with trade union organizations".

Moscow Mayor Valeriy Saikin began by criticising the new platform of the CPSU Central Committee. The draft platform, he said, lacks an analysis of the way traversed by perestroika and has few constructive proposals to offer to the forthcoming party congress.

The Central Committee, Saikin said, began perestroika having no finalised interconnected blueprints for the solution of political and economic problems, and often acted randomly.

"In the struggle against deformations of socialism we let socialism itself be trampled underfoot, we pictured the life of the elder generation as a continuous chain of errors, and blamed all present day troubles on that generation," Valeriy Saikin said.

He insisted on a more clear-cut formulation of the party standpoint concerning the multi-party system, on the expeditious adoption of laws on public organisations and parties so as to put everything on a legal foundation.

Saikin supported the point in the new party platform pledging the party's adherence to the Leninist principle of the free self-determination of nations, including the right freely to secede from the union. He said he wanted the Soviet Union to remain a voluntary community of republics.

Atabally Shalyev, a shift foreman from Turkmenia and a member of the party's Central Auditing Commission, called for an approval of the new party platform. In his opinion the way to renew the Soviet Federation and to

form equitable relations between nations and ethnic groups based on genuine mutual respect, as outlined in the draft platform, can and should become a guarantor of creating a truly democratic society capable of meeting the requirements of human rights and rights and norms of nations.

Shalyev said he was confident that the Communist Party is the only force capable of leading society out of the present critical situation. Favouring the expansion of independence of all party links, Shalyev resolutely rejected the idea of turning the party into a confederation of republican parties.

Sergey Alekseyev, chairman of the USSR Constitutional Compliance Committee, said that a transition from one system of relations to another in a vast country cannot be simple and easy. He stressed that the delegation of political power solves no problems by itself. Economic power is the main thing, he said. In this connection, he called for vesting real economic power in working people's organisations on the bases of leasing or buying out.

Alekseyev stressed that the development of democracy must go hand in hand with strengthening the state as a law-governed state. He supported the new platform's provision for presidential powers.

At the same time he noted that the draft needed further elaboration. He insisted on including the statement on the need for the working people to assume economic powers.

With this, the discussion of item one of the plenary meeting's agenda was closed.

Vorotnikov Views Article 6 Decision

LD0702181490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1737 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, 7 Feb (TASS)—“The CPSU Central Committee plenum has adopted a decision that the party go to the USSR Supreme Soviet and Congress of People's Deputies with an initiative on the review of Article 6 of the USSR Constitution” (On the leading role of the CPSU in Soviet society). This was reported today by Vitaliy Vorotnikov, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, speaking at a meeting with a Brazilian legislative delegation, which is here on an official visit.

“We cannot rule out,” Vitaliy Vorotnikov said, “that new parties will appear. But we communists have no intention of giving up our positions. Like any party in the world we shall fight for our rights. There are hundreds of mass movements operating on democratic principles in the USSR. But we are opposed to organizations which propagate ideas of violence and separatism. All parties must act within the framework of the law.”

“Active events in the country,” Vitaliy Vorotnikov said, “have compelled us to bring forward the date of the CPSU Congress. It will take place in the second half of

June to the beginning of July of this year. The current plenum has approved the CPSU's political platform which will be published in the press. We shall be speaking not only with communists but with the whole people, too.”

Prospect of Personnel Changes

LD0702112590

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 0900 GMT on 7 February carries a six-minute recorded interview with V.P. Anishchev, member of the CPSU Central Committee and participant in the CPSU Central Committee Plenum, by an unidentified correspondent. The interview is on the party platform and the work of the plenum.

Asked about the possibility of any changes in the composition of the Central Committee and the Politburo, he replies: “You know, I have been a member of the party Central Committee for several years now; and when any personal reshuffles are in the cards, you can feel it in the atmosphere of the plenum. In this case I don't feel an atmosphere. Generally, anything can happen—a plenum's a plenum. Proposals could be submitted unexpectedly, because such turns of events now occur very often at plenums, because plenums are indeed being held ever more democratically. But it seems to me that there shouldn't be anything like that.

“I would however like to voice my own viewpoint—maybe it's only my viewpoint—that today, for the sake of perestroyka, the good of our people, and the future, we Central Committee members have to be very conscious people. If, for the benefit of the cause any of us has to step aside and make way for a young, more energetic, more thinking person, then I believe that everyone of us has to be prepared for this, and I personally am prepared for this.”

Lithuanian Communists' Split Condemned

AU0702190690 Paris AFP in English 1856 GMT 7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow, Feb 7 (AFP)—A Soviet Communist Party Central Committee plenum, which ended here Wednesday, condemned the move by Lithuanian communists to split with Moscow and called for the decision to be suspended. Baltic Fleet Admiral Vitaliy Ivanov told reporters that the plenum had condemned the split and had called on the Lithuanians to suspend their decision until the party congress.

The party congress is to be held in late June or early July, according to Russian Federation President Vitaliy Vorotnikov.

The Central Committee members said the move by Lithuanian communists to go it alone “was damaging for perestroyka, for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and for Lithuanian people”.

Plenum Decision on Draft Platform

LD0702205590 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 2008 GMT 7 Feb 90

["Decision of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum of 7 February 1990 on the CPSU Central Committee's Draft Platform for the 28th CPSU Congress"—TASS headline]

[Text] Moscow, 7 Feb (TASS)—There follows the text of the decision:

1. To approve the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th CPSU Congress, taking into account the discussion and remarks voiced by the participants in the plenum.
2. To publish the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th CPSU Congress in the press for broad discussion in party organizations and among communists and all the working people.

Gerasimov Holds Plenum News Conference

LD0702215890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian
1832 GMT 7 Feb 90

[News conference on the results of the CPSU Central Committee Plenum presented by Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennadiy Gerasimov and held in the USSR Foreign Ministry Press Center—live]

[Text] [Gerasimov] Esteemed comrades, ladies and gentlemen, we are commencing our news conference on the results of the CPSU Central Committee plenum, which has just ended. The following are participating in the news conference: Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Nikolay Nikitovich Slyunkov, Politburo member and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov, candidate member of the Politburo and first deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet; Andrey Nikolayevich Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; and Aleksandr Semenovitch Kapto, chief of the Ideological Department of the CPSU Central Committee. The floor is given first to Aleksandr Nikolayevich Yakovlev. Go ahead.

[Yakovlev] Esteemed comrades, ladies and gentlemen, it is hard to immediately give an all-embracing description, with claims to profundity, of the plenum which has taken place, since it ended just 15 minutes ago; and there probably has not been the time—at least, I want to say this for myself—to grasp everything and somehow to summarize and classify everything. But, before saying a few words, all the same, about the essence of the matter, I would like to stress the following. The plenum proceeded over three full days, and not two, as had been intended, and not one day, as was usually the case in the past. This, I believe, reflected, above all, the atmosphere of intense expectation in society, the importance of the moment which the country is experiencing and, of

course, the agenda, since we are dealing with the party platform, the draft party platform, for the 28th congress. All the documents of the plenum will be published. Their publication has begun. Moreover—and I want to stress this, to avoid any misunderstandings—they will be published in full, without omissions, with everything just as it happened.

This frees me of the need to retell both the report and also the basic debate. I think that it will be much more interesting for you to read the speeches in the original.

In my view, the most important thing is that this plenum was eagerly awaited both in the party and in our country as a whole, and, perhaps, if I am not mistaken, abroad as well—judging at least by the mail, by the...by the mass information media which preceded this plenum, there was really great interest.

But people were not only waiting. Both the Central Committee and all of us who are in the party leadership received very many questions, demands, and proposals. Sometimes these were expressed in the most sharp words and forms. I have to say that, on the whole, this wave of interest, this wave of criticism if you like, and the wave of demands more pleases than alarms us, although I won't say that this is always pleasant. As they say, we are all people and we are all human.

But, on the whole, what all this mail and all the discussion which unfolded before the plenum proves is that both communists and our whole society are living as one. At what pace, in which direction, how, which way, and at what level of quality will the development of our society proceed in future?

You know that before the plenum in some mass media the question was also posed thus: Will society turn back, or will it again advance even more quickly and make some kind of new start? So this is what I want to tell you.

Well, I want to say to you: If you ask me the main results of that rather long three-day session, it was that the very intensive work, the very intensive discussions very clearly demonstrated that the party and its leading section intend to go further, to develop perestroika by even more decisive means, to renew the party—that is, to move along the road of developing the democratic process and glasnost—but to move more resolutely than has been the case up to now. We rely in this on the politicization of the masses, on the civic activity of the people, which has risen very sharply recently.

Today, this is what I would also say further. Perestroika today, the support of perestroika today, is dearer to us than yesterday and the day before yesterday, because the country is at a crucial turning point with the forces of inertia not yet giving up their positions, with the new methods of work not yet having been secured, and only gathering strength. The illusion that one just has to clap one's hands three times and say perestroika three times and the matter will move forward, of course, is not justified, and could not, could not be justified. Such

illusions have been dispersed, and the realization has come that the flourishing of society and its further democratic development can get going only with the intensive labor of everyone, and with the sensibly organized and directed labor of every person, with all competence, with all competence. Competence is what is needed today.

After all, we understood very well as early as 1985—and it has become even more apparent now—that our people, our working people have been saying one thing: Give us freedom and the opportunity to work rationally, effectively, and with all our might, and do not interfere.

For people to be truly in charge, and for this to be possible, I repeat: The processes of restructuring have to be further advanced. Such is the essence of the expectations, which I believe the plenum has justified.

However, although the plenum also spoke a great deal about the current moment, some very sharp remarks were expressed, aimed at the leadership of the party's Central Committee, at the Politburo, at individual Politburo members, and at Central Committee secretaries and so on. The discussion was comradely, on the whole. There was nothing unusual in these discussions. It was what is now already customary in our party, including plenums of the party Central Committee.

However, apart from a discussion of current problems really necessary for the people, and the resolution of those everyday concerns with which our country and every person lives, apart from answering those expectations and the specific...[corrects himself] the expectation of specific decisions concerning the individual, this plenum is also distinctive by virtue of the fact that in essence, a further step has been taken, a major step away from the authoritarian, bureaucratic model of socialism born in completely different conditions and toward a democratic society of socialist choice.

So this is the kind of turn that was noted at the plenum, and all of us Soviet people—the leadership and the working people—really ought to give this the appraisal it deserves.

I reiterate that an analysis was given at the plenum of the unsatisfactory...[changes thought] an analysis of the fact that things do not always progress satisfactorily, that there are very many deficiencies, that we ourselves have made quite a few mistakes in the course of perestroika. At the same time, however, it was noted too that in an important matter like perestroika, like the renewal of society, like the democratization of an authoritarian state, it could not fail to be like that; it would be naive to expect anything else. Nevertheless, if we are to speak yet again about the more important thing that happened at that plenum, then a platform, a draft platform of the party has been adopted for the 28th Congress. This is a most important step in the history of our party, signifying the fact that the party is making a great, major historical movement in handing over power to the soviets, to the soviets. The party itself is changing its

role. It is becoming, or wants to be, the vanguard force in society and to struggle with political methods for the role of the vanguard ruling party in the competition with any sociopolitical movement. Will that process go ahead easily? We do not think it will. It is fruitful, to a certain extent, but painful as well. It is, naturally, of course, planned, as they say by perestroika. That is the logic of perestroika, but people's psychology, people's habits cannot be planned.

All this has to be cultivated. This great change in people's minds, this transfer to a new quality of party life, obviously is not going to occur easily; it is going to require from us effort, exertion, understanding, and everything connected with this, in equal proportions.

Although the plenum seemingly has ended its work—three days of intensive toil—all in all the work is only just beginning. It is now going to be, or rather, will be moved on to the local party organizations, seeing as prior to the congress—which is going to take place in late June-early July of this year—there will be a large-scale report-back and election campaign, from top to bottom, in every primary organization, in rayon committees, in city party committees, in oblast and kray committees, and in the republics. As you see, we face a very serious examination before the people, before perestroika, and if you like, before our country's future. None of this is dead simple, and we are very well aware of this and are proceeding in this direction in a deliberate fashion.

Someone may ask: What is there in this platform that could attract both world public opinion, and above all, our people? First and foremost, that which I have said already, that this is a step toward transferring power to the soviets: a major, historical step. However, also raised are major issues of economic development, of relations of production. Also raised are major issues of political relations, freedom of the individual, human liberty, and artistic freedom. Also raised are important problems of production relations in the countryside. In fact, the issues of the structure of power also are raised once more.

In particular, the plenum supported the idea of asking the people's consent to the introduction of presidential rule, so that the functions of power in the country would be concentrated in the hands of the president and his cabinet for a certain election period, this not only being topical from the standpoint of resolving today's problems, but also from that of our future needs. This question is also very serious and important for us, and represents a step on the path of democratic development in our country.

Finally, to conclude what is perhaps a rather dragged-out introductory address, it is important to stress also that what was discussed during the course of these three days was the renewal of the party itself. We were criticized very seriously and we were criticized correctly for the fact that, having begun perestroika, the party began to lag behind in democratic processes. The processes for

which the party itself provided the impulse and which it initiated itself began to leave the party behind. That is why the plenum came out firmly in favor of the party's restructuring its work in such a way as to lead the democratic restructuring processes.

The question of the situation in the Lithuanian party organization, which was carried over from the previous plenum, was discussed as the second question, but I think that we will try to cover this topic while giving replies, if there are any questions on your part. And now, please address your questions to any one of us.

[IRISH TIMES correspondent in English, followed by Russian translation] A question from the IRISH TIMES: On the last point, could you be a little more expansive about what form the decision with regard to the break-away of the Lithuanian party in December took, and were any kind of organizational decisions made with regard to organizational problems, with regard to the individual at this plenum?

[Unidentified speaker] Anatoliy Ivanovich Lukyanov.

[Lukyanov] As you know, since the last plenum it was passed on to us to resolve the matter of those resolutions, those decisions that were adopted by the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. At the last plenum, the decision was adopted concerning a trip to Lithuania by a group of Central Committee members in order to study the situation, the view of people, and meetings in party organizations. Central Committee secretaries travelled there, and Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev also travelled there. All this was covered in our press.

At the plenum today, there was a very painstaking discussion of the results of this trip. There was an account of the impressions brought back from this visit. Speeches were heard at the plenum, from both Comrade Brazauskas, first secretary of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee—which, as you know, declared itself independent of the CPSU—and Comrade Poletskis, secretary of this Communist Party's Central Committee. There also were speeches by comrades who had set up a provisional Central Committee of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the platform of the CPSU: Comrades Burokevicius, Shved, and others. And apart from that, a whole number of comrades who travelled to Lithuania spoke and shared their impressions.

After the detailed discussion, after consultations—for which a special interval was declared—a decision of the party Central Committee plenum was adopted, and was adopted unanimously, on the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania. This decision says:

First. The CPSU Central Committee plenum regards the decisions adopted by the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania as an organizational-political split with the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The plenum condemns such actions because they undermine

the unity of the CPSU and cause great damage to the process of the renewal of the Soviet federation and of society as a whole.

Second. The plenum supports those Lithuanian Communists who formed the provisional Central Committee on the platform of the CPSU, maintained loyalty to the principles of internationalism, and came out for the implementation of the revolutionary transformations under conditions of democratization and renewal of the CPSU, consolidating all the peoples of our multiethnic union.

The plenum instructs the CPSU Central Committee Politburo to give all necessary help to the provisional Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania on the platform of the CPSU in its practical activity, and to create the corresponding material and financial conditions for this.

Third. The plenum once again calls on those Lithuanian comrades who have joined the autonomous Communist Party of Lithuania to halt, until the 28th CPSU Congress, the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania with regard to the program and Rules of the CPSU and, on this basis, together with the Communist Party of Lithuania which remains on the platform of the CPSU, to elect delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress.

The plenum appeals to the Communists of Lithuania to join actively in the discussion of the pre-congress platform of the CPSU Central Committee, to recognize their historical responsibility for the fate of the Lithuanian people and for the whole of our multiethnic state, for the fate of revolutionary perestroika.

Thus, the Communists of Lithuania have had opened up for them the opportunity to discuss once more all the issues, to examine for themselves the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania and to decide the questions of their participation in the 28th party congress.

That, in brief, is what I can say about that.

[Unidentified speaker] A question from Hungarian Television for Aleksandr Yakovlev. I should like to know what changes Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's proposal underwent, regarding the possible formation of a multi-party system in the Soviet Union somewhere in the future. What changes were there to that at the CPSU Central Committee plenum? What changes did the platform undergo? I would also like to hear from you how you imagine the introduction of a multiparty system in the Soviet Union, from the particular point of view of the Army, the Interior Ministry, the KGB, and the diplomatic corps.

[Yakovlev] Well, first, there were no substantial changes at the plenum to what was proposed initially in the platform of Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. The plenum supported the ideas, the main ideas on this issue.

They consist in—and you will read this—the fact that under the conditions of the democratic process one naturally cannot exclude the formation of any socio-political movements which stand on a platform of renewal of socialist society, on a platform of perestroyka. The second point is that it is intended that our party and any other movements, and the party is also a movement, ought to be, or rather ought to act within the conditions of the Constitution, of recognition of constitutional standards, and within the framework of the Constitution. That is the second point. The plenum also adopted the proposal that the Central Committee go to the USSR Supreme Soviet with the legislative initiative about abrogating Article 6, about changing Article 6 of the Constitution, and about elaborating a clause concerning the party and socio-political movements which would be appropriate for the contemporary stage of the political development of the country, for the political process which is under way, and would correspond to the tasks of continuing political reform, political reform. We do not consider at the same time that a multiparty system is a cure-all and is the magic wand which allegedly determines the democratic process. I have already spoken about this in this auditorium. But at the same time we do not consider that any party, that any one party should claim a monopoly.

This was also supported by the plenum of the party Central Committee. But in this connection I would like also to emphasize the following.

Sometimes a question is put to us as if we, as it were, should permit or not permit, allow or not allow this or that party. This is an incorrect posing of the question, which we do not share. The party is a formation—the party is a natural process in democratic society, a constitutional process within the framework of the Constitution and the constitutional foundations of the state. At the same time, you yourselves realize that the party's task does not include some kind of obligation or undying wish to have opponents for itself, and itself to organize an opposition for itself. This should all occur naturally.

[Lukyanov] Aleksandr Nikolayevich, perhaps it should just be added that the plenum emphasized that parties are not acceptable for us....

[Yakovlev interrupting] Yes, you are right.

[Lukyanov, continuing] ...that would by force attempt to overthrow our system, implant interethnic discord and go beyond the framework of the Constitution. It is only on the basis of the Constitution and within its framework that any movements or any socio-political organizations may exist.

[Yakovlev] Oh, excuse me, you mean the second half? Well, you know, this is not a pressing issue for us at present, inasmuch as we have only one party, and we do not yet have a law on socio-political organizations in society. It has only been tabled, I think, or is being considered in the Supreme Soviet. Therefore, it would at present, you know, be indeed a kind of pre-Christmas

fortune-telling to say what the party situation, this or that party situation, will be in various bodies.

[Correspondent, with superimposed Russian translation] A question from the Italian ANSA news agency. You said that the plenum decided to move toward the creation of presidential government and a presidential republic, and that the president will be elected and enjoy full powers in the matter of the renewal of society. Could you say anything additional about when the president will be elected and with what additional powers he will be entrusted?

[Yakovlev] You know, this is not the prerogative of the plenum of the party's Central Committee, and I am simply not in a position to answer this question. This is the prerogative of the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies. How it decides is how it will be. We express our point of view when we speak about the future, about the development of our state system—the construction and structure of the supreme power—we express, make such a statement, we are tabling, intending to table such a proposal, well, we are expressing our opinion. But it would be very interesting for us as well to know how the Congress of People's Deputies, and before this, how the Supreme Soviet will decide.

[Unidentified correspondent] A question from ABC Australia. Will the proposed new political executive structures of power replace the Polituro? Will they implement the same authorities and powers and will they be elected or appointed?

[Yakovlev] I think that this issue is also about future organization. How will the Congress of People's Deputies decide? It will either decide...well, that the president's appointment by election is an indisputable matter. The formation of the cabinet depends on how the Congress of People's Deputies decides. But as far as the correlation of power between the Politburo and the future structures of power is concerned, I think this is an issue which is a very...[changes thought] You know, the power of the Politburo, if there is such a power, and the power of the future cabinet should not be compared. The Politburo's power, as we understand it, is on the basis of the platform which has just been adopted.

The Politburo will direct the processes in the party—in the party, not in the state, not in economic life. That is the whole point. So everyone will be working on his own affairs. We are, after all, moving toward the division of party, state, and economic activities, legislative and judicial activities. So to say now that something is going somewhere, something from the Politburo, is not a totally precise way of posing the question. Here, in the questions, to some extent there are elements of the sort of dogmatism that we are already abandoning. We are already abandoning it. That is why the plenum has been convened. That is why the platform was endorsed. The three-day discussions went on so that we could find a new role for the party that would really not replace economic, administrative, state, legislative, or judicial

bodies, but would conduct its own affairs, while of course implementing its own policies, campaigning for those policies, and fighting for such policies, and would propose program objectives to society—and society decides whether to accept those objectives or not, whether to accept those programs or not. You understand, all that is now being reinterpreted. It is being reinterpreted. So we need to regard the development of future processes as the process of democratic development, and it will give much more in the course of that development. Life will also suggest to us many new forms. That is inevitable. The five-year period, the five-year experience of perestroika, has already told us that the dynamism has been heightened, I would say. The dynamics of development change every day, you know, and the temperature, as they say, also rises every day.

[Lukyanov] And then, during that time, changes have already taken place. Very much has shifted from party bodies to the sphere of activity of the Supreme Soviet, the government, the Constitutional Supervision Committee, the Supreme Court, and so on. One cannot fail to notice that—the changes that have occurred over the past five years.

[Unidentified Irish reporter in English] [Words indistinct] Irish television.

[Unidentified speaker] (?It is switched on.)

[Irish reporter] I'd like a translation of your....

[Second unidentified speaker interrupts] The microphone is switched on.

[Irish reporter in English with superimposed Russian translation] I am sorry. A question from Irish television. I would like to ask you for additional clarification regarding your relations with the Communist Party of Lithuania. As I understand the position which you expressed today, discussions with that party are going on and you would like the Lithuanian party to make its contribution to the preparation of the congress. At the same time, in relation to a multiparty system, you said that you are ready to cooperate with and encourage those parties which are in agreement with the Constitution of the Soviet Union. It appears that there is a clear contradiction here between the two positions, since the Communist Party of Lithuania is not right now putting forward a question of full independence from the Soviet Union.

[Lukyanov] Well, I would reply as follows. The doors for the Lithuanian Communists, for their participation in the preparation of the congress, are open. We are ready to continue dialogue; we are ready to continue working and cooperating. Now it is up to the Lithuanian Communists, to a significant extent, to those who make up the Independent Communist Party of Lithuania, and the point is that there is a fairly significant proportion of Communists there who remain on the CPSU platform.

This in no way contradicts the Constitution. All movements, any movements—and that is true of any country—can exist and should exist if they recognize the basis of existence of this state, of this federation, that is, its Constitution.

[TASS correspondent] A question from the TASS agency, or more precisely two questions, if I may. Could you explain the new structure of party leadership, that was mentioned in some contributions? In particular, there were reports that there would be a party chairman, deputy chairmen, and so on.

The second question, also proceeding from the debate, is about various forms of property. Is private property being allowed and if so, could it be on an equal footing with other forms of property? Thank you.

[Girenko] The question of property. The party is rejecting a simplistic view of socialist property and the ignoring of commodity and money relations. That is why the party is rejecting those forms of property and those forms of management which give rise to man's alienation from property. The only exception is the position held by the party, which is supported and discussed by the entire people, that is the point of view of the whole people, not to allow the appropriation of other people's labor. [indistinct mumbling among participants]

[?Gerasimov] The first question; repeat the first question, on the structure of the party.

[TASS reporter] The first question is about the structure of the party: The question of the party chairman and deputy chairman and whether, in particular, the institution of Central Committee secretaries would be preserved or not was talked about, or more precisely, discussed in some participants' speeches in the debate. How is this planned?

[Yakovlev] I understand. Well, the platform will be submitted for discussion by the public, for discussion throughout the party. Meanwhile, in this draft we are proposing the introduction of the post of party chairman, a deputy and his deputies. Yes, we intend for there to be party Central Committee secretaries, who will head commissions, working commissions made up of members of the party Central Committee, with their own small apparatus. Time will show how best to organize this and how best to do it all. Such proposals are being submitted for discussion by the party.

[Lukyanov] And the presidium of the party Central Committee will contain the leaders of the Communist parties of the union republics. That is the scheme that is planned.

[NHK correspondent] NHK television, Japan. A question for Aleksandr Nikolayevich: Please, say what effect the results of the plenum will have on Mr. Gorbachev's position.

[Yakovlev] A very, very positive one, I believe.

[Unidentified speaker] [Word indistinct] radio. A question in two parts: You just said that the party Central Committee in general has adopted a decision to go to the Supreme Soviet with a request to annul Article 6, to change Article 6. Please tell us: That has been clear long since, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, so was it necessary to put us Communists in that position for these six months in order then to admit what was clear to us all?

And the second question, for Comrade Lukyanov: I attended all the sessions of the Supreme Soviet. It was a splendid political school. Does it not seem to you—and to you, comrade Politburo members and secretaries—that the USSR Supreme Soviet now, probably fortunately—having read the discussion at the party Central Committee plenum—approaches the matters under discussion in a much more politically responsible manner than some or many members of the CPSU Central Committee who participated in the discussion?

[Yakovlev] Well, at last our journalists also have started learning how to ask questions point-blank and put the interviewee in a rather delicate and difficult position!

[Lukyanov] I will give you an answer. [laughter] First, as far as Article 6 of the Constitution is concerned, not everything is as clear as you think. What we are talking about is even now putting this issue to the congress, which has to decide. A considerable number—and this is shown by polls—are in favor of retaining the article, some say it should be abolished, and others say it should be amended. As you can see, the plenum has raised the issue of amending that article. This probably means, as is demonstrated by the experience of the union republics, that the article might mention both the Communist Party and other movements. And the point is not whether or not the Constitution contains such an article—at one time it did not—but the actual position of our party. One ought not to confuse the two issues, especially since I have to tell you that abolition, or the demand for abolition of the article, sometimes is combined with changes to the nature of life in the party itself in our country, with a multiparty system, and so on. These are different planes, the juridical and actual constitutions, as Vladimir Ilich Lenin used to say.

Second, you say that the Supreme Soviet takes a more responsible approach to the issues than the Central Committee plenum, and so on. I think this is an improper conclusion. The thing is that it was the party and its plenum that engendered perestroika. It was the first to define this road. Very many disputes have passed from the plenum to the Supreme Soviet, and the Supreme Soviet itself is learning a lot, learning democracy, although I would also say that the plenum is learning from the Supreme Soviet. They are communicating vessels.

[Yakovlev] You know, I personally think there is nothing special about the differences and the diverse, sometimes contradictory remarks—be they liberal, radical, progressive, conservative, or neoconservative. It would be

strange if suddenly now, after 70 years of silence, we all were to start speaking identically once again, only this time saying the opposite.

Such things do not happen in life. They do not happen. Otherwise, this would not be society, it would not be people; I do not know what it would be. Let everyone say what they think, that is simply fine.

[Correspondent in English with superimposed Russian translation] A question from THE WASHINGTON POST.

[Gerasimov] A microphone, please. It is necessary to provide a translation of your question. You are an infrequent guest among us. It is necessary to provide a translation. It is necessary for the translators sitting in the booth.

[Questioner] UCHITELSKAYA GAZETA, Tarabrin. Aleksandr Nikolayevich, both of my questions to you [part of question drowned out by English translation which is as follows: "...will be perfectly specific. Forgive me for turning my back to you. My first question is this." English translation is then switched off and the question is heard to continue in Russian] In his speech Minister of Culture Gubenko spoke of the need for a cardinal change in the attitude to the development of culture and education in our country. Therefore, my first question is this: Are there likely to be any specific steps in this direction in the near future? And my second question is, how do you, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, personally, view the speech made at the plenum by Comrade Brovikov, USSR ambassador in Poland?

[Yakovlev] May I start with the second one? At the plenum I expressed my view on this subject, and it will be published tomorrow. But to anticipate or to run ahead somewhat, my attitude to it is negative. But I think that it would be better for you to read it tomorrow. There, what I said about that speech will be published word for word. That is the first thing.

As far as culture is concerned, although this is not my sphere of activity, I share completely and utterly the content of your question; I understand why you ask it, and at the plenum the question was put rather about the priorities of culture and agriculture. And one worker came out and said: Then why not the base industries? There was an argument about balancing the development of the national economy which excludes those spurts [ryvki] which are called priorities. In other words, there was a discussion about this, but I share the pathos, the content and the concern which were voiced in the speech by Nikolay Nikolayevich Gubenko, our new minister of culture.

[WASHINGTON POST correspondent, in English with superimposed Russian translation] A question from THE WASHINGTON POST, that is two questions for Aleksandr Yakovlev. First of all, were there any personnel changes in the Politburo or the Central Committee, that is, was anyone removed from them or were

any new members added or has anyone retired on pension? And second, a month ago the events in Lithuania gave rise to great dissatisfaction and disillusionment in the country. [speaker is actually heard saying: "Six weeks ago last month, there was a great deal of anger and frustration about Lithuania and the Communist Party there"] However, is it not possible to say that now in the CPSU a similar process to that which happened in the Lithuanian Communist Party is happening, in other words, attempts to restore the authority of the party in a situation when the party has lost touch with the processes going on in the country?

[Yakovlev] No cadre changes took place at this plenum. That is the first thing. And this task had not even been set. Second, I would not put the question like that—that the party is at present subordinating everything to regaining its prestige. On this matter various points of view exist in the party as well, various points of view. On the one hand it is possible to kind of agree, and the plenum spoke of the party lagging behind in places—or rather not the party, but party organizations, but not the whole party, but maybe some part of it, a passive part—but nevertheless the question pointedly stands as to the renewal of the party and its internal life and the democratic basis of the party. And the most important thing is that the whole party mass be included in this life, this is the whole question. A certain isolation has occurred of the party apparatus from the party masses. This must all be turned around, so that the party masses play the decisive role in the party, that is rank-and-file Communists, that they choose their leaders from top to bottom, participate in working out party decisions and political programs and bear responsibility for it; this is what it is actually about. This is what it is actually about. Yes, there are arguments in the party as regards the fact that some consider that everything is being derailed, everything is collapsing, that there is some kind of crash, that we are virtually on the eve of catastrophe and so on and so forth. I think...[changes thought] I do not share such a point of view; I think that my colleagues present here do not share such a point of view either.

Yes, we take a critical attitude to our activity. Yes, we see that much needs to be changed. Yes, we see that in some things we are lagging behind the processes. But this does not at all mean that we are not controlling the political situation, that we do not know what to do tomorrow, that we are not leading the masses with us. Otherwise, perestroika simply would not proceed, since today, just as in 1985, the party is leading the perestroika processes, and the plenum—this latest three-day plenum—has proven this brilliantly, having elaborated what I consider to be a progressive platform.

[TASS correspondent] (S. Osnovskiy), TASS news agency. One more question for Aleksandr Nikolayevich. Many, or rather some speakers at the street meeting on Sunday, said that if, so to speak, the results of the plenum are not satisfactory, then similar actions may be continued, and dates were even named. How do you

think that the results of this plenum will be evaluated by those who took to the streets on Sunday?

[Yakovlev] Well, it is difficult to say, comrades, who will evaluate things, and in what manner. You know, you cannot guess that. Everybody evaluates things proceeding from his own interests, depending on what he wants to receive from that evaluation. After all, there are people for whom any decision seems incorrect. Or rather, it does not seem incorrect, but it is more to his advantage to consider any decision incorrect. There are certain nuances in the political struggle. The foreign correspondent knows this well. We are beginning to realize this. We are beginning to realize this, because emotions, ambitions and so forth also play a major role in politics. But nevertheless, it seems to me that if I am well acquainted with the various platforms, with the various utterances, and with the proposals, then I think that if one approaches the issue seriously, attentively and thoroughly, then the draft platform which we are proposing—I mean the party's central committee plenum—may turn out to be, given a rational attitude, the consolidating platform not only for the consensus of the party, but also the consensus of the people.

[LE MONDE correspondent] Two questions from LE MONDE, Mr. Yakovlev. First, a technical point. Could you read out the part of the platform that concerns abrogation or change in Article 6? And a second question, a political one. In light of these past three days of discussion at the Central Committee, how would you describe the main political and ideological tendencies which the party is experiencing? And do you consider that these different tendencies will be represented at the congress in different platforms?

[Lukyanov] Let's read it out.

[Yakovlev] Go on, read it out.

[Lukyanov] I cannot do so absolutely precisely, because we changed this wording several times. The wording on the role of the CPSU in connection with Article 6 is as follows:

The CPSU, just like other sociopolitical organizations and mass movements, takes part in running state and public affairs, and puts forward its representatives to soviets of people's deputies and other state bodies. The party does not take upon itself state commanding power [gosudarstvennoye vlastnoye polnomochiye]. Its role is to be the democratically recognized political leader, acting through Communists, not claiming advantage and not claiming to have its special position written into the Constitution of the USSR. In this connection the party considers it essential to introduce, as a legislative initiative for examination by the Congress of People's Deputies, the proposal for the corresponding change in Article 6 of the country's basic law.

That is the wording. As you can see, the start of this wording sounds almost legislative. [indistinct interchanges]

[Unidentified speaker] Was there a question there of political currents, as I have also understood?

[Girenko] Well, you see, I would not formulate or describe it like that: as political currents. Even though it would be a pretence for me to say that all of us were sitting for three days trying to persuade one another that white is white and black is black. No, all three days there were fairly heated debates on many issues, if not to say on all issues which were discussed. There wasn't a single paragraph of the platform which did not involve an argument, or a discussion, yes...[changes thought]...the last, we ended yesterday at half past three in the morning—I am speaking of the editorial commission. [sentence as heard] There, too, there were arguments prior to submitting certain elaborations of some wordings to the Congress and prior to this, in my opinion, all this went into the night, because the commission had been organized on the first day of our work, on the first day of work.

This alone shows that this session and these discussions did not have the nature of nothing but friendly embraces. They had the nature of heated emotional arguments which occasionally somewhat exceeded the limits of, so to speak, well, how can I put it mildly? But all of this is all right, all of this is normal, provided it all serves the interests of the cause. As for some trends, well there are people who so far have been very strongly attached somewhere both to the methods and habits of the past, to some spiritual, intellectual, and psychological comfort and all that. There are people who simply treat the ongoing events with calm and welcome them. And there are people who come out maybe more fervently for speeding up the processes, who show impatience, a certain radicalism and all that. And I think that in every country it is a task for politics to pick up all these processes and to find some universal consensus, otherwise political leadership will not be political leadership. We cannot just simply brush one thing aside, adopt another, and ignore the third one. One must not act like that, especially in a nascent democratic society. I personally would not pin any labels on anyone, and on the whole I regard this as a useless and unnecessary thing.

[Unidentified correspondent in English, with superimposed Russian translation] A question from the GUARDIAN newspaper, London. The adoption of the institution of president is a rather impressive change in the Constitution. It was presented to the plenum without prior discussion. In Mikhail Gorbachev's report there were only two sentences on this. Could you tell us, when did the Politburo first discuss the idea and, secondly, is the Politburo united in supporting this whole idea? And then, what does the Politburo think, what measures need to be distinguished; at the moment Mr Gorbachev appoints ambassadors and appoints those who hold talks between the USSR and other heads of state.

[Lukyanov] I would like to answer this question of yours. I have to say that the idea of creating the office of head

of state—what it will be called has still not been determined—was voiced even before the first Congress of People's Deputies and has been actively discussed. This is not a new idea. If you open up our latest newspapers you will see whole roundtables of jurists devoted to these ideas. There existed in the Soviet Union the institution of a collegial [Lukyanov corrects himself] collective president which has in its time been the Central Executive Committee Presidium, and then the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet. A system has now become developed whereby the president or the chairman of the Supreme Soviet devotes a lot of time just to the Supreme Soviet but it is necessary for him to unite both kinds of power.

Many jurists are voicing such proposals. In other words, it is clear that both the Soviet experience and the experience of foreign presidential governing bodies will be utilized, but in any event it is possible to say that what the final scheme will be and how it will be finally decided—this will be decided by the Congress of People's Deputies. In any event, the president will be the person who will be responsible to the people and to the country's representative bodies.

[Unidentified correspondent] The AL-MUSAWWAR magazine, Egypt. How can it be explained that Politburo members approached the plenum without a single agreed position, even on the main issue, the law on ownership, for instance? Were any votes taken? Do you agree with Yegor Kuzmich's view about Germany's reunification?

[Yakovlev] Why do you say that? We have come to the plenum with the Politburo having a single point of view, among other things on questions of ownership. And as far as I can remember we simply had no special debates on this matter.

Secondly, the German question was not discussed, was not discussed at the plenum. That's all.

[Unidentified correspondent] The Dutch paper HANDELSBLAD. One small elaboration regarding the Lithuanian Communist Party. How do you now regard this party? Does the CPSU now look on it as a fraternal party? And would you call this the first sign in the Soviet Union of a multiparty system?

[Girenko] I would like, if I can, to answer this question as follows: Today the Lithuanian Communist Party is experiencing a process of defining itself. And the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress adopted the decision to form an independent Communist Party of Lithuania, which is leaving the CPSU, without consulting, without consulting widely with Communists. And today in Lithuania each Communist is in the process of determining which position he should take. And today at the plenum the comrades from Lithuania said that the Communist Party of Lithuania which remains on the platform of the CPSU now numbers 35,000 Communists, whereas the Communist Party of Lithuania, which has stated that it is leaving the CPSU, has slightly over 70,000 Communists. So then, approximately another

100,000 Communists have not yet determined their position. That is why the plenum expressed its attitude, proceeding from the fact that some proportion of the Communists still has both the time and the opportunity to determine and take up its more precise positions. We expect the consciousness of Lithuanian Communists and of the Lithuanian people, a sober understanding, a correct understanding of everything now taking place in Lithuania, to prevail sufficiently and that a considerable number of Communists will remain in the CPSU. As regards how we will organize our work with the Communist Party of Lithuania, we proceed from the fact that, after all, there is a Communist Party of Lithuania, which is a part of the CPSU, and it is taking part and will undoubtedly take part in our party's work in all areas. And (as for) the part of the Lithuanian party which has announced its decision to leave the CPSU and, for the time being, is still confirming that decision, the plenum of the Central Committee appealed to that section of the Lithuanian Communists to go back again, as it were, to the decisions of the 20th CPSU congress [as heard] and suspend those decisions as regards the annulment for those Communists of the rules and program of the CPSU.

We consider that the Lithuanian Communists do have an opportunity to do this, and in that case there would be normal relations, as they always have been, with that Communist Party until the 28th CPSU Congress. But if this does not happen, the CPSU will naturally develop relations with the independent Lithuanian Communist Party as a Communist party, with all the consequences ensuing from that, so to speak. It will take part, insofar as it can, in our work, in our common work, but without forming part of the CPSU. This is unconnected with the issue of multipartyism.

[Unidentified correspondent in English with superimposed Russian translation] ASSOCIATED PRESS. Mr. Yakovlev, could you tell us if this decision allowing a multiparty system is based on the events in Eastern Europe, where we have seen the fall of the Communists and their departure from power, or is it based on the experience of the five years of reform pursued by Mr. Gorbachev?

[Yakovlev] Well, in the first place it can in no way be based on those events which are taking place, which have taken place, which are taking place in the countries situated to the east [as heard] of us since, if I remember, a multiparty system has existed, even up to the present day, in all of these countries. There is no country where there are no other parties.

It is a different matter with regard to the position which they have occupied in public and political life. But that is a different matter. Of course, that approach, which is expressed in the draft platform, arose not today and not yesterday; this question was carefully weighed up earlier as well, and it was, in general, clear, and there is no need to be too sagacious; if we are starting on a broad

development and a profound development of the democratic process in the country, then it is clear that will touch all sociopolitical movements. For if one is to talk seriously about the development of democracy, people's power, pluralism of opinion, the independence of the republics, the right of minorities to express their opinions, and so forth and so on, then the problem of various sociopolitical movements and their new role naturally arises. To realize this, you know, not too much sagacity, I repeat, is necessary.

It is a different matter...[changes thought] If we are to be completely open—and we have to be precisely like this now, and all the people here are serious, and it is difficult to deceive you here, just as it is for you to deceive us—then it is necessary to see that the country just now is in a very complicated position, both economically and socially. At the beginning I said: In the transitional period, which is difficult, difficult, with tension, costs, you know all this demands...[changes thought] The country, look at how it has raised itself up. People have straightened their shoulders, they express various interests, at times directly opposed. If in 1985 we had suddenly said: Come on, boys, go and organize 154 parties at once, I can imagine what would have happened. Every process must ripen in every specific country, in every specific country.

We have our history, our traditions, both old and new. We have our democratic and antidemocratic culture, both the one and the other. We have our own experience, experience in human relations, moreover in a country such as ours where more than 100 nations live, more than 100 nations—and this is also a very serious issue—a country that has grown up out of an extremely backward country, that was on the edge of European development. All this puts a political, economic, psychological, and emotional...[changes thought]...well, leaves its stamp on the development of our society. We cannot fail to take this into account, but in the present time the logic, the logic of the development of perestroika and the struggle for the processes of perestroika, leads us to the fact that this democratic process must develop further, further, but it must develop naturally, naturally, on the basis of the law, on the basis of the law, on the basis of the Constitution, on the basis of the people's desire, if you like, to organize a party, not to organize a party, what to organize, in what form, an opposition party or not. However, we hope for one thing, that this must be a party standing on a platform of socialist choice. However, as Anatoliy Ivanovich here added, we are against a party that would all of a sudden want to organize itself as a party advocating violence, well, and any other goals that would not express the ethics, morality, and traditions of the popular masses and socialist society.

[Unidentified speaker] Tell us, please, was the question of fighting crime discussed at the plenum, and has this been reflected in the draft platform? Thank you.

[Lukyanov] At the plenum, it was stated clearly and firmly that it is necessary to strengthen radically the

struggle against crime; against violations of the law; the struggle for strengthening law and order and for improving the work of all forms of law-enforcement bodies. Special attention was paid to increasing the role of the courts as guarantors of strengthening the observance of the law in the country. To this issue, the issue of the functioning of law-enforcement bodies and the issue of crime fighting, is devoted one of the lesser sections making up the chapter in the platform which concerns state power.

[Unidentified correspondent] WASHINGTON POST. Mr. Yakovlev, you spoke of allowing or encouraging parties that share the socialist choice. It seems to us that this wording rules out the majority of parties, as we know them, of the type that exist in the West. I do not know whether or not an ordinary conservative party such as those existing in the West could be seen as unlawful in the Soviet Union. Several years ago, a party called the Democratic Union was founded in the Soviet Union. Do you consider that such a party could be legal, lawful, if Article 6 undergoes changes in the way you spoke of?

[Yakovlev] Well, you know, first, I did not speak about allowing, or however else you put it. That is not a function of our party, to allow or not allow other parties. I emphasized that it was precisely up to the law and the Constitution, and, well, the outcome of subsequent democratic development. Yes, as a Communist party we are going to fight to remain the ruling party, but through political methods, through Communists in parliaments, in other bodies of government, and so on, through propaganda, through campaigning, through party mass media, that is, through all these means.

Well, you know, as for what kind of parties, it is difficult to speculate on this at present. Evidently a definite procedure will be adopted by a law of the Supreme Soviet on the registration of parties, sociopolitical movements, and so forth. Then a judgement will be passed on this—I do not know whether it will be by the Supreme Soviet itself, or by a constitutional court—I just do not know, or whether it will be by some kind of commission. This will be shown by the future. I do not think that at present we can predetermine this here with you. Moreover, I stress once again that this is not a function for our party.

[Lukyanov] Indeed, the Supreme Soviet is presently preparing a draft law on this matter, on public associations.

[Unidentified correspondent] POLITIKA, (Bajalski), Yugoslavia. I have a question for Comrade Yakovlev. May one consider that in the almost five years of the policy of perestroika that have passed, the present party plenum has been the highest and most difficult ideological and political pass that the Central Committee has had to negotiate in order to adapt the party and society for a faster and deeper democratic breakthrough, to democratic transformations?

[Yakovlev] Yes, I agree with you. This plenum was marked by precisely such a character. It was indeed, to a certain extent, such a breakthrough, and as I said right at the start, a historic plenum, since it is a matter of a program of action under the new conditions of perestroika having been proposed by the party. After all, this is our—that is, after actually taking into account the experience of perestroika—this is the first program of action. It is not yet of an all-embracing program nature. This is a matter for the future. For this reason we would sooner call it a platform program, a program of action, a program of action for the immediate future, for the immediate future. From this point of view I consider that if our society and party and the party organizations will accept and approve this program, then this will be a great democratic step, profound in content, of movement along the road toward democracy.

[Unidentified correspondent] NOVOSTI PRESS AGENCY. Aleksandr Nikolayevich, two questions. The first: Do you allow for the possibility of a transfer of the congress to an earlier time period, or is it final? And the second question: Is it planned to invite Communist and workers' parties from abroad to the 28th congress? Thank you.

[Yakovlev] The first thing. I think that we have now reached a consensus on holding the congress at the end of June or the beginning of July. It seems that this suits and, as it were, reconciles the various points of view on this count, since if it were earlier there would simply not be time to hold a full-scale report-back and election campaign from top to bottom, from top to bottom. As for...[Yakovlev changes thought] Especially as we still have elections here, to the local soviets and the republican, oblast, and kray soviets, which are also a very serious political campaign that will both pose many questions for us and will answer many questions. As for the second question, such an invitation, such an issue was not considered.

[Correspondent Kisilev] Dmitriy Kisilev from the "Vremya" program. Speaking during the first day of the plenum's work, Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said that the platform proposed by him envisions the existence of various forms of federative links in the Soviet Union. Was this position supported? If so, does this mean that the CPSU Central Committee intends to put forward a legislative initiative on the conclusion of a new union treaty, according to which some republics will join the Soviet Union under one set of conditions and others under another?

[Lukyanov] The point is that a legislative act devoted to delimiting the powers of the union and the republics is now being prepared. It is hard to say now in what form that legislative act will be expressed in the Constitution, as a new treaty or a chapter in the Constitution on delimiting powers. But, in any event, it will be a perfectly clear list of the powers of the union and the powers of the republics outside this list. It is natural that this list will apply to all republics if it is a federation. However,

taking into account the peculiarities of each republic, it is not ruled out that there might be diverse nuances within the framework of that list, outside it. That is perfectly natural, because the republics are diverse, as are their territories, populations, and conditions of existence. Incidentally, the experience of other countries and, in particular, Russian pre-revolutionary experience show that diverse territories have diverse degrees of autonomy. We must approach our federation flexibly, and that is the guarantee that it will be renewed and filled with new content.

[Unidentified correspondent] The newspaper RIZOSPASTIS. Tell us, please: Did the plenum take a position on whether the positions of general secretary or chairman and president of the country would be combined in future? Also, what did you mean, Aleksandr Nikolayevich, in your speech when you said that the changes in the socialist countries have to be looked at from the point of view of the Soviet Union's security?

[Unidentified speaker] Do you already know my speech? It has been reported by TASS, has it? What was the first question?

[Correspondent] Combining the posts....

[?Yakovlev] Ah well, this question was neither discussed nor raised at the plenum.

[Lukyanov] First one has to establish the post! [laughs]

[?Yakovlev] Yes, right, Anatoliy Ivanovich; first the post should be established and only then can one combine it or not, and this is a prerogative of the Congress of People's Deputies—I repeat this already for the third time. The thing is that I had to answer questions—and you will see that—arising from the concern voiced at the plenum in connection with the changes in socialist countries. And answering that question I said that yes, indeed, events are taking place and sometimes they are unexpected and complex, but one should treat them with understanding.

If we...if I recall my speech, well...if we speak about freedom for our own people, then why should one deny it to others? If we speak about the sovereignty and freedom of our republics, about their independence, then why should a different logic be applied to others? If we...and so on. I do not want to quote myself. And in relation to this I said that, regarding the German question, this is a special question for us, and one cannot put it on the same level with all the other questions. I think that everyone present here understands the reasons. The Soviet people have lost neither memory, nor certain feelings nor psychological sentiments, so to speak, toward the recent past in our history. We do not come out...[changes thought] Moreover, we share the desire of our friends in the GDR to advance toward unification and to solve some questions of federative or confederative structure. However, in the given instance, one thing concerns us: that the security of our borders be guaranteed if all this should suddenly happen at a certain stage,

at some time, and that no new threat of some kind from the quarter we know be created. We are in favor of Germany in Europe, and not of a European Germany. This is a very serious issue of principle for us. I have talked about this at less length, but I included this content, about which I have just spoken.

[Unidentified speaker] (Noorus), Estonia. Maybe I am greatly mistaken, but it seems to me that the Soviet Union has a future only if it remains a union of independent states. In this context, how is one to understand the condemnation of the Lithuanian Communists? So what do you get? Free states have joined and yet they have an interstate Communist Party? Could you comment on this in this context?

A second question on the status of the union republics: So far, the status of the union republics has not been de facto defined, and it seems to me that these arguments will continue. Can you define the status of the republics, and is there a difference, for example, in the status of the three Baltic republics and the other union republics? Thank you.

[Lukyanov] The status of the union republics is defined perfectly clearly in our Constitution as sovereign states in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, that is, a federation of 15 republics enjoying equal rights. No one has changed this status. There is a special chapter in the Constitution devoted to the rights of the union republics, quite extensive rights. As far as the party is concerned, the party of one of the republics which has decided to become independent of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, this is a completely different issue which, by the way, is not connected with statehood. To the contrary, we view the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as one of the guarantors of the unity of this federation and of taking into consideration all the features of each republic, all the diversities of the republics, the peculiarities of the peoples, and the unity of those peoples. There are no contradictions here; this is dialectics.

[?Yakovlev] Maybe, Anatoliy Ivanovich, it also should be said that that status defined in the Constitution in no way resolves the question that the federation must be given substance, enriched, so that the republics should feel greater independence—perhaps so that they feel themselves masters on their land and may decide all questions within that republic's competence or those questions which they have not voluntarily given over to the competence of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

[Female correspondent] ZEMEDEL'SKO ZNAME, Bulgaria. A few words, please, about the platform of the party in the agrarian sphere, and in particular about the platform of the party on land ownership, as various opinions have already clearly appeared there, you have had the (?Akor) congress, and meetings of its representatives with you. They presented their interests very clearly. What will you say on that question?

[Unidentified speaker] As regards the agrarian policy of the party, the essence lies in giving rural workers the freedom of choice of all methods of running a farm, diversity of forms of ownership, diversity of forms of running agriculture. All forms—state, collective farm, state farm, cooperative, peasant, individual farms. Just one form is unacceptable—the appropriation of the labor of another and exploitation.

[Female correspondent] Ownership of land. [words indistinct]

[Same unidentified speaker] Ownership of land? Land is transferred over to leasehold, with right of inheritance.

[Female correspondent] Who transfers over to leasehold—the collective and state farms...

[Same unidentified speaker, interrupting] The land will belong to the soviets.

[Female correspondent] Yes [words indistinct].

[Lukyanov] According to the basis of land legislation under the draft, the main distributor of land everywhere—in the cities and in rural areas—will be the relevant bodies of power—the soviet of people's deputies.

[Gerasimov] It's getting late. The time for presenting materials for publication is approaching. We see that some comrades are leaving. The last question, please, NOVOYE VREMYA.

[Unidentified correspondent] NOVOYE VREMYA, Sidorova. Aleksandr Nikolayevich, how can you explain such a quantity of critical speeches toward our foreign policy, especially on the second day of the work of the plenum? All the more so since it would seem that it is namely in this sphere that our country has achieved the most tangible success in recent years.

[Yakovlev] I am thinking about that myself, and I cannot understand it. [laughter in the hall] When I do understand, I'll tell you without fail. Well then, comrades and gentlemen, ladies, thank you for your attention. When you read about the platform, come once again with questions.

PRAVDA Publishes 6 February Plenum Speeches

Shevardnadze: Keep Perestroyka Alive

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[Debate speech by E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] E.A. Shevardnadze. This may not be a very popular request, but I would ask for a few minutes longer than the time allocated to me by the standing orders, if possible.

M.S. Gorbachev. We will follow the content of your speech.

E.A. Shevardnadze. I'd like to say a few words by way of explanation in connection with Yegor Kuzmich's speech.

I do not know why, after parliamentary, official, and detective investigations into the Tbilisi events have been carried out—particularly after the question was examined at the Congress of USSR People's Deputies—it was necessary to reopen this discussion.

In order to somehow try yet again to restore the truth, I want to say that there was no Politburo session, there was an ordinary meeting at the airport. Apart from other issues, the alarming telephone calls from Tbilisi were reported and it was stated that the Georgian comrades' request to be given the necessary help in restoring order—not least in securing the return of those internal forces subunits which had been deployed on Georgian territory and subsequently redeployed to Armenia—had been satisfied.

It was categorically stated, and categorical instructions were given by the general secretary and the Politburo, that the matter should be resolved by political means and through a political dialogue. Those were the instructions and recommendations that were given. That is all that happened at the airport.

M.S. Gorbachev. No, it's not all. We also instructed Comrade Shevardnadze—despite all his traveling and so forth—and someone else...

Voices. Razumovskiy.

M.S. Gorbachev. ...Razumovskiy to fly to Tbilisi.

E.A. Shevardnadze. And that happened, that conversation took place. Our Georgian comrades said that there was no need for such a trip. That is the whole truth.

Ye.K. Ligachev. Eduard Amvrosiyevich, there's no contradiction between you and me...

E.A. Shevardnadze. No, I didn't say that there was.

Ye.K. Ligachev. Listen, what am I supposed to do if a magazine with a circulation of 4 million distorts things? After all, at the end of the day I too have an opportunity to state my view. And you are all keeping silent, dear comrades.

M.S. Gorbachev. I think we ought to finish the first part of the speech there and move on.

E.A. Shevardnadze. I think this kind of painful reaction serves no purpose. First, I wasn't silent: I've given explanations to the USSR Supreme Soviet commission and said everything that needed to be said. Second, I'm not having a discussion with you, I'm just asking why this discussion needed to be started at all following the Congress of People's Deputies.

Ye.K. Ligachev. I didn't start it.

E.A. Shevardnadze. I'm not accusing you.

M.S. Gorbachev. This just shows the atmosphere in which we are struggling to implement our policy and that it is very necessary to maintain our sangfroid.

E.A. Shevardnadze. On the whole the draft platform will undoubtedly contain the main guidelines by which the party should be guided during the transition to democratic socialism.

The very concept of a transitional period presupposes that there are clearly defined phases in our progress toward our goal.

Through this platform the party is completing a definite stage in perestroika and moving on to the next phase, which will undoubtedly be linked with the adoption of a new Constitution. Despite all the temptations held out by rapid decisions, I would refrain from going too fast on this.

I think that we do not need to lay down any specific timetable. The emergence of the Constitution should be the result of the affirmation of basic norms of democracy.

There are, however, things which cannot be postponed. Today we must make decisions which will keep perestroika's chances alive. If we fail to consolidate healthy forces today, tomorrow chaos and anarchy could emerge. And I share the concern of the comrades who have spoken at this rostrum. Under these conditions it isn't hard to imagine the appearance on the scene of dictators large and small who wouldn't think twice about reversing our country's development.

A viable party doesn't need a monopoly on power. It should recognize—and to all intents and purposes this has been done in the platform and it is a courageous step—the need for political pluralism and cooperation with all other healthy sociopolitical associations.

This new phase should demonstrate the party's ability to come into line with the new political reality. This is far harder than stating our readiness for self-renewal.

The monopoly on power has played a bad joke on us. It has destroyed political life as a sphere of collaboration between different political forces. When perestroika generated such forces, it turned out that the syndrome of directive authority had deprived us of our will to deal with them.

Perestroika abolished declarations and demanded action. For instance, the principle of self-determination was declared for so many years. That was enough, since behind any principle there was always an argument of strength. And now we have lost or are losing this argument.

If we want to maintain our community of fraternal peoples, we must recreate it as a treaty-based [dogovorny] union of really sovereign states, and cooperate in

practice in making the principle of each republic's national sovereignty really meaningful.

We ought to be wholly understanding about the Russian Communists' proposals to set up their own state and party structures, bearing in mind the profound changes taking place in the country. Only by acting in this way can we count on maintaining a viable and strong center.

We must overcome the crisis of confidence as quickly as possible. This was mentioned by Comrade Vyalyas and others. We should start with our treaty practice and introduce legal instruments into the fabric of relations between republics, thereby improving that fabric. This is an area where we must lose no time!

Another area where urgent measures are needed is the functions of power. I'm talking about the power of the presidency. Democracy and a power vacuum [bez vlasti] are incompatible concepts. I unambiguously advocate setting up this institution. And once we reveal all our intraparty secrets I will say that this has been my position from the beginning.

Time will not permit us to delay in resolving this matter. We will also have an opportunity to include in the draft of the future new Constitution a norm on direct and general elections for the country's president.

Perestroika has long ceased to be merely our domestic affair. The international sphere is no less indifferent to our perestroika. In order to realize this we should recall where we were in 1985. That was a watershed in the opposition to peace. There was the arms race, which degraded us economically, the expensive confrontation with the United States, West Europe, and China, the ambiguous relations with the leaders of the allied countries, the war in Afghanistan, double standards of political behavior and, as a result, deep-rooted distrust of us. This preyed not only on the country's foreign policy but on its attitudes to its own citizens. Not only statesmen but ordinary people were asking how anyone could fail to be afraid of a state which dealt so severely in its relations with its own people.

Of course, there can be widely differing opinions about what prompts admiration for different states. But I fear that the grounds for admiration in our case were rather dubious.

Where we stand now and how we are treated in the world is well known. Although I know that foreign support for perestroika even annoys some people in our country. Sometimes demands are heard for us to ease up on our foreign policy activity. Unfortunately, this would not work. By going into isolation we would not isolate ourselves from the threat of nuclear and ecological catastrophe, the demographic explosion, and related economic problems. We would be depriving ourselves of the benefits of international exchange and limiting our opportunities to modernize the economy and acquaint young people with the achievements of world thinking.

On the contrary, it is only through extensive international cooperation that we will be able to solve our most acute domestic problems.

There is also talk about unilateral concessions and the surrendering of positions.

Never on any occasion have we made any concessions to anyone, and if we did, they were concessions to common sense. As for surrendering positions, this happened many years ago, and we are now regaining them. With difficulty, but we are regaining them.

As the leader of the department which puts our foreign policy course into practice, I am prepared to answer to any audience on why we have adopted the line of practical disarmament, concluded treaties eliminating intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles, withdrawn our troops from Afghanistan, normalized relations with China, moved toward the signing of the Vienna agreement, initiated contacts with the EC and the European Parliament, why we are laying the foundations of international cooperation in the ecological sphere, and so forth. Of course, this has become possible as a result of constructive dialogue with all our partners.

Behind all this is the titanic work done by the country's leaders and the general secretary of the party Central Committee. Perestroika should not be accused of destroying Europe's political structure. It was destroyed by the will of peoples who were no longer willing to put up with violence.

And violence—this is forgotten for some reason—was committed in the late forties, when the structure of popular democratic regimes that had emerged after World War II was broken up. When the democratic forces which had cooperated with the Communists for the sake of victory over fascism, for the sake of freedom and democracy, were driven out of the coalition governments of Central and East Europe, and regimes of personal power—called state dictatorships of the proletariat—were established. Both politicians and academics will have to look into this phenomenon. One more question: Do systems produce dictators, do dictators produce systems, or are both propositions true? That is a subject for serious, very serious, and profound research.

It was back then, not in 1985, that the undermining of faith in a socialism based on oppression and violence began. Today you can hear people say: Where were you? That question has been asked from this rostrum too. Why did we not foresee the events in these countries?

We did. And that was why, starting in April 1985, we fundamentally restructured the nature of interstate ties with them, abandoned interference in their internal affairs, and stopped imposing solutions. But, as our own experience attests, it is easier to change policy than to change people. Many leaders in these countries were cut from the same cloth—and it is well known who cut and sewed that cloth. Some of them came to power not without the help of former Soviet leaders, but after April

1985 they could not be removed from power by the current Soviet leadership, since, I repeat, it had forsworn interference in other countries' internal affairs. This was the only correct decision.

How many times was the country's image in the eyes of mankind distorted by such interference. Remember the Czechoslovak spring. Surely the Czechoslovak spring couldn't be regarded as imperialist intrigue? How many examples of that kind there are!

In the new conditions the East European countries are continuing to develop good-neighborly relations with us. They remain members of the Warsaw Pact and partners in economic cooperation.

But when the great masses start into motion and stability is shaken it is difficult to predict only favorable developments. Negative factors are clearly visible in the positive dynamism. The specter of revanchism is stalking Europe in an embrace with the ideas of unity and unification, and the craving for justice is tainted by a craving for political vengeance. The new status of the German question has awakened dangerous hopes of a revision of borders: Various articles are not only mentioning the Western borders of neighboring states but are even starting to talk about the territory of sovereign Soviet republics—the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Lithuania.

Europe can build a common home that is comfortable for all the European peoples and create a new community of these peoples if it gets through the current zone of crisis without upheavals.

We have many reasons to place events within the country in the context of all-European and world affairs. It is from this viewpoint that I propose to look at even the decision of the 20th Lithuanian Communist Party Congress. I am not sure that our Lithuanian friends wanted to set themselves against the CPSU in some way. I understand the motives, the desire to preserve the party as a real and effective force in national life. Here I am resolutely opposed to any sanctions. But at the same time I would like to say to our Lithuanian friends and Lithuanian comrades: Ponder everything well, consider everything well yet again. You will find things incredible hard in conditions of European disorder if the now obvious signs of this disorder become a stable negative trend. Therefore I would not look at this question, as all others, in isolation from the world and European situation.

In other words, nobody can be complacent.

We still live in a world of great threats and, as Mikhail Sergeyevich rightly said in his report, real dangers. It is therefore extremely important that stability is maintained in our country and the process of consolidation proceeds. Stability in our republics, oblasts, cities, and enterprises means stability in the country and, in the final analysis, a guarantee of the stability of peace—peace on our planet.

Yakovlev Supports Idea of Presidency

*PM0802105190 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 5*

[Debate speech by A.N. Yakovlev, member of CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of CPSU Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Comrades! Eduard Amvrosiyevich [Shevardnadze] has already offered an assessment of events in East Europe. I agree with that analysis.

We can scarcely remain indifferent to what is happening in those countries. The Central Committee members and the ambassadors to those countries are well aware of the complexity of the situation. A report has been circulated among the party, and another is in hand and will soon be sent out to party organizations.

The processes there are diverse and the results are diverse, but there is one pattern: The deeper the crisis in a particular country, the graver the consequences. Therefore the transformations were seriously delayed. Yet there were alarm signals—in 1953, in 1956, in 1968, and in 1980. The German question is especially complex. It is for us a matter for profound reflection for many reasons. And very active political and diplomatic work on German affairs is now under way.

But another question arises here—that of our reaction. It has repeatedly been raised in the Politburo, but it is still too early to draw definitive conclusions.

Nevertheless, comrades, if we are proclaiming the principles of freedom and democracy in our own country, how can we deny this to others!

If we want our republics to be free and autonomous, we ought to approach other countries with the same logic, too.

If we proclaimed freedom of social choice back in 1985, it is pointless now to invent some kind of magic prescriptions for halting events in these regions, and anyhow, this is both impossible and unnecessary.

I repeat, not everything is yet clear. We must carefully watch events, especially from the viewpoint of our country's security. The issue there is clear. That is point one.

Two. The platform. Time is extremely tight. Perestroika effectively grew out of the contradictions that were gripping Soviet society. Contradictions in social relations. They could be resolved either via a social explosion, or via all-embracing radical changes.

History has effectively presented us with the opportunity for a peaceful creative revolution. The political crux of the moment is: Will we be able to take advantage of this opportunity. That depends on us, on the decisions we make during these days of February 1990.

But even in this case the resolution of the contradictions cannot be painless and proceed without drawbacks, without errors, and without excesses [perekhlesty]. This is clear enough, not to say abundantly clear, to us now. And no matter how regrettable or even tragic it may be, we must realize that in a transitional period this is just as natural as a temperature and pain during a sickness, although, of course, it is impermissible and harmful for the doctor to be a passive onlooker.

That is why the question of the party, which, once it is renewed, will, I am sure, be able to ensure a consensus among the people, arises so acutely today.

Three. I support the draft platform. If you read it carefully, it is a substantial advance in understanding the principles and norms of our socialist communal life. In fact it raises in a new way the questions of human freedom, freedom of creativity and speech, ownership and commodity-money relations, the market, new production relations in the countryside and the social restructuring of the countryside as a political priority for the next few years, labor ownership, political pluralism, the new concept of the party's role in society, the change in all power structures, and problems of self-management. I support these proposals.

Only yesterday everything I have listed and much else besides was regarded as malicious loosening of the screws along the road of socialism, yet today it is in the party Central Committee's platform, is in practice becoming part of life, and will require us to make qualitative changes in our work. It will be very difficult and painful to comprehend all this, it will make people edgy and disturb them, for people's interests and hopes vary. And, most importantly, the greatest competence will be required, for only knowledge rids a person of prejudices, whereas ignorance rids him of responsibility.

It has been said here that the draft platform, as it were, was written simultaneously with the right hand and the left. I would put that down not as a bad point but as a good point of the document. It feels its way to the political middle course [ravnodeystviyushchaya] along which a healthy political center of the party can be created and embodies potential for mutual agreement and cooperation among all forces within the CPSU, and also with all perestroika forces and movements within society.

Four. Things are very difficult for perestroika at the moment. For two days now this has been being said. And perestroika itself is contradictory.

Having proclaimed and initiated radical reforms in the economy, in policy, and in the entire way of life of the people and the party, it has come under fire from the right and from the left. For right-wingers it is impermissibly revolutionary, and for left-wingers intolerably conservative and sluggish.

Perestroika formulated theoretical concepts which constituted a breakthrough—and ran up against the tenacity

of dogmatic sentiments and against pre-perestroika ideological fundamentalism.

It is calling for the overcoming of the nurtured civil passiveness of mutual alienation—and is running up against new waves of bitterness among people.

It proclaimed the need for a new morality and norms of dignity, honor, and decency—and immorality, epigonism, malice, and egoism floated to the surface.

All this is reflected in the platform. But, as we vote today to take the proposed platform to the 28th congress, we should make a mental note that its content is not a maximum but a minimum below which we cannot drop. Otherwise things will be bad.

Five. I would deem it advisable to support the proposals on strengthening supreme power in the country. Or, as it is sometimes put, the idea of a presidency built into the political system.

There are more than enough reasons for such a step. And it is not only a matter of maintaining legality and order and state and general discipline in the country, although this is very urgent today. All world experience demonstrates: There is always a specific sphere of the most acute and urgent problems of domestic and foreign policy which are sometimes in the nature of a crisis. There are matters that require initiative and the need for rapid and extensive maneuver. This constitutes the essence of day-to-day political management, which is different in its functions, tasks, and forms from what the Congress of People's Deputies, the Supreme Soviet, and the USSR Government are called upon to engage in.

I repeat, I personally see the requirement for this kind of organization of supreme power as lying not in our present needs but in our future needs, in the demands of a normal life and a normal, rather than crisis, organization of the political process.

Six. I would also like to speak out on the following question. We have a vital need of realism, sober assessments, and complete truth in everything. But I do not share the feelings of panic in describing the processes taking place in society and the party. Panic always heralds disorderly flight and defeat, it is just that it is more difficult to understand this in peacetime than it was at the front. Let us not work ourselves up into a terror, which might lead to paralysis in actions. Political blindness is dangerous, of course. But the whipping up and mystification of nightmares are equally dangerous. There are crises that go before a catastrophe, but our crisis is different. It is like the birth pangs of the new. There is no denying that it is difficult, agonizing, and painful. For all the seriousness of the situation, for all the burden of problems in the economy, in interethnic relations, and elsewhere, I do not share the opinion that society or the party is now faced with the prospect of a catastrophic crisis. But such a crisis will arise if we ourselves are slow to act, confine ourselves to half-hearted decisions, and hesitate or, heaven forbid, waver.

Seven. In these complex conditions we need more comradeship, understanding, and mutual respect. And in general does it not seem to you, dear comrades, that at our recent plenums, along with comprehensive analysis of the questions under discussion, there has been a certain shrillness and suspiciousness?

In this connection I would like to express my disagreement with both the content and the tone of Comrade Brovnikov's speech. I could not understand you, Vladimir Ignatyevich! I have known you for a long time. So I did understand you, but it is precisely this that pains me. You have a good grasp of international affairs, but now nonchalantly, with insinuations and smears, using emotions rather than arguments, you essentially cross out everything that the Central Committee and its Politburo have done in the international arena. You know from Poland as a Central Committee member how difficult the processes now taking place are.

Of course, it is scarcely advisable to speak of the foreign policy results of perestroika only in uncritical tones of delight. But it is a fact acknowledged throughout the world that there has been a tremendous leap toward a peaceful future for all mankind. And, you will agree, it is unfair to perceive in this someone's arrogant pretensions, and it is, in human terms, offensive to hear it.

If we are now going to begin to divide the party according to who is a true, orthodox supporter of genuine Socialism and who supposedly wants to destroy this Socialism, the outcome is clear. A "witch hunt" and the quest for or artificial creation of "enemies" have never led to anything good.

The specific nature of the moment is that perestroika and its spiritual and political results have accelerated the process of the collapse of everything obsolete. But our sluggishness, shillyshallying, and miscalculations, together with the efforts of the forces of inertia, have retarded the creation of the new. This gap must be overcome more rapidly. With the imposition of order, with reliance on legality, but also with the faster bringing into being of the new and revolutionary.

Will the opening of new fronts—whether with the intelligentsia, the working class, the peasantry, or anyone else—help us in this constructive creative endeavor when it has already been repeatedly proved that the root of the problem lies in the system of existing relations?

The 28th congress must be a congress of cohesion and of a dash forward on the basis of perestroika, not the congress of a split; it must be a congress of the revolutionary overcoming of the accumulated explosive contradictions.

The draft platform opens up this opportunity for us, the opportunity for democratic consensus on a democratic basis rather than disorder. Dear comrades, we should not miss this opportunity. That is now the main political question.

Medvedev Criticizes 'Demagogues'

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[Debate speech by V.A. Medvedev, member of CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of CPSU Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] I think that no one has any doubts that we have indeed reached a critical moment in our society's development; perestroika has entered the phase of dramatic ordeals, namely the consumer market racked by inflation and shortages, interethnic conflicts, which are developing into bloody strife, the outbreak of strikes, political tension, and ideological confusion in people's minds. What are the reasons for the situation that has taken shape? Of late (and this has been heard in certain speeches at this plenum), there has been an increasing tendency to ascribe all our ills to perestroika and white-wash the past. It is supposed to be wrong to claim that the people are in favor of perestroika. I want to absolutely disagree with this kind of approach since, irrespective of one's protestations of devotion to perestroika, such claims signify that people are trying to push us backward.

Over the decades of deformation and stagnation, a critical mass of explosive material accumulated which could have provoked shocks of incredible force had it been left any longer. We can now see this even more tangibly from the example of the countries of East Europe. It is my profound conviction that it is perestroika and the fact that, thanks to it, we have been able to uncover the roots of many problems and set about creating new democratic mechanisms and structures that have enabled us to avert the most serious scenario for the development of events and avoid catastrophe. We have been given an opportunity to convert an imminent explosion into a controlled reaction—although it is only an opportunity, and how it is exploited depends on our decisions and actions today.

If you take this aspect of the question, I believe that you cannot help acknowledging that, despite the correctness of our overall policy, many of our concrete steps were indeed by no means always adequate and were sometimes simply hasty or even mistaken.

Of course, there is nothing easier than to give a critical list of these steps one by one. It is far more difficult and important to analyze what is happening and map out a constructive approach to the matter.

I believe that our main mistake lay in permitting a break between the dismantling of the old and the creation of the new mechanisms. This applies to economic reform, including the state of the consumer market, it applies to the restructuring of political structures, and it also applies to the ideological sphere, about which I will say more later.

What is the way out? I believe that the only way out—and this is expressed in the draft platform—lies in extricating society as rapidly as possible from a state of disequilibrium. This is a very dangerous state because any chance incident, any shock may impart an undesirable character to development processes.

We must extricate society from the crisis by advancing more resolutely. In connection with the preparations for the 28th congress, the congress itself must take a resolute step forward in shaping the sociopolitical and economic mechanisms of democratic socialism. I favor undertaking the maximum possible and admissible within the framework of our socialist choice. Society will not understand or support us if we do not propose and implement truly radical changes in government, economy, politics, and ideology.

It is now a question of the party's survival as the vanguard political force. Either we are able to take charge of the rapid but controlled process of transformations or it becomes an uncontrollable flood and comes under the influence of populist demagogues or overt pogromists. It might not only sweep away the party but also our fledgling democracy and hopes of humane socialism in our country.

To ensure that reforms are radical and at the same time consistent and controllable, we vitally need a firm, prestigious, and at the same time democratic authority responsible to the people.

In this context, I consider the provision in the draft platform on broadening the state's powers and introducing a presidential form of rule to be of fundamental importance. Admittedly, I may say that this is not perhaps very opportune now, but I have believed from the very outset that the leader of the party should have charge of effective supreme state power in the country. In my opinion, the resolution of this question must not be delayed. We must, of course, take resolute steps to renew the party itself. Comrades, I see no force in the argument that all perestroika should have started by changing the party's place in society and restructuring the party. If we had begun to smash up the party from the very outset we would have ended up with pure chaos. Yet now there is the threat of chaos if we are unable to really renew the party.

I fully agree with my comrades that the party must be the ruling party not according to constitutional norm but under a mandate obtained from the people for policy which it elaborates and proposes to the people. And, of course, a mandate for its practical activity. Article 6 must undoubtedly be revised, especially since its substance is now at variance with the document which we are proposing—the platform—which sets out a new view of the party and its place in society.

Of the questions of party restructuring, I would like to broach that of ensuring freedom of opinion within the party and a respectful attitude to dissent—provided, of

course, it does not affect the ideological-political foundations of the party. A disrespectful attitude to different views and suppression of the minority view is one of the main factors of conservatism, stagnation, and retarded development, because new, progressive ideas do not emerge from the majority at a stroke. Of course, not all new ideas prove to be correct. But keen debate, comparison of arguments, and exposure to real practice, which alone can produce truth, are also important here.

I also want to voice my opinion on electoral questions, particularly concerning the election of delegates to the coming congress. I believe that the power of party masses must be fully exercised in the course of these elections. Nominations and the elections themselves must be a matter for all communists without exception. There can be no doubt about this, and I believe that anything else will simply not be accepted either within the party or in society. We must give a good deal of thought to how to implement this to ensure that we do not lapse into formalism but make way for truly prestigious qualified people, sincere devotees of perestroika, that we do not turn the elections into a game.

A thought occurs to me concerning, in particular, elections of delegates from among party activists and leaders; this question is, as you know, significant and affects the whole party in general. I believe that it would be correct and supremely democratic for them to be elected on a multiple-candidate basis by all communists in the party organization in question—if all a rayon's communists without exception expressed their opinion of the rayon leaders and if all an oblast's communists expressed their opinion of oblast leaders, and similarly at republic level. Could this perhaps even be done for the CPSU as a whole?

Comrades! I agree with the comrades who have said that all the party's ideological work is in need of further profound restructuring. We can all see the complex processes that are developing in the spiritual and ideological sphere and the strength of the interest in and critical sentiments toward the press and television. We must investigate all this in an unbiased fashion and separate the wheat from the chaff.

For my part, I believe that the changes taking place during the perestroika years in the information sphere in the context of openness, democratization, and glasnost have a fundamentally positive point on the whole, despite all the contradictory elements in the process. They are, indeed, one of the main results of and factors in perestroika. This claim was recently criticized in the press but, notwithstanding, was presented as an assessment of ideological work itself. That is not the case. It is a question of changing the acute situation in the information sphere.

As for our own ideological work, there are, of course, very many highly serious problems in this area. They are no fewer than the problems in the economic sphere or the sphere of interethnic relations. We have indeed

renounced the old ideals and values and have slated a great deal, but new ideas are having great difficulty in penetrating people's consciousness. The old system of leadership of the ideological sphere founded on rigid pressure and continuous supervision has disappeared but no new one has been set up. This is a complex and agonizing process.

By no means everyone has withstood trial by glasnost. Various editorial offices' endeavors to please the public often take the form of political rock-throwing or simply incitement and the distribution of low-quality goods.

The wave of criticism is pounding against our fundamental values—Lenin, October, and socialist option. This has been mentioned before here by Comrade Belyayev, so I will not repeat what he said. Authoritarianism, intolerance, and categorical opinions are typical of many mass media and publications, which almost deem themselves the absolute embodiment of the spirit of perestroika, while in fact foisting on people their one-sided, subjective interpretation of it.

All this notwithstanding, I believe that it would be totally unwarranted to make the mass media shoulder the main responsibility for the calamities that have befallen the country or for the decline in party organizations' prestige, their failures in elections, etc. The mass media do not exist in empty space, they are part of society, they reflect in one way or another the processes under way in society. The times of the monolithic approach to ideology and sham unanimity and prosperity have receded into the past, never to return.

So how should we proceed now? Some people would like to return to the old, well-tried, strong-arm methods and the hectoring tone, but that is not to be. Authoritarian control of the spiritual sphere, rigid pressure, and diktat are simply impossible. Times are different now, and it would be wrong to try to force ideological processes down the old tracks. We cannot advance if we are looking back. There is only one way—to switch to legal foundations for regulating the relations that arise in the sphere of ideology and the mass media. Unfortunately, we are lagging behind in our adoption of the Press Law; even the draft is far from complete.

Of course, under the new conditions the role of ideological influence on the press, of dialogue, and of efforts to convince people based on public opinion is increasing. Our party press is the mainstay here. Some transformations have been effected here and new people have entered the leadership. This applies to PRAVDA, the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, TASS, the State Committee for the Press, and NOVOSTI. There have been results. They are clear from the example of PRAVDA, which has begun to reflect our difficult reality in a more militant, trenchant, and complete manner. Unfortunately, this cannot be said of other ideological institutions. At present we are mainly working with leaders, whereas a considerable number of journalists are still outside our purview and very, very

difficult processes are taking place among them. There are many problem areas in our television too.

The role of constituent bodies which have their own press—the trade unions, the Komsomol [All-Union Lenin Communist Youth League], women's and other public organizations—must be enhanced. Difficult questions concerning informal organizations' publications will also have to be resolved in the new conditions.

Comrades! I am convinced that, provided that we take a common, profound, creative approach, the discussion of the CPSU Central Committee platform within the party and its adoption at the congress are bound to herald a profound turn in the life of the party and the country and open the way to extricating the country and the party from the current crisis. I believe that we must all work toward this goal.

Vorotnikov: 'Sickly' Perestroika

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[Debate speech by V.I. Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic (RSFSR) Supreme Soviet Presidium, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on 6 February]

[Text] Esteemed comrades!

In discussing the Central Committee's draft platform for the party congress we are discussing the most complex problems of the development of Soviet society. It is no accident that we are also hearing some heartfelt and trenchant speeches. I too favor a fervent, passionate discussion. And the main thing for us today is to find the truth and to delve concertedly into some incredibly complex issues.

I believe that the draft platform does basically what it is supposed to do: provide initial guidelines for the pre-congress discussion and guarantee its constructive, creative nature.

One of the central issues of the discussion is the question of the powers of the authorities. The sickly nature of perestroika and the fact that many of the problems which should have already been solved are unsolved can be attributed also to the fact that the power that the authorities can wield—something without which no society can exist—has been weakened here. Like it or not, the managerial structure now taking shape does not provide a guarantee for the effective implementation of state authority.

Democracy and freedom are indisputably indispensable conditions for perestroika and are also its goal. But this is not a boundless sea. Democracy has its bounds: the state, the law, and legality. But we are witnessing the law being ignored, the institutions of authority are being rolled back, and the foundations of the state being besieged.

I think the solutions proposed in the platform which envisage the introduction of the institution of a presidency for the country are correct solutions which will make it possible to strengthen state power and defend democracy. I must admit self-critically that I myself did not support this idea at one time; but I am now convinced that presidential power is essential.

The second key feature of our platform is the determination of paths which will make it possible to speed the country's emergence from the economic crisis. It is not an easy matter to implement the government program which was supported by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies. The appropriate normative acts still do not exist, and those which have already been devised and adopted are not yet having an effect and need clarification. It seems to me that neither restrictions being placed on the cooperative system, nor the taxation of the fund for increasing wages, nor certain commercial innovations (the so called "free zones," hard-currency stores, and so forth) are capable of ensuring a breakthrough in the development of the national economy. More radical solutions are essential. This would also accord with the spirit of the draft platform.

What might we be talking about? Undoubtedly the monetary reform ought to be conducted more rapidly. Can it be assumed that, merely by the production of goods, we are capable of keeping in check the enormous mass of money which is hanging over the economy like a ponderous weight? At best, it will be possible to successfully slow the rate of inflation and possibly stabilize today's situation. But only with the aid of monetary reform will it be possible to trim back the tens of billions of rubles that have not been earned through labor. That is how matters really stand, bitter as it may be to say so.

Going on to price reform: Postponing it for long also makes no sense. It is necessary to revise wholesale, purchase, and evidently, retail prices for certain types of goods so that these prices may more accurately reflect the level of socially essential expenditure and also the quality of products and services and so that they may more actively stimulate scientific and technical progress and resource saving and promote and intensified policy of thrift. The appropriate state subsidies for low-paid strata of the population are naturally essential here.

Finally, we must not delay reforming the taxation of citizens. Those who possess property and receive high earnings must pay higher taxes.

One more key question of our platform is the attitude toward private ownership. It is, of course, not a matter of terminology—private ownership of labor [resources] or private ownership by a collective [trudovaya chastnaya ili kollektivnaya chastnaya sobstvennost]; it is a matter of principle. Do we or do we not accept a form of ownership which is defined as "power over another person's labor, the appropriation of that labor"? Is hired labor acceptable to us? Some people are for it, others are against it. They say that this is not exploitation and that

hired workers will not even notice the boss pocketing their earnings, and that a worker at a state enterprise also does not receive all of what he earns. But how can this be tied in with the proposition in the platform that the party will combat exploitation of man by man? This must be tied together.

Of course, from the viewpoint of the scale of our economy, small elements of private ownership will yield a certain effect. That is so. But how will society react as a whole to the introduction of private ownership which will bring with it a different sociopsychological climate and different relationships among people? All these circumstances must be very attentively worked out and taken into consideration.

Turning now to the kind of society which we have been and are building: In general, is it worthwhile to set ourselves tasks of social construction or would it not be more correct simply to rest, figuratively speaking, on our laurels and, without wasting energy, to drift with the waves of objective socioeconomic laws. I think this is a naive approach. It contradicts not only Marxism, it also contradicts the meaning of the entire historical process. Each political party, each state has its own "construction" programs—in America, in Japan, in France, and so forth. In my opinion we have both been building badly and drifting with the current, and sometimes even against the current. It is necessary to improve building, on the basis of objective laws and not attempt to suppress these laws, for they wreak cruel vengeance. But they also have to be taken skillfully into account, proceeding from specific, real conditions.

We must say precisely that we are building a just, humane, socialist society, that is, a society of equal opportunities and equal rights and obligations. A society in which the status of man and his material prosperity are determined by his labor contribution. What we have already done in our history—for all the mistakes and imperfections—constitutes a colossal stride forward in the development of world civilization. For various reasons we have gotten held up en route and we now need to make haste to make up lost time. But our socialist choice must be unchanged.

Now I would like to talk about the following. We need to proceed from the premise that the pre-congress period will be not only a period of debate, of the discussion of program issues; to a greater degree it will be a period of acute political struggle. And this struggle is already under way. Therefore, it is extremely important to be totally clear about the correlation of political forces, about the state of public opinion, and about the true mood of the masses—and I stress this.

To the honor of our people, it must be said that the propaganda maelstrom into which they have fallen and the blows from the "left" and the "right" have not disoriented the basic mass of folk and have not placed them on the wrong foot. Despite the fact—or maybe precisely thanks to the fact—that the transition from

passivity to political activeness has proved to be so abrupt, it has been clearly revealed that our society nonetheless possesses a sufficient degree of political sophistication. I should like particularly to stress the following: Despite all the past blunders and bans, it—our society—has not become inert and faceless, it has not lost its basic precepts of life and its vital values. And this is now making itself felt everywhere, including Russia, although some people, are trying to reproach its people for political passivity.

Of course, considerable strata of the population today perceive politics purely emotionally. The emotional "froth" which appeared in the first years of perestroika remains to this day a nutrient medium for various kinds of currents—from anarchists to monarchists, including those of a nationalistic persuasion.

It is, of course, impossible not to see that the political experience accumulated in the past year has somewhat adjusted this situation. Faith in a "miracle" not wrought by human hands is waning, nor do people have faith in those who call for the existing social structures to be smashed and who declare that universal grace would then arrive. Moreover, anxiety for socialism, for the fate of perestroika, for those who have taken this heavy burden onto their own shoulders, and for the leader of perestroika is increasing more and more.

And here, of course, the active role of our ideological institutions is very important. Unfortunately, while criticizing—and rightly so—our economic structures, we are paying less attention to the great flaws that exist in ideological work. Here too there is still much inertia, pure routine, outmoded patterns, and an inability to convey the party's ideas and policy to the masses. A qualitative improvement is especially essential on this front.

And finally, concerning some specific features of the situation taking place in the Russian Federation: A stormy process of sociopsychological changes is also unfolding in our republic. Here, the development of Russian Federal [rossiyskiy] (and particularly Russian national [russkiy]) self-awareness is taking place to a considerable degree as a process of comprehending the feeling of having been encroached on and passed over. The problems of the RSFSR's economic autonomy, of the republic's political sovereignty as part of the Union, of the situation of certain national-territorial communities in the structure of the Russian Federation itself are being discussed in increasingly sharp terms. In other words, perestroika in the country has reached the stage where Russia is becoming the epicenter of powerful social debate.

It need hardly be said what sort of political repercussions this could cause. Especially if account is taken of the fact that Russians [rossiyanin] are settled all over the country. Many among them are industrial workers. As a result, the composition of the population in a number of republics has assumed a special national-class character.

Today, experiencing the unpleasant consequences of certain socioeconomic processes and of the intensification of interethnic tension, the working class is launching a struggle for its own interests, thereby willy-nilly promoting the activation of national awareness in Russia.

As a result the destiny of the majority of the working class in the USSR is being linked increasingly tightly with the solution of radical socioeconomic and national problems of Russia.

Hence the prospect of the renaissance of a precise class approach to socialism both in Russia and in the Union.

We can see today that many political groupings are striving to play their own "Russian card"—from "leftist" extremists to conservatives. There is a danger that, on the wave of national sentiment, extremist currents could arise in Russia. There are already signs of this. And it is extremely important to do everything to intercept these forces' national "card."

The question of coordinating the efforts of the party organizations of Russia and of the content and nature of their activity ought to be approached in this light, in the light of the complex tasks facing these party organizations. I think the creation of the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau was a justified step although it was formed without consulting the republic's party organizations. And it is no accident that different views are being expressed here as to whether or not a strictly Russian Communist Party is needed, and how the Bureau ought to have been formed.

It seems logical to me that before the 28th congress a Russian party conference should be convened at which the question of the structure of the party organs of the Russian Federation should also be examined. Of course, these questions are not simple and they have to be carefully studied, and all the "pros" and cons" have to be weighed. Most likely we will hear many sensible thoughts during the discussion of the platform. But the chief thing is that the essence, the basic principles should be clear—the fact that the Russian communists must in every way promote the unity of the party and of all Soviet people. We are obliged to remember this now, both while glancing back at the past and while peering into the future.

Vyalys: 'Present Crucial Stage'

PM0702141590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
6 Feb 90 Second Edition p 6

[Debate speech by V.I. Vyalys, first secretary of the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Comrades, our plenum is of exceptional importance for all communists living in the land of the Soviets and every Soviet person. And no doubt, therefore, everyone of us today feels a special sense of responsibility as a communist toward the party.

Life itself, life with all its tumult and its contradictions, is urging us to speed up perestroika in both the country and the party. And believe me, these are not just words: Concrete action is needed here. So all the peoples, as I have already said, have been looking forward to the present plenum. They expect the party to have the ability and the desire to transform itself in order to be not a perfunctory but a real political vanguard of society, the kind of vanguard of society which enjoys the people's vote of confidence.

All this demands at the present crucial stage, when new foundation stones for the future are being laid, not only the utmost circumspection (and that is necessary!) but also a revolutionary resolve to discard ossified postulates and the customary elements of an outmoded model of regimented socialism. What is the prescription here? We are right in saying at this plenum: Consult with the people and with communists. And that is why the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee decided to convene its 20th congress as early as March. In the runup we are carrying out genuine party discussion, party discussion with the communists of primary party organizations.

The question arises whether the draft platform for the 28th CPSU Congress proposed to us meets the current requirements and tasks. It undoubtedly does in many respects, but it does also retain alongside bold provisions stemming from the new realities in the country and the world quite a few hollow schemes. It is, of course, impossible to combine the incompatible: the desire for radical transformations and the wish not to forgo old principles and thereby create a certain universal draft that suits all the basic forces. Is not this duality the reason why our perestroika sometimes approaches the radical solution of key issues in the country's life so timidly? And this causes uncertainty and dangerous tension in society.

The renewal of our federation and our party and the working out of the state status of republics have quite evidently become the central question of perestroika. The delay in solving it has greatly intensified centrifugal trends in the country. Unfortunately, those trends, which also exist in our republic, are really alarming the people.

Less than two years back Estonia, along with its Baltic neighbors, raised a question which was urgent for us, but not only for us: the question of the need to conclude a union treaty and provide the republic's sovereignty with new content, the question of bringing relations between them and the center to a level corresponding to the modern realities. They were, in our view, sensible and calm proposals. They stemmed from both the Estonian Communist Party and the people's democratic movements. And it is very gratifying that they are now emphasized in the draft platform. But at that time the attitude toward them was guarded, to put it mildly. Moreover, amendments to the Constitution appeared

which it was difficult to regard as other than encroachment on the already truncated sovereignty of the republics and as an intensification of unitarist aspirations.

The Estonian Supreme Soviet adopted a Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Republic on 16 November 1988. There we spoke about the renewal of the federation, but beyond talk the matter is making intolerably slow progress. Every step toward strengthening republics' sovereignty has to be fought for, overcoming mistrust, resistance, and recidivism aimed at disinforming people.

The CPSU Central Committee platform proposed to us today recognizes many things that were "seditious" only yesterday, including the right of nations to protect their own native language and culture. It is proclaimed that our ideal is not unification, but unity in diversity. That undoubtedly marks progress. If such understanding and recognition had come earlier, if these vital processes had not been resisted and there had been no deliberately created image of the enemy in the shape of awakened national democratic, I stress, democratic movements, we would most likely have been spared many tensions and tragedies today. Nor can it be ruled out that many conflicts would not have reached danger point, but time is a resource which is lost irrevocably.

Talk about the need for decentralization of economic management goes back a long way. Here there has been a little more progress, yet virtually every step taken by the Estonian Government, despite the fact that we have been given economic autonomy by the country's Supreme Soviet, receives in practice a mixed response and sometimes provokes plain resistance. That is what happened when we introduced markups on tobacco and vodka prices to improve the position of low-income citizens and stabilize at least to some extent the republic budget. And the two-ruble increase on a bottle of vodka in Tallinn became virtually an event on a union scale.

Of course a modern economy cannot, as the platform for the congress correctly notes, do without a center, but a center operating on a macro level. Let us also note that the platform states that the center has no interests of its own distinct from the fundamental interests of the peoples belonging to the federation. That is a very fundamental conclusion, and God grant, as atheists say, that we transform it properly into practice.

We have only one way of strengthening the trust that is so needful. And that is decisive decentralization. Only really autonomous republics can voluntarily, as our platform stresses, delegate some of their rights to the Union. Here, and this is very important, the specific features of each republic should be taken into account. But something else is needed, too: a clear demarcation of rights and duties between the center and the republics. This question brooks no delay. There can be no one-way traffic here. The republics are now being promised the right to determine their own development on their own. Fine. But how is this compatible with unshakable centralized planned principles and influence? The definition

of the precise extent of such influence and its mechanisms are therefore of extremely great importance. This has also been correctly stated in the platform.

What kind of autonomy can a republic have if its land and resources do not belong to it? It is absurd. A sovereign republic without its own land cannot exist. And, therefore, we do press our request that a really specific definition be provided on these questions in legislation, because it is of enormous, I would say, fateful political significance.

The unevenness of the processes of perestroika induces uncertainty and the fear in people that many things could still be reversed. Nor are sinister scenarios ruled out. All this strengthens our desire to really seek proper guarantees of the republic's sovereignty and autonomy. The present integration process in our Union is of course a reality, and no one can or intends to deny it. We stated this very loudly on 2 February, on the 70th anniversary of the Tartu Peace Treaty between Soviet Russia and Estonia. Some 3,000 people's deputies of various levels assembled in Tallinn stated this in their declaration. The Tartu peace, which has undeservedly been long forgotten, is an important landmark in the history of relations between our two neighboring peoples and serves as an example of real Leninist political wisdom in solving difficult interethnic problems. We are all returning to history and cleansing it of the accretion of lies in order to draw useful lessons. Alas, we sometimes do this very late. The Estonian people are convinced that the wisdom shown 70 years ago will also help us find a correct solution in the tumultuous times of our perestroika.

Mikhail Sergeyevich is absolutely right when he says that we have not yet lived in conditions of a real federation. But we have still not lived in conditions of a renewed party and the autonomy of union republic communist parties. We should acknowledge that we do not as yet possess our own properly full action program. To tell the truth, we have been deprived of normal horizontal links with other organizations both within and outside our party. We have been virtually deprived of everything that should fill it with vital sap, a sense of worth and of the future.

We know remarkably little about one another, having almost no contact with one another, yet without this there can be no proper party integration or party trust. There can be no unity without trust, respect, and the right to act on one's own, to act in conformity with specific conditions. We support in the platform section on the party precisely the postulate that the correct solution of the autonomy of union republic communist parties is assuming special political significance. The CPSU central organs' tutelage over them has been unacceptable.

We also support the proposal to elect a chairman and two deputy chairmen at the congress. The principle should be unshakable: The most profound democracy of the party

is the highway we should follow. Perestroika inside the party itself is the natural and sole condition that guarantees us success and the trust of the people. We have had a very great number of declarations, it is now time for concrete action.

Ivashko: 'Economic Anarchy'

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8 Feb 90 Second Edition p 2

[Debate speech by V.A. Ivashko, member of CPSU Central Committee Politburo and first secretary of Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! We are having to discuss the platform for the 28th congress in a sociopolitical atmosphere of the utmost intensity—at a crossroads, indeed, in the destiny of our Fatherland.

In this connection, one cannot help recalling that in Lenin's lifetime, in that tense period when the political situation and the distribution of forces were changing, so to speak, before people's very eyes, party congresses were held annually, and in addition party conferences were convened in the intervals between them. I believe that in today's conditions too we should return to the Leninist practice and considerably intensify the work of the highest—and not only the highest—party organs. In this connection, it is expedient, in our view, to give a communist a delegate's mandate for the entire term of office of the relevant party committee. We have submitted a proposal to that effect, but it is not yet receiving support, on the grounds that this has never been done before. Although it was in fact done in our party in the twenties. And then I do not understand why we can elect a rayon soviet deputy for five years, yet we cannot assign the right of the delegate's mandate to a communist for two and a half years, especially since he could be replaced at any time for various reasons in the party organization that elected him. Then a great many questions would be simple to resolve: elections of secretaries and the bureau by the congress or conference, accountability of the bureau and secretaries to the conference. And it is well known that the wider the range of people participating in decisionmaking, the more democratic it is.

Comrades! The CPSU—to be or not to be; how is our multinational Fatherland to be preserved; how is a real breakthrough to be achieved in all spheres of life; how is stability to be ensured in society? Those are the questions that people expect the party to answer today. This is the reason for the communists' demands for the date of the party congress to be brought forward. And unless we find the answers to these questions—this must be stated frankly—there will simply be no opportunity to fulfill the proposed platform and no one to do it.

The realization of the objectives and tasks formulated in the draft Central Committee platform under discussion will take considerable time. At the same time, the

situation in the country and society is complex. There are many problems that must be tackled urgently, today. I therefore consider it necessary to add to the draft Central Committee platform concrete political directives on the stabilization of the situation in the country, first and foremost in the economic sphere, directives that should be fulfilled today and tomorrow, or else it will be hard for us to find a way out of the situation before the congress. This could be done in Section 3 of the draft platform.

To what do I refer?

First. It must be observed that not only has there been no improvement in the economic sphere, in fact you could say that it has deteriorated further. A few figures: In January 1989, the rate of growth in output in the Ukraine was 5.9 percent, in the year as a whole it was 2.8 percent, and in January 1990 it was 1.5 percent. To the best of my knowledge, in the country as a whole there was no growth at all in January, but a solid minus, so to speak.

How can we set about improving the market situation if production is not growing? It is impossible. People may say that there is nothing terrible about low economic growth rates if structural changes are taking place, say, as a result of conversion or changes in favor of the production of goods for the market. But that is not happening either. What is the problem? The problem is that economic anarchy—I am not afraid of that word—has become established in the country. We have left behind the old methods of economic management, the market is not yet operating, and for these reasons the production sector is not supplied with the minimum necessary resources, and meanwhile the shadow economy is busily getting rich.

A few illustrations. Everyone has heard of the now "celebrated" ANT cooperative. On Sunday SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA told us about a protocol under which this cooperative was to export freight through the port of Novorossiysk alone. Let us not dwell on such "details" as 500,000-600,000 tonnes of chemical freight or 500,000 tonnes of metal. Let us not dwell even on the detail of 2,000 items of military equipment in transit. Ultimately our tanks, when "in transit," so to speak, are fast. Let us dwell on the fact that this cooperative decided to sell 5 million cubic meters of timber abroad this year. Is that a lot, or not much? I looked it up. It seems that under the annual state order, our Ministry of the Timber Industry supplied 47 million cubic meters. So it amounts to more than 10 percent of the entire state order. Meanwhile, homes have been built in the Ukraine and are standing there with no windows or doors because there is no timber. Meanwhile, in the Donetsk mines, the miners cannot work or work in violation of safety rules because there is no timber, no props. Yet we are watching the country being sold off wholesale.

I could cite many other illustrations from the experience of recent days, when the republic KGB stopped unlawful operations. It is no accident that so many posters against the KGB have appeared now. For instance, one Sumi enterprise is selling in the form of abrasive powder 200 tonnes of titanium dioxide, without which you cannot make whitewash, selling it at \$1,700 a tonne, yet we buy this dioxide abroad at \$3,500 a tonne! A Zaporozhye enterprise is selling 206 tonnes of costly metal in the form of scrap, through a Riga cooperative. A Krivoy Rog enterprise is selling 400,000 rubles' [R] worth of aluminum goods through a Moscow cooperative. In Nikolayev, they prevented the removal of 1,800 tonnes of rolled bearing steel from Moscow, which is being sold although there is nothing to make bearings from. Comrades! What is this, if not economic anarchy? Sabotage? Perhaps it is. In 1989 consumer goods—mainly food products—worth R3 billion, at a conservative estimate, were exported from the Ukraine across the border on the basis of fraudulent private telephone calls. How can this be?

I think it is necessary to exercise power as of tomorrow, not to postpone this until the congress. The government should resolve these questions. No country in the world exports what it needs itself.

The next question that I believe should be included in our document is the question of balancing our finances.

In the past year, the emission of money in the country totaled more than R18 billion. That is seven billion more than in 1988. Emission would be nothing terrible in itself, if there were the goods to back it up. But there are not. Where has this money gone? Into increased wages, perhaps? Yes, that does happen. But in the main the emission was necessary because our banking system is not fulfilling its control functions. So-called noncash money, that is, simply entries on paper, is now uncereemoniously turned into cash, which the shadow economy dealers and other "smart" people put in their pockets.

Let me cite a rather curious illustration. A certain psychotherapist decides to go to the city of Mariupol. Everyone wants to be well in with him, so several Mariupol enterprises immediately make a noncash transfer of R545,570 to a cooperative for the psychotherapist. The logic goes like this: It is not mine and it does not come out of the wage fund, so it will not be missed.

Comrades, how much cash has gone the same way, and also through credits which no one repays, for the purchase of equipment from private individuals which is shipped across the border as contraband or otherwise? This laxity must be stopped today.

Another point. Comrade Ryzhkov put forward at the congress [of USSR people's deputies] what is, in my view, the only correct economic recovery program. It is well thought out, but we must start on it, we must fulfill it. Why are we delaying and not going over to a controlled market, beginning with, for instance, the market sale of a number of goods, naturally not consumer goods

in wide demand. From time to time, for instance, we increase gold prices, and by so doing we only increase the wealth of the dealers who have the gold in their possession. We should set the free market price for gold and other similar things immediately, at a stroke. It may become 20 or even 40 times more expensive, but, first, the state will get the money, and, second, there will be no point in hoarding because the face value of the hoards will rise, but they will not come into circulation because no sensible person is going to buy from private hands what he can get in the stores. That could be done without delay. It also applies to other luxury items, anything that is not an essential. This is a step toward a controlled market economy.

Comrades! Decisions that hamper, as I would put it, the fulfillment of the food program are impermissible. This year the Ukraine fulfilled everything stipulated by the state order as regards crop farming products. But at the same time the center is failing to supply 1.2 million tonnes of forage for hog complexes and the poultry industry for 1990. That means that Comrade Nikitin and his commission for purchases will fail to receive 120,000 tonnes of meat from the Ukraine. Miracles do not happen: You cannot feed hogs or chickens on air.

Where are you going to find 120,000 tonnes of meat, Comrade Nikitin? That question interests me greatly. Can the food program really be managed that way?

Comrades! It seems to us that the right balance must be found in the platform and in the new statutes. First, we believe that the statutes should not be long and cumbersome, covering every detail. They should only define the principles of party building, and all the rest is democratization in the party. In this connection, I think there should be a special section in the statutes on the status of union republic Communist Parties, which, while adhering to the positions of the single program and statutes and operating on the basis of the Leninist principle of internationalism, should be autonomous in resolving questions of their own activity, including the formulation of a policy line appropriate to local conditions.

I believe, Comrades, that the draft platform, amended and corrected in the light of the discussion at this plenum, should be submitted to the party without delay, and, most important, we should begin immediately to tackle urgent questions. The people expect it of us.

Gankovskiy: CPSU 'Out of Touch'

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[Debate speech by Yu.A. Gankovskiy, "Nizhnevartovskneftegaz" production association party committee secretary, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 6 February]

[Text] Comrades! My speech reflects the opinion of the oil workers' city party organization communists. As a

result of my daily contacts with communists at one of the country's biggest oil and gas production associations, I can say without exaggeration that the attention of all communists, and even those who surrendered their party cards yesterday, is focused on this plenum. Naturally, the desire to have its proceedings broadcast was expressed. Many communists are waiting for this plenum and for the CPSU Central Committee platform to finally decide on whose side they are.

Comrades, I am not depicting the situation as worse than it is, but those members of the Central Committee who have visited primary party organizations in recent months could not fail to notice how tense the situation is. Whether we like it or not, a debate is already under way in the party; different viewpoints are being expressed, but most communists, while sharply criticizing party organs and the apparatus, nonetheless pursue the aim of improving the situation rather than wrecking it.

What problems concerning the party and its central organs are raised most frequently? Many people express doubts about the Central Committee in its present composition being able to adopt radical decisions on the reform and perestroyka in the party. After all, only just over 11 percent of the leading organ of the party consists of workers, while the party statutes maintain that it remains a party of the working class in terms of its class essence and ideology. This rate of representation causes puzzlement among many workers.

We all remember the April (1989) Central Committee Plenum when a substantial section of Central Committee members departed in connection with their age or inability to fulfill the duties of Central Committee members. Less than a year has passed, and the Central Committee again includes 38 pensioners. More than half the Central Committee members joined the staff of central organs during the 1961-1981 period, and more than 55 percent of them are older than 60. Communists are saying openly: The Central Committee is formed on the basis of the length-of-service approach. This criticism applies not only to the Central Committee but also to obkoms [oblast committees], gorkoms [city committees], okruzhkoms [okrug committees] formed by the respective apparatuses to serve under them, so to speak. Why? It is because we have no mechanism for elections to leading party organs. It is done along the following lines: "So and so has been nominated. No objections! Done." The Central Committee instruction on elections to leading party organs, adopted recently before the last report-back conferences, is out of date; it became divorced from life while still at the printers. Meanwhile, we are still trying to force our dynamic life into the framework of an armchair instruction.

The second major problem is the party's financial assets. The fact that the Central Committee budget is the favorite subject of the party's critics on both the left and the right is well known. Our city party organization published its budget, and the questions disappeared immediately. We are told: Read IZVESTIYA TSK

KPSS, everything is published there. True, but only in relative figures, and it is not clear how to work it out. "I no longer want to belong to the CPSU because I do not know what happens to my dues," this statement crops up frequently in communists' declarations when returning their party cards. There is nothing I can say to them. The atmosphere of confusion has prompted a number of party organizations to retain 50 percent of the dues, although they are clearly aware that by doing so they are infringing the CPSU statutes. The foot-dragging and indecision of the Central Committee in respect of these questions give us reason to believe that the Central Committee apparatus and members of the elective organs are not aware of the acute nature of these problems and the barrage of criticism directed at rank-and-file communists in labor collectives today. And how could they be, if even the three Politburo members who have visited our city over the past five years did not find the time to meet and talk to party organization secretaries. They attended meetings, but they were meetings with economic managers and ministers.

We are saying that the basis of the party, the primary party organization, is the immediate organizer of the implementation of decisions adopted by congresses and Central Committee plenums and Politburo and Secretariat resolutions. Judging by the published data, the Central Committee lineup includes only one party committee secretary. Perhaps this is one of the main reasons for the Central Committee getting out of touch with life and with the concerns of the party grass roots. In my opinion, it is very important to ensure that in the coming pregress debate these very party grass roots are able to feel that their words and proposals are heard, analyzed, and taken into account. Because otherwise, what is the upshot? Our party organization discussed the Central Committee Theses for the 19th All-Union Party Conference with great enthusiasm and commitment. A mass of proposals was dispatched to the Central Committee. What happened to them? Who analyzed them? Why were some things taken into account and others not? Communists are in the dark about this. There is no mechanism in our party for the discussion and subsequent adoption of final documents.

It might be appropriate for the present plenum to set up a commission made up of Central Committee members who would analyze all the proposals sent in during the pregress debate and publish a brief report in the party press, say, once a month. This would, on the one hand, enable communists to know for sure who is dealing with this laborious but very necessary task, and on the other hand, it would enable everyone to judge the progress of the discussion of key party documents.

Our primary party organization and the communists in the Nizhnevartovsk city organization fully support the known proposals of a number of party organizations for direct elections of congress delegates in party okrugs. This would reassure everyone that delegates have earned their right to their seat in the hall rather than having

slipped through on the basis of a personal data sheet. The existence of the credentials commission itself would also become meaningful.

A process of polarization of communists' views is under way today, and unless we want to bury our head in the sand, we must admit that the 28th congress may become the point of departure for the rebirth of a multiparty system in our country. It is necessary to give some thought to this today and try and anticipate the situation that may arise.

Another theme, set out in the platform, which I believe will be adopted by the absolute majority of communists, is the approach to the formation in Russia of its own communist party and full-fledged organs for its management on the same lines as the communist parties in all the other republics. Comrades, believe me, I am familiar with the situation at grass-roots level. The demands of communists and, it is possible to say without exaggeration, of all the Russians as regards this issue are clear-cut. Russia's interests as regards both the state and party system must not be infringed. I believe that the communists in Russia are capable of sustaining the Central Committee apparatus of their Communist Party on a sensible scale.

Comrades! Why is so much criticism and abuse heaped on us communists? The more I think about it, the more I am convinced that we have done everything to end up in this situation. Take all our major social programs of recent years which promised us all a happy life—the food program, housing by the year 2000, the health program, the school reform, and so forth. They all came from the party's pen, were widely advertised as the latest example of concern for specific categories of Soviet people, and for the umpteenth time they were resoundingly not fulfilled.

In the prevailing atmosphere, where communists and elective party organs lack responsibility, we have lost a substantial share of our former prestige. Now a proposal personally to Comrade Gorbachev: While you were only general secretary, Mikhail Sergeyevich, I can tell you without a hint of flattery, that we felt that new ideas were being born in the party and that a certain amount of work was under way to reform it and to discard what was obsolete and outdated. You now have four posts. We get the impression that some people would like to ensure that the general secretary fails to attain success in any of them due to fragmentation of effort. We believe that these questions need to be discussed and resolved.

Now a few words about our region. I had a telephone call from Nizhnevartovsk today. Comrades, it is minus 40 degrees there. I have just been listening to the miners' problems. Ours are the same. The conditions in which oil workers are living today ought to evoke everyone's acute alarm and concern. Oil workers are a long-suffering people and, aware of the current situation in the country, we continue to work, and work honestly. The Nizhnevartovsk area is currently providing the country with 104

million tonnes of oil [no time period specified]. But just take a look what kind of a state order has been drawn up, an order which is not backed by either material or financial resources, as had been promised by the government. To this day there is uncertainty about this. Collectives are beginning to express dissatisfaction. Take the unresolved problems as regards pulling down temporary accommodation and building housing and sociocultural amenities. After all, how do people live? Having worked eight hours in minus 40 degrees in the slush, a man returns to his temporary accommodations and there is nowhere to get warm and dry out. On a rig the man gets to eat fish, and even that only every other day. Meat is simply unobtainable in the city, even for coupons. Therefore we appeal to the Politburo—comrades, focus your attention most seriously on these problems faced by Nizhnevartovsk oil workers, both in the sphere of food supplies and in the sphere of housing construction. Moscow construction workers are leaving the city in 1991, but housing has been curtailed by 25 percent already in 1990.

We are currently selling 99.8 percent of the oil we produce to the state at 23 rubles—this is the size of our association's state order. It is an extortionate state order in our opinion. If we were allowed to sell even 10 percent of the oil which we produce, we would not be asking the government or anyone else any questions.

Take a look at the Central Committee's approach and attitude to the problems of the Tyumen Oblast party organization as a whole. It is not just that no member of the Central Committee has paid a visit to this major region of the country or attended an obkom plenum, but even the resolution which was dispatched to the Central Committee has gone astray somewhere. And we have not been able to track it down over the past two days. Therefore the opinion has taken shape that the Central Committee has lost contact with grass-roots party organizations.

The following phrases are in frequent use: "The party has decided"; "the party has dispatched"; "the party has summoned enough strength"; and so forth. Let's take a look, comrades, what is meant by this: All its 20 million members? After all, I as one of them have not been consulted whether this or that should be decided or dispatched. It is high time to define at what level decisions are adopted. Whose decision is it—a Central Committee plenum's, the Politburo's, or the Secretariat's? Let us organize it in such a way that not just communists but all the working people are aware who is deciding what, and what they are responsible for.

Esteemed comrades! I do not want you to perceive my speech as criticism for criticism's sake, as an attempt to blame the Central Committee for everything. This is far from my thoughts. Let us think, seek, and act together thus restoring the trust of millions of communists and people in the party.

There is also another proposal: According to our communists, the report-back and election campaign should be held after the congress. Why? The new documents will have been published and communists will have been able to decide on whose side they are, what they support, and whether they can carry on.

PRAVDA Publishes 5 February Plenum Speeches

Belousov on Conversion Issues

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[Debate speech by B.M. Belousov, USSR minister of the defense industry, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Today's speeches made the point that the platform under discussion must be political. I disagree. The country's socioeconomic and political problems are not simply tied in a knot. These problems motivate and stimulate each other. Political tension, with its extreme manifestations in one region or another, is immediately reflected in the condition of the commodity market, and this, in turn, further aggravates the political situation.

This is especially felt in industry, even in the defense industry, which is its best organized, best balanced, and most skilled section.

Today we are working on specialized output without major disruptions only because, by dint of historical circumstances, our main plants are located in Russia's European part, the Ukraine, Belorussia, the Urals, and Siberia. At the same time, as part and parcel of the country's economic and industrial complex, our sector is feeling the full impact of all the collisions of our times associated with the reorganization of the economic mechanism of the economy's management, the attempts to organize market relations, and the democratization of production and social interrelations, which is aggravated by the negative process occurring in a number of the country's regions.

The majority of our labor collectives is engaged in a quest for solutions aimed at enhancing production efficiency. This work is based on the introduction of new forms of economic mutual relations tied to the principles of material interest, autonomy, and responsibility, as well as on civilian production making the utmost use of our scientific and technical work experience and the technologies applied in the manufacture of military equipment.

Our work in conditions of the operation of the new economic mechanism and the results of this work give us grounds to draw certain conclusions and to answer the question: What are the causes of poor production efficiency and economic decline? In our view, there are several causes involved. Certainly, the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee June (1987) Plenum and the 19th All-Union Party Conference laid the foundations

for perestroyka of the economic mechanism and created conditions for the utmost development of initiative and interest.

At the same time, we embarked on the process of perestroyka of the economic mechanism with inadequately conceived economic levers of management and juridical and legal norms, with cadres who basically lacked economic training. Furthermore, our central economic departments, not quite familiar with the practical economics and specific features of production organization, were frequently guilty of unprincipledness and haste, and promulgated insufficiently considered and verified normative acts and documents. All this led to certain negative consequences. Specifically, this was how we legitimated the first model of economic accountability. I believe that we thus wasted 2 years. A series of documents was issued which stimulated unjustified wages growth unrelated to labor productivity growth. Conditions were created to earn profits which were not backed by a corresponding growth in output and reduced prime costs. It was decided to comprehensively develop wholesale trade and direct links without taking into account the market's potential and the shortages of basic materials. Consequently the ruble incentive failed to work, the State Committee for Material and Technical Supplies continues to lose its grip on management, and widespread barter has developed, which naturally aggravates the situation.

The granting of full autonomy to enterprises in questions of shaping and approving the plan, which was effected without the proper measures of responsibility for failure to accept the state order, for its execution, and for breaches of established ties, resulted in more widespread shortages and the disruption of the production balance. These shortcomings are obvious to us all today, and in the future, when elaborating normative and legislative acts, it will be necessary to model the situation very thoroughly and calculate the possible consequences of their introduction, and to involve more widely in their discussion economic managers and practical workers at various levels.

Now I would like to dwell on the sector's specific problems. This probably applies to a number of other ministries.

First. One of our most important tasks is the conversion of military production. Conversion is necessary in order to improve today's situation in the economy but, at the same time, it presents us defense industry workers with a whole package of questions which are difficult to resolve and are of an economic, technical, and social nature. Please understand me correctly: It is not a question of us now having to work hard and overcome difficulties. We are long used to this. Something else is at issue. The opinion still prevails that conversion is a process whereby major benefits can be produced without any serious costs, simply by prescribing targets—which is indeed being done at times. We are in a position to reconstruct facilities for new civilian production units,

to swiftly retrain our cadres, and to change the orientation of design bureaus and institutes. It will, however, be exceptionally difficult to solve this task without the appropriate investments and the required allocation of equipment geared to the creation of new technologies for the production of consumer goods and manufacturing equipment for the agro-industrial complex and light industry.

We solve most of the equipment problems by developing our own machine tool building. The volume of its output in our country will increase by a factor of 2.5 in 1988-1995, but this will not fully support the conversion program. At the same time, the machine building complex is planning to virtually halve equipment deliveries in 1990 compared with the average annual level of previous years. And yet the conversion-generated demand for equipment will increase 40 percent this year. This is necessary in order to ensure a growth rate of 134.3 percent in the manufacture of consumer goods, 160 percent for equipment for the agro-industrial complex, and 119 percent for light industry equipment. There is a similar trend in the allocation of capital funds for retooling. On the whole I believe that one way to solve the problem of financing work on enterprise reprofiling must be to channel into this work part of the funds released from orders for military equipment.

The defense industry finds itself in complex conditions as regards questions of foreign currency self-financing for conversion programs because of the lack of opportunities to share in foreign currency allotments from deliveries of its main output abroad. It seems necessary to me that such allotments should be introduced while intensive conversion is in progress.

The solution of conversion-related issues affects the vital interests of millions of the sector's workers and members of their families virtually everywhere in our country. In this context I believe that the time has come to elaborate, discuss, and ratify a law on the conversion of defense sectors of industry in the USSR which must take into account the rights and responsibilities of enterprises and state organs of management and the principles of financing programs and regulating mutual relations between management organs and enterprises.

Over the last 2 years our sector has pursued the quest for and approval of various forms of economic accountability of practically all four familiar models. The experience and work results thus acquired enable us to draw the conclusion that the most effective form is still the second model of economic accountability and leasing, which must be actively developed. Furthermore, it seems to us expedient and possible to switch scientific organizations to a profits taxation system in 1990, thus trying this system out in real life with a view to its future widespread introduction in industry. We believe that the widespread introduction of these forms of economic management, coupled with the decisions—adopted by the government a few days ago—on making wages fund growth dependent on increasing the output volume of

essential commodities, will ultimately speed up the market's saturation with goods and, on this basis, lead to the easing of social tension.

The changing structure of production plans in the defense industry, geared to a sharp increase in nonfood goods and civilian output, means a change in the structure of the material and technical resources being consumed. We have still not finally resolved these questions. In our view, associated sectors must immediately establish the relevant capacities. The granting of extensive powers to local organs of power complicates the mutual relations between union-jurisdiction enterprises and local organs. At times the latter are not responsible for the end result of a specific enterprise's work, and they often deem it possible to make decisions at odds with economic accountability and the principles of the new economic management mechanism.

These and other decisions which are not thoroughly considered—like raising freight transportation charges and diesel fuel prices without changing the mutual relations with the state budget—do not in the conditions of conversion help to improve the social situation. Furthermore, the planned economic recovery measures will not produce the desired results unless we manage to stabilize the sociopolitical situation in the very near future.

As a supplement to the Law on the Resolution of Labor Disputes it is necessary to urgently define procedural measures ensuring specific responsibility for unlawful work stoppages and any ensuing damage to the national economy.

One more issue, comrades. In our view, the adoption of the decision on the electability of enterprise, shop, and production subdivision leaders fails to justify itself in many cases. Therefore, having seen this for ourselves, we must decide to immediately introduce the appropriate amendments to legislative acts.

Questions of stabilizing the situation in the country have been discussed at different levels on many occasions. There is a prevailing opinion. Inasmuch as they are also being raised here, at the party Central Committee plenum, I deem it necessary to formulate today, with due consideration for the situation, decisions which would guarantee a real improvement of the situation. This should be done through communists who are USSR people's deputies in the Supreme Soviet, and their precise fulfillment should be ensured. There is no doubt that the CPSU Central Committee platform section "For an Efficient Planned-Market Economy" correctly sets the objectives and tasks. However, as the experience of the last 5 years shows, these were also our goals in those years. But it was all done piecemeal, without taking into account—during the transition stage—the necessary optimal combination of the old economic management system and the activation of the new. This is why, in the political platform—which I support—we need to clearly define the ideology of the actual transition period

bearing in mind the realities of today and the government program approved by the Second Congress of People's Deputies. The efficient work of the national economy in the next few years will depend on this.

Shabanov: 'Boost' Change of Pace

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[Debate speech by V.A. Shabanov, member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission and senior foreman at Saratov's electrical components production association, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Comrades, prior to my departure for the plenum, I attended a meeting of our association's shop party organization secretaries who expressed the hope that today's CPSU Central Committee plenum would help to speed up the renewal of the party and the whole country. At the same time, they spoke of their alarm about the Communist Party's future, about its role in society and its vanguard influence, and about the perestroika it is implementing in light of increasingly frequent attacks on its policy, ideology, and organizational basis. I would like to express my view on this matter.

The time has finally come to call a spade a spade. Some learned men, together with informals, sundry nationalists, and shadow economy wheeler-dealers, are pushing the country along the path of bourgeois reformism, restoration of private ownership, political anarchy, and subversion of the party's cohesion as the vanguard organized detachment of working people.

But we workers cannot accept such a development of events. We believe that, in the face of prevailing socioeconomic problems, it is necessary to clarify positions, outline prospects, and resolutely part company with those who would like to divert the burgeoning forces of perestroika.

A genuine party member has no doubts about the truthfulness of Marxist-Leninist teaching, the correctness of the socialist choice, and the positive results produced by 70 years of Soviet power. There have been, of course, mistakes and deformations which led to the present difficulties. It is naive to imagine that all this is behind us. We know that a great deal of hard work lies ahead, but the strategy has been determined—the country is on the move.

The point now is to boost the pace of changes. This will certainly get done if the party organization in every labor collective, in every city and village, proves itself to be an active political force upholding the fundamental interests of the working class and the peasantry. This is a question of every party organization's autonomous and constructive stance, its own action program in the struggle for perestroika.

Such programs have been elaborated in our oblast party organization. They help to develop the initiative and activeness of communists and to transform all spheres in

economic and political life. The most important point is that party committees are facing up to social problems and are consistently implementing the oblast programs for ensuring food supplies for working people, accelerating housing construction, and producing consumer goods. The results are promising.

The retail trade turnover plan has been fulfilled, the working people are better supplied with goods and foodstuffs. Compared with 1988, food stores in the oblast's state trade network have received 35 percent more poultry, 50 percent more pork, and twice as much mutton. The trade network is steadily supplied with vegetables and potatoes. As a matter of fact, it can even be said that, in a certain sense, we are better supplied with vegetables than some union republic capitals.

The oblast party organization strives to earn the working people's trust by means of practical deeds, of an open and honest policy. Over the last month, members of the party obkom [oblast committee] bureau, of gorkom [city committee] and raykom [rayon committee] bureaus, and of elected party organs, as well as apparatus officials, visited many party organizations to explain the tasks facing communists and the ways and methods for solving them. To work among the masses, to be familiar with their moods, to be able to approach people and influence them—this behest of Lenin's is now more topical than ever before.

Working people and rank-and-file communists are greatly perturbed by major questions of our life. One of them is the better utilization of primary party organizations' creative potential. They certainly need greater autonomy. I think that regimentation of their activity should be reduced to a minimum, whether they concern forms and methods of work or financial management. They ought to be given the right to admit and expel party members at their own discretion, to delegate [delegirovat] the candidacies of their own representatives for election to higher-ranking party organs, and to make appointments to leadership positions.

Much depends on the composition of party ranks. Perestroika needs staunch fighters rather than philistines who are ready to sacrifice their party membership cards for self-seeking reasons. You have seen for yourselves many people burning their party membership cards. This is not heroism, it is turpitude and betrayal of ideals.

There is no point in keeping such people in the party. By cleansing ourselves of selfish and other morally unscrupulous elements, we can only boost the CPSU's prestige as society's vanguard force.

Fundamental importance attaches to the question of what is to happen with the principle of democratic centralism. Many suggest its rejection as embodiment of administrative diktat and its replacement by the principle of democratic accord. But how justified is this

approach? Practice has already shown that uncontrollable rally democratism hardly ever produces constructive results. Truth cannot be born out of endless disputes. Rejection of centralism would make the elaboration of an all-party line more difficult. And any slackening of discipline would make its implementation simply impossible.

A party without discipline and without a single center, as V.I. Lenin pointed out, is not a revolutionary but a reformist party. Should the CPSU be such an organization at the present stage?

Today we are justified in talking about the need to establish power by the party masses within the party, but this is a two-way process. It is necessary to give some thought to ways to enhance the role and responsibility of members of elected party organs and make them subject to effective daily monitoring by primary party organizations. This must be ensured in line with the appropriate statute norms and with the main functions and principles for shaping the party apparatus.

In our view, we ought to elaborate and determine the status of members of elective organs, including the CPSU Central Committee and the Central Auditing Commission, and of primary and shop party organization secretaries. But this is a matter for the future draft statute. Why am I raising it here? Because the brunt of party work is borne by our shop organization secretaries. This is what often happens: There are occasions when, at election times, we do not elect as party organization secretary the person we would like in the job.

Why is this? People's wages are based either on piecework or on wage rates, and people often have to go for a comrade who is materially less dependent, even though their preference might lie with a comrade who is on piecework at the time. I would like to say that it is necessary to more accurately define the position of shop party organization secretaries.

There is hardly any need to overdramatize the situation concerning the insufficiently clear delineation between the functions of party and soviet organs. The political system's perestroika creates conditions for the transfer of economic powers to local soviets and for radical change of the contents and methods of party work. At the same time, concern should be shown for ensuring that not only primary but also rayon, city, oblast, and kray party organizations acquire greater independence in their choice of forms and methods of work and in determining the structure and staffing of their party committees on the basis of local conditions and the availability of wage funds. This should be reflected in the statute.

Some thought is called for by the situation prevailing in many Soviet public organizations. The parameters of their responsibility are very vague. They duplicate each other. Just think about it, trade unions are responsible

for everything, party organs and soviet officials are responsible for everything. Consequently, overall responsibility declines.

I believe that communists must bear their share of responsibility for the passiveness, inaction, and propaganda of alien ideology, for participation in nationalist and separatist organizations and in extremist actions which clearly contradict the statute's demands and perestroika's interests.

Comrades! Our most important task today is to rally the party ranks and to consolidate the people around the party on the platform of perestroika. Despite all the differences of opinion, the party line was laid down a long time ago, and it is necessary to actively struggle for it by all means of ideological influence. We cannot remain impassive to the fact that, under the pretext of pluralism, many mass media denigrate the party and its leading organs, groundlessly affix insulting labels to its apparatus officials, and revise the foundations of Marxist-Leninist teaching. I think that members of the editorial offices of printed publications and the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting should be more frequently reminded of their responsibility for the ideological consistency of published items. We cannot, for the sake of boundless press freedom, abandon the Leninist principle of party-mindedness of the press and make ideological concessions.

Our collective is eagerly embarking on putting complex domestic appliances into production to replace discontinued defense output. But we are encountering considerable difficulties in material and technical supplies, in establishing production-sharing liaison, and so on. Practice proves that the conversion of defense industry enterprises should be pursued in a more considered and more systematic fashion.

I am gratified that many of the questions raised in my speech have already been reflected, to a greater or lesser degree, in the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th congress. This proves yet again that the Central Committee is perfectly familiar with the problems, topics, and questions which perturb the party's members and the country's population.

But I would also like to support the proposal initially made by Comrades Systov and Mesyats: We are in favor of a report and election campaign to be held after the congress. In other words, the party must conduct this campaign from the positions of the 28th CPSU Congress with due consideration for its decisions and proposals as the main party document for the next 5-year plan period.

In conclusion, and on behalf of Saratov Oblast Communists and working people, I would like to address all party members and labor collectives in our multinational country: Comrades, refrain from joining the strike movement! The country is at a crucial stage, each enterprise is involved in production sharing with dozens of others, work stoppage at one of them leads to nonperformance of targets by many others. Nonperformance of targets

entails material losses and mainly moral dissatisfaction with one's own labor which engenders lack of confidence in the organization of production at any enterprise which may suffer from delivery shortfalls through the strikers' fault. Only by means of responsible and high-quality labor will we be able to help our government and, ultimately, our own selves in stabilizing the country's economy.

Mutalibov on Transcaucasus

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[Debate speech by A.N. Mutalibov, first secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! A tragic situation has taken shape in Azerbaijan. The expectations with which my people have lived for the last two years have brought them to the brink of despair. Their dream of peace and calm and their hopes for justice and assistance have proved futile. All this time blood has been shed: It flooded the streets of Baku during the dark days of January. People deceived by the times perished: Azerbaijanis, Armenians, Russians, old people, women, and children. We grieve these victims, of course, and our shame for the helplessness shown is great.

All this has yet to be investigated; people must know the truth, and learn the truth they will. At the same time, the events of January cannot be viewed without taking cause-and-effect factors into account. It is no accident that I have begun with what has been troubling us for two years now: The whole country, the whole world is closely following the events in the Transcaucasus. The conflict which began on the first crests of the restructuring wave and the events in Nagorno-Karabakh have developed into a tragic confrontation between two peoples which, before restructuring, had never reached such a degree of alienation and unconcealed hatred. Essentially, a civil war is in progress, and even the army cannot stop it.

When assessing analogous events we refer to the problems which have accumulated in interethnic relations. Without dismissing these problems, I nevertheless believe that Soviet people's main problem is dissatisfaction with their life. As far as interethnic relations are concerned, we must call a spade a spade. If we are talking about relations between the Armenians and Azerbaijanis before the events in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast [NKAO], surprisingly these problems were resolved by thousands of mixed marriages, as a result of which families are now suffering a double misfortune. No one is now in any doubt that the claims made against the territory of the NKAO were the cause of the events. It is clear that the aim has been to become part of Armenia at all costs and do everything possible—even destroy the economic ties with Azerbaijan which have justified themselves—in order to artificially reorient these ties elsewhere.

I must talk about this very frankly today, because this is the root of the tragedy. The idea of self-determination for nations which has appeared recently serves this very aim. I am referring to the NKAO's Armenian population. References are even made to Lenin. Probably in order to give this theory authority. Are we supposed to believe that any area with a high concentration of Armenians—or any other nationality in any other republic—must definitely have self-determination? Recently much-hyped references to the long suffering of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh—now justified, incidentally—and “concern” for them have caused irreparable damage and grief to all the Armenians who once lived in cities and regions of Azerbaijan and all Azerbaijanis living until recently in Armenia.

Believe me, I am not using this rostrum to stir up emotions. You have heard mutual recriminations more than once. My aim is to again stress with all responsibility that the two sides cannot have been equally to blame for what has happened. It cannot be that the conflict was started simultaneously on the basis of some mutual compact. Someone must have been the first to start this vile provocation. So why have the names of these people not been spoken aloud for all to hear? Many of them are continuing to fuel the interethnic conflict with enviable persistence worthy of better application. Moreover, some of them have been invested with the rights of USSR people's deputies. Is it not time to put a stop to their activities in this direction? Thus, the open, totally unsubstantiated territorial claims by one republic against another have been the cause of the conflict.

This incident has no precedent in the history of the Soviet state. Unfortunately, it was not given a fundamental party and state assessment by the center at the very start—nor were the appropriate decisive measures taken to quash any attempts to put these plans into effect. In your speech today, Mikhail Sergeyevich, you confirmed that Azerbaijan's integrity is to be upheld. We are grateful to you for this, because this is a right enshrined in constitutional law. We invest this statement with the idea of the primacy of this law, under which the NKAO is an inalienable part of Azerbaijan and part of its state and political system. No one has the right to violate the sovereign rights of a republic or intervene in any way from the outside. The guarantor of objectivity in the observance of all citizens' rights is Soviet legislation, by which we intend to strictly abide. The formation of the NKAO Special Administration Committee was regarded as a violation of this principle and a lack of confidence in the republic's leadership, despite the fact that this committee was invested with a peacemaking purpose. In reality, however, the committee's actions did not normalize the situation in the republic—rather, it made it worse.

The lack of a solution to this problem was regarded by the republic's working people as an inability on the part of the Azerbaijan Communist Party to guarantee the protection of their national interests. The deeply rooted practice of appealing to the center was seen as a lack of

independence and an inability to assume responsibility for resolving the fundamental problems posed by life. All this did serious damage to the republic party organization's authority and formed a vacuum between it and the people which was skillfully exploited by everyone resolved to use this breach to their own ends.

This led to a virtual paralysis of political power for some time, and this power is going to feel the effects of 1990's difficult January for a long time to come. Nevertheless, today I would like to speak out very definitely on the January events and say, on the basis of humanist ideals and everything that I have had to hear in the last week from everyone I have had to meet: Greater professionalism should have been shown, of course, and unwarranted brutality avoided. This is being said everywhere in our republic today, and I am obliged to convey this to the plenum participants.

Comrades, in no way do I wish to damage the army. The army is forced to intervene in matters when the local authorities essentially lose their authority. Nevertheless, I do believe that all of us, all our law-enforcement institutions must focus on those processes which are taking place in various regions and resolve them with the methods that are supposed to be used rather than resort to bringing in the troops. Tbilisi and Baku are enough. I am addressing this to myself and to the republic party organization first and foremost.

Against the background of the events now taking place, there are a great many factors preventing us from normalizing the situation. All kinds of people, all kinds of scum have broken through to the surface, comrades. They include those who use various slogans. But, you know, we must not make generalizations and question the Azerbaijani people's commitment to socialist ideals and develop the myth of Islamic fundamentalism, which evokes a very painful response in the hearts of the Azerbaijani working people.

There are dangerous "theories" being put about by homegrown political scientists that are designed to whip up unhealthy passions. These ideas are being insinuated from a certain quarter.

Comrades, I should also point out that the mass media must show greater sensitivity and understanding of the situation in the region. Newspapers and Central Television broadcasts are read and listened to very closely by everyone—not only in Armenia and Azerbaijan but throughout the country. Any ill-considered, unobjective word is carried on a wave of indignation and serves only to destabilize the situation. I would primarily like to apply this to the broad publicity given to Russian refugees, who are sowing panic.

Well, we have now reached the stage where armed formations—armed, you understand—are active on both sides. Another fact we have to face, comrades! What is to be done? In some cases, i.e. in the context of Azerbaijan, we call them militants—I can understand your indignation—while in others, i.e. in the context of

Armenia, we call them the home guard. In both cases, of course, Soviet laws are being broken. How can we present the situation in this way and even take photographs, you understand, and show the whole world?!

Yes, of course order must be instilled, and I believe the measures we are now taking and the improvement already noted will, coupled with the attitude to the problem shown here today, soon help us to sort the situation out and avoid further confrontation.

Despite its severity and lack of precedent, everything that has happened in Azerbaijan, comrades, is the result of the general ill of the formation of democracy now characteristic of our society.

It is no secret that in the party milieu and social circles voices are being heard to say increasingly loudly that restructuring is becoming uncontrollable, that it is skidding and swerving, and that glasnost often becomes a mouthpiece for some and a means of blocking others. Some forces feel excessively free in conditions of democracy, while others are the object of defamation. The comrades have talked about this. The paradoxical situation has arisen wherein a political system reforming in favor of establishing rule-of-law relations is being forced to resort to the aid of strong-arm methods taken from the arsenal of the administrative-edict management system. What does this show? The flimsiness of democracy? A lack of political experience of working in the new conditions? Or the demoralization of the state-legal structures?

At present we are given no answer to these questions from the draft platform under discussion. We are witnessing how in a number of regions of the country so-called informal movements have now essentially become parallel organs of power. This has certainly been made possible not only by the weakness and tactical blunders of party organizations but also by the fact that hitherto these organizations' activity has not been regulated by legislation. Most important of all, the CPSU has failed to evolve a clear political line with regard to the new movements and to define their place and role in the political system undergoing renewal.

This has led to a situation where, in practice, genuine democrats and frenzied nationalists, champions of restructuring and separatists are all tarred with the same brush. It is certainly no accident that the political strike with which certain forces have armed themselves as a means of pressure has still not met with broad opposition—from the public first and foremost.

I think the time has come to call a spade a spade. Clear emphases, characteristics, and guidelines in the Leninist fashion are needed in the political struggle. I want to agree with all the proposals made by the comrades who spoke before me. And to put forward literally a few of my own. It must be said that there are quite a few contradictions in the draft platform. Particularly with regard to nations' right to self-determination. On the one hand, this principle is affirmed to the point of including actual

separation, and a mechanism is even to be worked out for this; while on the other, it refers to the party's duty to persuade the people concerned that this choice is inadvisable. This issue must be made clear and unambiguous. The draft indicates that the party's role is to be the democratically acknowledged political leader. But I am not sure that the party will preserve its leading role in society against the background of vast social problems which are evidently not going to be solved in the near future. In the economic sphere, it is emphasized that the party will work for the implementation of socioeconomic programs. There is even a detailed list of issues ranging from saving resources to conversion. But all this does not constitute the prerogative of the party's future activity. This must be clarified. A few words about planned and market methods of economic management. It seems halfhearted to try to improve the economy solely on the basis of these methods without offering a radical solution to the problem of ownership or ensuring the necessary discipline.

Theories on speeding up the pace of reforms and filling the market with consumer goods have a hollow ring to them. I believe attention should be drawn to this.

Paton Urges Technical Progress

PM0702165990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Feb 90 Second Edition p 3

[Debate speech by B.Ye. Paton, member of the CPSU Central Committee and president of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Academy of Sciences, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Esteemed comrades! I ardently support the basic provisions of the platform placing paramount emphasis on man and his welfare. At the same time I think that an undeservedly modest place is given to science and scientific and technical progress in the party's pre-congress platform. But this is, after all, a fundamental question. We are now losing out to the developed Western countries precisely because we have not been able in recent decades to take due advantage of the fruits of the scientific-technical revolution and to attain the kind of level of development in production forces whereby the acuteness of political, social, ecological, interethnic and other problems is sharply reduced. Essentially we remain in a bygone technological era. In order to overcome this it is necessary to vigorously develop basic and applied research.

So, taking into account that the platform is the fundamental document with which the party links the tasks of overcoming both the political and the economic crisis, the inclusion in the platform of specific provisions about science and scientific-technical progress is undoubtedly necessary. The latter should be defined as the main factor in our economy's recovery and growth. But it is not just a question of yet again declaring the importance of accelerating scientific and technical progress. Much has been spoken about this, as we all remember, and, let me note, generally what was said was always correct. But

the correct words have diverged from the deeds and they could not, naturally, have a tangible effect on the qualitative indicators of our economy's development.

However lamentable it may seem, many economic leaders at various levels have taken quite a scornful attitude toward scientific and technical progress, and among them there has developed a mistrust of its huge transforming potential. Economic reform for all its radicalism is directed largely at direct instant profit, the attainment of which in present conditions, as a rule, does not need any great effort in the sphere of scientific and technical progress. Rather the reverse, I would even say. So in the platform it is not enough to include theses about the role of science and scientific and technical progress in our society's renewal. It is necessary that they firmly enter the minds of all communists as a program demand. That's the first thing. The second, and in this case the main point, must be that communists working in state and economic structures should see that the task of accelerating scientific and technical progress is of prime importance, and by their actions purposefully and consistently help to create favorable conditions for its practical implementation in all spheres of the country's national economy. The most important factor, in our view, is the investment process, that is, ensuring a high level of targeted investments in the progressive sector, first and foremost the science-intensive sector, with the steady introduction of technological innovations. Backed by legislation and elevated to the rank of state policy, this can ensure the necessary enhancement of the standard and competitiveness of the production processes in operation, and their full entry into the contemporary world market.

While implementing economic reform, it is necessary to grasp that unless we legislatively gear the production process to renewal as we ought to, and just as, incidentally, the Western countries do, all our organizational and economically accountable subterfuges will merely remain shaky buttresses for an increasingly decrepit edifice. Only science and scientific and technical progress will give us a competitive economy. Economic accountability, including regional economic accountability, as well as republics' economic sovereignty must, in our view, only underpin this objective, but by no means replace it. So, I shall stress once again, the clear, specific and detailed thesis about the exceptional role of scientific and technical progress in ensuring the success of the restructuring of the economy must certainly be broadly reflected in the pre-congress platform and in all party and state activity.

To go on. In order to resolve the diverse questions of scientific and technical backup for all economic recovery activity it is necessary to clearly formulate the principles of operation of the country's integrated—I stress integrated—scientific complex. A lot has been said before about the significance of integrated Soviet science. But here again generally correct words were not backed up by real deeds. Unfortunately, the results are of little comfort and are well known.

The considerable barriers separating scientists in the various republics, the division of science into metropolitan and provincial science, and hence the scandalous inequality in the material, technical, and financial backup of research—all these relics, unfortunately, have still not been overcome. It should be added that the integration of academic, VUZ [higher educational institution] and sectorial science has not occurred. In this connection I think that the idea of the identical opportunities for all scientists to obtain finance, acquire access to funds at all levels, and to participate in state programs, competitions and so on must be consistently developed in the platform. The platform must define the party's attitude to questions about raising the prestige of scientific activity, social protection for scientists, and the adoption of a law on science. I am sure that this law is essential. Genuine perestroika in science is inconceivable without actually uniting the efforts of its academic, VUZ, and branch sectors, which, while tackling their own specific tasks, must vigorously and, what is most important, in a committed way participate in union-wide scientific and technical cooperation.

It is no less important to occupy a fitting place in the international scientific community, and to make use of the advantages of international cooperation and the division of labor between various countries' research collectives. This is the shortest path to mastering the enormous potential of knowledge and innovations already assimilated by modern civilization.

The last point. In the daily struggle against numerous difficulties it is somehow being overlooked that our science was simply obliged to predict much of what is taking place and make sure that the negative processes did not gather momentum. This, unfortunately, did not happen. Our science, first and foremost social science, frankly, blundered, and if certain scientists spoke out in sober terms then they were by no means heard by everyone.

There are many reasons for this, but the main one, in my view, is that perestroika has still not been able to break the stereotype of the social scientist, rigorously programmed by the administrative-edict system to substantiate, as a rule, retroactively the latest decisions of the party and state leadership. Let's be frank: Even today it does not always have a real need for the principled conclusions of a scientist who is not inclined toward opportunism and time-serving.

We must resolutely change the scale of criteria in assessing the work both of individual scientists, and of entire institutes. The appropriate changes are also needed as regards the use of their deductions and conclusions. Otherwise we will frequently move blindly around the complex labyrinths of the processes of our political development.

I think that the party must morally uplift social scientists and strengthen their morale. Let us not forget that

objective scientific knowledge in their hands is a powerful influence on people's minds and hearts. All this to a significant degree must also apply to representatives of the so-called exact sciences. It is clear that scientists' morality was bound to suffer under pressure from above, when it was a question particularly of the need to give science's blessing to all kinds of gigantic projects, which frankly smacked of adventurism.

In these clashes the inability to voice firm objections inevitably turned with time into the ability not to object, which sometimes simply turned into a tragedy. The conclusion from this is clear: Science must not serve the powers that be, which in their turn must not encroach on its independence. The Academy of Sciences must enjoy genuine autonomy, and be really independent. Only then will science accord with its mission and really help the party. And this is vitally important today.

Proceeding from what has been said, comrades, I think that questions of the further vigorous development of science and scientific and technical progress must be allocated to a separate section of the preCongress party platform.

Ryzhkov: 'Firm' Action To Uphold Law

PM0702133990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
7 Feb 90 Second Edition p 4

[Debate speech by N.I. Ryzhkov, member of CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of USSR Council of Ministers, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Comrades! The CPSU Central Committee's draft platform for the 28th congress raised a vast range of crucial questions of the restructuring of society and the party and analyzed the sociopolitical atmosphere in the country and the related tasks.

Recently I have spoken a number of times on questions of economic and social policy and the activity of the USSR Government. And I share the alarm and anguish for the economic situation in the country which have been expressed today.

Now, at the Central Committee Plenum, I would like to talk about problems which particularly worry communists and indeed surely all Soviet people—the problems of the situation in the party.

I fully share the platform's main thesis that overcoming the present difficulties and raising Soviet society to a new level of political and socioeconomic development are inconceivable without the renewal and democratization of the CPSU and the consolidation of links with the people. In the period since April 1985 amid the turbulent maelstrom of events, vast in significance and often dramatic in essence, happening both in our country and in the socialist community countries, we have felt and experienced ourselves the truth that no party has a perpetual monopoly of power and that a vanguard position is not a gift of the Constitution. Thus it is so

important that at the plenum we face the truth in an honest and serious way with a tremendous sense of responsibility, no matter how bitter that truth may be. The truth is such that—day in, day out—it provides increasingly powerful evidence of the growth of crisis phenomena in the CPSU. In fact, attacks on the party have intensified and its influence on the course of events is weakening. There is no ideological or political unity within its ranks, and leftwing radical and neoconservative approaches have emerged. In many party organizations and committees we see confusion, disorganization, and timidity in practical matters. All this, unfortunately, is the reality.

It demands from us at this plenum the most frank discussion, open to all of society, a discussion on the restructuring of the party and its profound renewal. We must give a direct answer to questions which just a few years ago seemed simply inconceivable. Is the CPSU still the ruling party, the political vanguard of the people? Or is it tending to abandon that role? Should there be a multiparty system or not? Does the CPSU still adhere firmly to positions of communist ideals or is it leaning toward social democracy? Does it fully foresee the social and political consequences of establishing a market economy? Will a society of social justice be formed on that basis, such as the people chose in October 1917, or will it be something different?

Behind these questions lie the main causes of the difficulties that the CPSU is experiencing. It is my profound conviction that they should be sought not outside the party but within it. And their solution lies not in the past but in the future—on the path of the radical renewal of the CPSU's internal life and activity.

I am firmly convinced that it is impossible to find that path without a major moral renewal. The starting point of this process must be that the self-renewing party must, on its own initiative, very clearly and honestly dissociate itself from all the negative elements in the past: Terror must be called terror, the dispossession of the kulaks must be called unlawful action against society, and the struggle against imaginary enemies must be called crimes against our brothers.

All this should have a beneficial influence on changing the moral atmosphere within the party and, without doubt, will be correctly perceived by Soviet people. Against this background everything positive created by generations of communists over decades will be highlighted all the more clearly. At a time when the question of whether the CPSU will be the leading political force is being decided, the moral standing of its members and the party as a whole is a factor of tremendous significance.

The party has assumed a responsibility toward the people for the renewal of socialism by means of perestroika. And therefore we have no right to lag behind events. We must direct them, showing initiative in the theoretical comprehension of the processes taking place, pursuing an active and positive policy, and overcoming

the things which hinder the implementation of the transformations proposed by the party and supported by the people and which destabilize the situation in the country.

In this regard I want particularly to dwell on the question of the multiparty system. In my opinion, it is already too late to discuss whether a multiparty system is necessary or not. In fact it already exists. Whatever the motives of the various sociopolitical movements, this idea is finding an increasingly broad response, primarily because of the growing dissatisfaction within society at the economic, social, and political situation and the consequent lack of faith among some people in our party's ability to normalize the situation and implement its own plans. In these conditions, the party must use its platform to clearly express its opinion and to state its position on this extraordinarily urgent question, which could change the whole course of the history of our society's development. We, as communists, cannot avoid a direct answer here. In my view, we must learn the difficult art of being able to work and live with other sociopolitical formations.

The sooner we do that, the better it will be for the party and the whole people. Difficult though it is for me to say this, the CPSU, through developing in conditions of monopolistic party and state power, has lost the combative qualities which are organically inherent in any political leader of society. Of course, the birth of new sociopolitical movements is not a random process, even though in conditions of a rapidly growing democratization it may have an explosive character. If society, the state, and the supreme organs of power do not take a balanced approach to these processes on a really constructive basis and, if it cannot influence them organizationally without disrupting the democratic foundations, there may be unpredictable consequences. After all, it is generally recognized that a period of democratization experienced by a people previously deprived of political freedoms can be a stage of dangerous crisis.

Of course, all this must have a firm legal foundation preventing the emergence of all kinds of "pseudo" and "ultra" movements which may harm, and indeed, already are harming both society as a whole and individual citizens. Accuracy and clarity are needed here.

It is time at last for the organs of people's power to define their position with regard to all the sociopolitical movements in the country and to tell the people where the aims of true democracy are being pursued and where, instead of progress, destructive and ruinous actions predominate.

By the way, while quite justifiably paying great attention to law-making in the socioeconomic sphere, we are proving extremely slow to developing work on the creation of legal acts regulating social relations in the country.

In conditions of rapidly developing sociopolitical processes, movements, and structural formations the right to be the political leader must be won. And the CPSU

has all the potential to do that. Now it is a real force capable of solving our society's difficult problems.

If the party takes that path, it will be necessary to state its position in terms of a legislative initiative on Article 6 of the Constitution, so as not to give further grounds for insinuations and various kinds of generalizations.

Comrades! The central question in the country's political life is that of the party and the soviets. It must be openly acknowledged that many of our problems in recent years are bound up with the fact that the process of separating the functions of the party, the soviets, and the organs of economic management has been slow and contradictory. At a time when party committees began moving away from traditional methods of outright directive-based management of the socioeconomic development of the regions, the soviets and their executive committees were essentially incapable of taking on themselves everything which ought to be organically inherent in them as organs of state power. I, as a member of the Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, am gravely worried by all this, because it is by no means the least of a whole range of factors which have created a situation in which the manageability of the national economy has recently diminished abruptly and has begun to have an extremely adverse effect on its development.

In my view, the difficulties here are due to the fact that we still have not really discovered how the party should act as political leader. The ideology of the concept of delimiting party and soviet organs states that the party is relieved of operational-economic functions and concentrates its efforts on elaborating political and ideological platforms aimed at our society's further development. One can imagine the elaboration of political platforms at union republic level, but at rayon, city, or oblast level, clearly, different tasks must be resolved. Now, however, rayon, city, and oblast party committees and their apparatus are continuing to work on economic matters, thereby supplanting or duplicating local soviet and economic organs.

Winding up the theme of the party and the soviets, I should like to particularly stress the extremely urgent need, urgent also in the light of the new views on the strengthening of the socialist federation: namely, the need for legislative reinforcement of state power, including executive power, in the country, from the USSR Supreme Soviet and Council of Ministers to the rural soviet of people's deputies. This problem is particularly topical now, when sovereign rights are being transferred from the party to the state. In this complex transitional period a highly dangerous power vacuum cannot be allowed to form. Here it is important to envisage everything necessary for the normal management of the country, notably with regard to the rights with which the USSR Supreme Soviet chairman really should be endowed.

In this connection, I am surely not alone in agonizing over why many correct and good decisions of the legislative and executive organs of power centrally and locally are so difficult to implement or remain on paper. The main reason now is the absence of the necessary sovereign rights among soviets and their executive organs. This is not the fault, as some people state, of party organs, which allegedly do not want to lose their spheres of influence. It all concerns the system of the party-state administrative mechanism built up over 50 years. The process which has begun is very complex, and it is important that it should not endure administrative crisis and chaos. Comrades, we shall not solve our economic, social, and other problems while the country is racked by interethnic outbursts and unlawful strikes and when the republics consider themselves free from the effect of union laws simply because they do not like them.

Hundreds of thousands of refugees have lost their homes, and they accuse the state of being incapable of ensuring their personal security and the safekeeping of their property. There are laws on responsibility for inciting interethnic strife, but they are not being applied. There are laws to combat crime, but their effectiveness has been undermined because the law-enforcement organs have been overwhelmed by a tide of unrestrained criticism. In brief, all this has now also become one of the paramount tasks.

It must be stated openly that any attempts by the executive power now to ensure order even within the framework of the existing laws are universally qualified as an assault on democracy, an attack on glasnost.

At the same time, the people are rightly indignant that the organs of power are not taking resolute actions to nip in the bud the increasing unlawful manifestations.

The situation is so tense that the government sees the solution to it in firm and consistent action by all organs of power and the use of the legitimate potential of the state to protect the rights of the country's citizens. I am confident that society will support that line.

I hope that you will understand that all these comments are dictated not by confusion in the face of difficulties. It is not the difficulties in themselves which are dangerous—they can still be overcome. But this fuels the situation, which is already extremely complicated by the population's dissatisfaction at the results of socioeconomic development.

The improvement of the country's economy and political stabilization in society are two indivisible and organically interlinked factors. They must be fully utilized in the present difficult, transitional period. It is patently clear that this requires a program of social consolidation.

Undoubtedly, the political basis of this program must be the CPSU Central Committee platform for the 28th Party Congress.

The socioeconomic basis is the program of the country's government, supported by the Second Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

And, finally, the basis of national accord is provided by the decisions of the Central Committee September (1989) Plenum on nationalities questions.

The consolidation of society and the mobilization of all the party's forces to achieve this goal are, I think, the only means capable of preventing the growth of negative tendencies in the country.

Comrades, life sets its demands before us very brutally:

Either we, at this plenum and the 28th Party Congress, manage to see the right answers and propose an effective policy, strengthen the party's cohesion and militancy, and thereby master the situation and steer the course of events in a healthy direction, or we fail in those tasks, and then we shall cease to be the ruling party and the political vanguard of the people.

Now, more than ever before, we need the cohesive and harmonious work of the Central Committee and local party committees and a close link between the party and the people. That is what can and must bring it to the path of renewal.

Kovalev: 'Favorable' World Context Seen

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[Debate speech by A.G. Kovalev, USSR first deputy foreign minister, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Esteemed Comrades! With every fiber of its political being, the party is sensing that perestroika's moment of truth is approaching. The strengthening of its buttresses and the pace of its progress are therefore assuming an even greater importance.

Now about unpleasant aspects and frankness. At the last three plenums, as if in accordance with prepared scenarios, an atmosphere was created which was hard to bear. Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev was forced to react with the utmost firmness and to all intents and purposes raise the question of confidence.

Why did people find it necessary to provoke such a reaction? Could it have been done to get us used to the idea that perhaps our course is not right, that perhaps our leadership is not the right one? I believe that the marked majority of people in the party and the country believe that the time has come to conclude that those who permit themselves this kind of behavior should get used to the idea that the time has come for them to resign. Their path and the path of perestroika are not the same!

It is becoming absurd. If the West, including the pope, praises our renewal processes, it is claimed that we are making mistakes. Following this logic, we were acting

entirely correctly when the whole world community was cursing us for introducing troops into Afghanistan. And now that our servicemen are no longer dying there, and people in East and West are paying tribute to us, it appears that we are wrong.

No one ever criticized the antifascist coalition. But as regards a different coalition, the pro-perestroika coalition, they are trying to criticize us. How much wit, tact, and power of persuasion was needed to win over opponents, sometimes very difficult opponents of the highest international rank, how much knowledge and determination in upholding the national interests of the Soviet Union was needed in order to form this coalition. Policy statements from the rostrums of the United Nations, the Council of Europe, and the "Finlandia" palace, free communication with the mass media and the mass public in foreign countries have served to broaden sympathies and support for perestroika.

We have heard more than enough hints about deviation from the sanctity of theories, according to Marx, Engels, or Lenin, and enough claims that they cannot undergo constant creative development, take account of realities, and meet the many challenges of our time. Once again the reproaches of "slander" and calls to "expel," familiar from the bad old times, and a barely camouflaged yearning for a heavy hand, have gained currency. After all, the apparatus populism, the Nina Andreyeva syndrome and its variations reminiscent of the Black Hundreds [armed antirevolutionary groups 1905-1907] did not emerge from a vacuum. Or has perhaps the recent political fracas at the Central Writers House in Moscow been organized by Fantomas [elusive, fictional criminal character]? The fact that the conservative forces have organized themselves is a more likely explanation. Organized themselves along the vertical, right up to the highest levels of power, and along the horizontal in the regions where blood is flowing, at rallies where passions are seething, and in places where the shortages are most acutely felt.

I believe that the attacks on the party's ideological and theoretical work are mounted above all by people whom the new thinking has bypassed, or who refuse to accept it just as they refuse to accept pluralism of opinions in society and in the party.

Now about the activities of the informal movements and associations. The only test of their legal or illegal status is respect for law and order and observance of the USSR Constitution. Bans are a breeding ground for extremism. All kinds of extremism.

There is a topic which must not be sidestepped. This is the use of force. It cannot be mentioned without feeling grief and sympathy.

It is above all necessary to define the dividing line, which must not be transgressed, between what is arbitrary and what is a necessity. If a decision to use force is adopted in circumvention of the Constitution and legal norms, then the verdicts of conscience and politics cannot be

ignored. It is impossible to get away with Talleyrand's formula: "Let conscience plague those who have it."

When all other means of ending outrages, crimes, and terror have been exhausted, then, and only then, does the use of force, including military force, become a direct obligation of the state. The norms of international law state that the use of force is permissible, but it must be commensurate with the legal aim.

We do realize, of course, that in the conditions of an orgy of violence, perestroika may fall victim to states of emergency. Extreme measures can subdue passions and calm the situation. But the solution of problems belongs to the realm of political means and dialogue. And here, just as in many other very complex and involved situations, we are placing the burden on the same pair of shoulders in the knowledge that no one else can cope.

During the years of perestroika the image of the Soviet Union as an enemy has been virtually destroyed in the outside world. It took an enormous amount of effort, political courage, and a heightened sense of responsibility for the fate of the country. In the talks which marked the breakthrough, above all at summit level, all this was demonstrated by the Soviet side consistently, resolutely, and with dignity.

Many people in our country have learned to perceive Western countries, including the United States, as partners. The most terrible thing at the moment is the manipulation of the image of the internal enemy, be it on ethnic lines or according to the type of labor or level of education. If the bogey of the internal enemy were to appear in the garden of perestroika, you could count on barbed wire and prison bars' going up again.

There is no parallel between consolidation and some kind of leveling in scholastic terms. Who is who? Everyone knows who the author of perestroika is. But who are his fellow-fighters, and to what extent? To know this is the civic duty of all our compatriots. Failing to recognize in time either a major apparatchik or a stunted blood-sucker who engaged in braking yesterday, sabotage today, and tomorrow... would mean committing an irreparable mistake. However, history is doing its job, the people no longer look on in silence, and the policy of restructuring socialism in the process of renewal is increasingly becoming a cause to which there is no alternative.

I dare to claim that the form which the self-expression of nations and ethnic groups may take is not all that important for the future of our motherland, be it a federation which allows also for confederative elements, or be it something more original, characteristic only of our fatherland's statehood. In my opinion there is a need for a new unionwide treaty to regulate all these problems flexibly and in differentiated fashion. The thesis of multifaceted, rather than uniform, ties between the parts and the whole seems very viable to me.

During the elaboration of the Helsinki Final Act the term consensus had to be explained. Today everyone understands it. Could this consensus not come in useful in our intraunion, interethnic statehood? Difficult, but highly viable.

And now about another consensus—global consensus. It has formed around the leader of our perestroika, and his exercise of the top party and state functions. The meaning of this consensus lies in the sober understanding and acceptance of the energetic peace-making efforts combined with concern for defense sufficiency. And the creation by means of all this of universal security and civilized relations between states and peoples.

It is my conviction that it is necessary to have a means to prevent the adoption of laws and resolutions which run counter the highest interests of society. It could be a right of "veto." To override it, a specific period of time and a qualified majority would be necessary. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet is not just a chairperson, he is the embodiment of the country's supreme state power. Such authority requires full-fledged attributes and powers. In this context I am also fully in favor of the creation of the post of head of state in the shape of a president. The need for this, I am convinced, is unquestionable and brooks no delay.

There is also another question which has never been touched on at Central Committee plenums or in the legislative bodies. It concerns the nuclear button. Who would be authorized to push it if the situation developed beyond the conceivable. From a purely party viewpoint it would be the general secretary, from the military viewpoint—the chairman of the Defense Council, and from the parliamentary viewpoint—the president. So we come to the conclusion that it should be the person who enjoys the absolute trust of the Soviet people and who is at the focus the global consensus of confidence.

The party has the unique ability to synthesize divergent social interests. Why not include a formulation on the following lines in the platform for the Congress—the CPSU is not opposed to reflecting in the new Constitution the possibility of the existence of other parties. It would be an demonstration of confidence in its own strength.

The Foreign Ministry, alongside the intelligence service, is probably the most sensitive mechanism for sensing the mood and the intentions of foreign states. Therefore I take the liberty of stressing once again that a perestroika coalition and the most favorable international conditions for our internal building exist in the world arena.

It is up to us alone. This means acting in the world of realities rather than roaming around the burial grounds of illusions, and listening to the heartbeat of the people and their constantly pulsing artery—conscience—even more attentively.

Gubenko Opposes CPSU Pay Raise

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[Debate Speech by N.N. Gubenko, USSR minister of culture, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 Feb]

[Text] Dear Comrades! In my lifetime, there has been no political leader from Stalin to Gorbachev who did not include two or three paragraphs about culture in his program speech.

The CPSU draft platform is a document of hope. It is the next document of hope in line, which could decide the future of the country, including its culture. I would like to say that it will decide it, but I am consciously saying could decide because the main thing that the party is being reproached with today is the almost traditional disparity between words and actions. This is the main thing that can deprive the party of the masses' trust.

The draft platform condemns neglect of the people's cultural and historical values, such that while 12 monuments are lost in the country every day. In a year, that is 4,380. And this when the state allocations for their restoration have increased to five times the 1986 figure. The roots of traditional people's culture, folklore, and trades have withered. Art has been banished from schools, architecture from the cities, and natural taste from life. The people are right to connect these losses with the party's policy in the sphere of culture.

Until such a time as every communist bears personal, and this includes criminal, responsibility for causing damage to culture, all the CPSU's intentions will remain on paper only.

Furthermore, according to the draft platform, the CPSU can see a future which will develop on the basis of powerful cultural, scientific, and technical progress, in which people are history's only objective. What a wonderful thesis! It is in the spirit of Lenin's political testament, which proved that the people's true sovereignty, economic improvement, and the resolution of social problems cannot be achieved without raising the masses' cultural level.

Lenin placed the question of culture at the center of his party and state policy. And this in conditions of a severe crisis! The cultural degradation of nations is avenging itself through losses in society's intellectual potential and the morality of the masses, economists, politicians, and cultural workers themselves.

According to UNESCO figures, we are 28th in terms of education standards. Lack of culture is a hole in the road toward humanizing the country and improving the economy and international relations.

The CPSU draft platform is proposing as one of its main tasks—and this gladdens me—that expenditure on the development of the whole sphere of education, enlightenment, and culture should be increased, and it supports

social initiatives and donations in the interests of developing education and culture. The only incomprehensible thing is how the platform reconciles itself with the laws that will be adopted at the next Supreme Soviet session. The Aytmatov commission, the Ryzhkov committee, all the creative unions, and the Ministry of Culture are fighting the Supreme Soviet Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission to exempt from taxation sums of money transferred to charitable aims and into nonrepayable financing of culture, art, and architecture.

For two months we have been trying to convince planners and financiers that they should liberate creative unions' enterprises from paying taxes on profit and on turnover. The result is one percent. Sums spent on charitable causes are restricted to only one percent of an enterprise's profit, and I can assure you that the elimination of the tax concessions which the government fixed only two years ago for enterprises in the creative unions will deprive them of the smallest chance of survival.

I repeat: If the CPSU draft platform envisages increased expenditure for the development of education and culture, the party must do everything it can to see the new laws correspond to its platform.

I would like to turn your attention to the paragraph in the platform on the rule-of-law state and self-governing society, which says that a great role in the formation of a rule-of-law state belongs to the development of political culture.

Dear Comrade Central Committee Members! Political culture results directly from culture. Culture is not a sector. Approaching it as if it were a department or a sector is disastrous. Culture is ubiquitous. It is everywhere. You can include it in any industrial or nonindustrial sphere you like as long as every one of you understands that, until every ministry, from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Light Industry, and every organization in every city and rayon has its own budget item for culture, there can be no question of any political culture capable of constructing a rule-of-law state.

Here, the need to elaborate Principles for Union and union republic legislation on culture becomes clear. Only a law will save us from commercialization, nationalism, and an administrative system in culture. Only a law will determine the budget and non-budget sources of financing. Only a law will provide freedom of creativity to culture and give it priority. Only a law will smooth out the line of social inequality, when the average wage in the country is R240, and the wages in culture are barely half of that—and a librarian or a musician earns R90.

It is the CPSU that should be the initiator of the law. This is a serious political question. It is a sphere of social development in which the CPSU should not make culture give way to other social forces. All the more so since the Central Committee, judging by speeches made by the party leadership, has a new concept of cultural policy. It

must be collected in a single document and implemented. The humanization of education and training must become a support for the CPSU's cultural policy. By training a child from an early age, from the cradle, from the nursery, and by filling school and higher educational programs with arts subjects, the state will be provided with a normal, comprehensively developed person.

Here a consolidation of all forces is needed, from the Committee on Education down to the creative unions, including the State Committee for Cinematography, the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, the State Committee for Publishing Houses, Printing Plants, and the Book Trade, and the Academy of Sciences.

And another thing. If the CPSU is proposing a conversion program, let defense take on the protection of culture. We are giving back the church its holy places. Let us give art back its holy places too. Let us not talk about far-reaching plans. Let us start the conversion here, now, with ourselves, Dmitriy Timofeyevich [Yazov, USSR defense minister]. Please give back to culture the monument to culture and architecture constructed by Stasov, so that we can make a Center for Saving the Country's Library Funds and Cultural Funds there. I repeat that the draft platform is a document of hope for us. I am talking about the Army Supply Warehouses, where a Defense Ministry vehicle depot is located. The monument to culture and architecture. The people are no longer convinced by appeals or promises, or theoretical platforms. They are only convinced by their own experience. As a result of decades of dictatorship by dogmatic ideology, the leaders of perestroika have inherited the legacy of a people resigned to their fate, used to being given meat on television, clothed with promises, and supplied with services in the newspapers. The people are materialists. If the present CPSU Central Committee platform demands more effort from them, the people are quite justified in saying: Give us a better life than the one we have now. And the party again makes promises: In 1991, the counters will be full of food, in 2000 every family will have an apartment, and republics will be independent.

Are we not consoling ourselves with more illusions? the people ask. No, the draft platform says, now the soviets really will have all the power, we will not teach the peasant how and when to plow and sow, the workers how to organize production, or the intelligentsia how to be creative. We do not now consider ourselves teachers, we are ready to learn from the people, and not just our own people. To brush aside international experience would be the greatest self-conceit. This clear position gives us hope in the draft platform. Dictatorship, promises, and forced retention of power are impossible and only lead to bloodshed. And the draft writes in black and white: "The CPSU is not making claims to monopoly, privileges, and the strengthening of its own position in the USSR Constitution." But this does not mean that the CPSU is ready to shed its political responsibility for the state of

affairs in the country. Democracy must acquire the stability and firmness of the law; it must become a habit, if you like, because until it does, establishing a multi-party system is accompanied by the danger of resolving many problems by force. "Habit is the soul of the state," Pushkin says.

In the example of perestroika we can see how difficult it is to give up other habits. In this sense, the provision in the draft platform that "the CPSU is a voluntary organization of like-minded people and leaving it cannot have any political or civil consequences" seems to me to be important. This provision rules out force.

It is no less important that the party "reserves the right to rid itself of those who reject its ideological and political and organizational principles and who belong to anti-Soviet organizations and take part in anti-Soviet actions." This is the path to purification and to unity of its ranks. It is intolerable for people in the same party to say "yes" to our face and "no" when they leave the room and go out into the square. These are people from another party. And I dare say that it is still within the CPSU.

I would like to outline one trend in relations between the center and the localities. Habituation to a parasitic attitude is the main obstacle on the road to decentralization and independence for both the individual and many state structures. The psychology of social parasitism, which we received as a legacy from monarchism, it seems to me, has led to the fact that people pinned their hopes in former times on the paternal Czar, and now in the same way they pin their hopes on the Politburo or, at a lower level, on the oblast party committee or another union ministry. They take and plead more often than they give. Parasitism has become a habit and a feature of all state and social structures, including the party. Some steal, and this happens everywhere, others just take things—they are allowed to. I fear that losses are awaiting the party soon in the March elections, not least because of the rise in earnings given to the administrative apparatus. The people justifiably see this as a conspiracy by anti-perestroika forces against a party which goes back, I would remind you, to a day when Comrade Tsyurupa, people's commissar for food, fainted from hunger at a session of the Council of People's Commissars. This card is already being played by the party's opponents, and before it is too late the decision must be recognized as erroneous. That will give back trust in the party to those who have lost it. Nobility that is based on the party's dignity, privations, and dangers connected with exhausting struggles, the habit of self-restraint, the idea of the Motherland's well-being, and faith—this, in the people's eyes, is what should embody the supreme moral strength of a real communist. And that will be action rather than word.

Kozlenkov: 'Assessment' of Leaders Demanded

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[Debate speech by V.V. Kozlenkov, secretary of the party committee of the "Progress" plant, Kuybyshev Oblast, at CPSU Central Committee Plenum 5 February]

[Text] Conscious of the whole complexity of the situation in which our party finds itself, the communists of our 5,000-strong plant party organization have entrusted me with drawing the attention of the participants in today's plenum to a number of questions that are urgent for us. What has been done over the five years of perestroika? What am I to tell people? What have we achieved? But there is nothing to tell, comrades. Yes, there is glasnost, not always objective, a little democracy, and other small changes in political life. But the attitude of many people to the party is determined today by empty store shelves, the raging of crime, the drop in living standards, and interethnic conflicts. A driver from Siberia was absolutely right to say at a recent conference in the Central Committee: How we steer determines where we go.

I would like to ask you, esteemed Central Committee members: Where are you steering? Communists and nonparty people ask: Why, when a particular decision is adopted, are its consequences not analyzed, forecast, and played through beforehand? For the country has more than enough loftily titled scientists and various centers and institutes. It is clear now that the complexity of the situation in which the party finds itself is a result of the lack of a scientifically substantiated concept of perestroika and of consistency and firmness on the part of the party leadership in implementing the political line.

Where is the assessment by the party of the omissions, errors, and even breakdown in work, and who has incurred personal punishment? Why do we spit—forgive my crudeness—on dead people and people who have taken a well-deserved rest? Did a majority of the now thriving Central Committee and Politburo members not have a hand in this? What are we secretaries of primary organizations, who spend 100 percent of our time among party members and nonparty people, to say? At the time of the not unknown struggle against drunkenness and alcoholism, we were required to institute party proceedings against communists, even including expulsion from CPSU membership, for an insignificant violation of antialcohol legislation. And at the same time, certain members of the Politburo, and also the Central Committee, oblast committee secretaries, and other party workers who have permitted and still permit serious shortcomings in work retire on pension with honor. But who has answered for the failure of decisions adopted during the years of perestroika?

Comrades, the word "conversion" has become fashionable recently. We realize that for a long time huge funds were invested in defense enterprises, and this is why our

plants are now measurably superior in terms of equipment and personnel. We are not opposed to starting up production of complex domestic equipment for the people as well. For this it is necessary to utilize our enterprise's entire scientific and technical potential, but without detriment to its working people. But in fact, comrades, things are turning out quite differently. With production of marketable agro-industrial output worth 1.27 million rubles [R] during 1989, direct losses totaled R745,000 and lost profit totaled R966,000, while for 1990 direct losses and lost profit will be several times greater. We are rendering unique equipment useless, losing highly skilled cadres, and complicating the already strained situation in the shops. Would it not be more rational to create on the basis of defense plants, plants specializing precisely in agro-industrial orders? Then we would not have to deal with uncharacteristic materials and technical processes. The impression is created that no one is tackling or in control of questions of conversion. It is time to understand that under the current conditions it is important to preserve what is most valuable—the highly skilled cadres of defense plants.

There is a big question about the fulfillment of the 27th CPSU Congress decision to provide the population with separate apartments or houses by the year 2000. The resolution was adopted, and we are obliged to fulfill it; but how? There is a shortage of cement, timber, bricks, and other construction materials. For 1 million bricks, plants are demanding, in addition to their cost, R500,000 for the additional development of production. For every ruble of joinery products produced, they are demanding materials and equipment worth R2. But where are they to be found, comrades?

Communists and workers are now saying: The period of stagnation has been replaced by a period of economic collapse. I have cited just a few examples, but they cause communists to take a negative attitude toward the Central Committee's activity. It is necessary to assess the party leadership's activity at the present time. Ordinary communists cannot understand how it is possible in such circumstances not to take measures to democratize internal party life. With a view to further developing internal party democracy and enhancing the activeness and responsibility of CPSU members in primary party organizations, it is necessary to eliminate the multitiered nature of party management and exclude tiers which do not have a direct connection to a primary party organization. Decisions adopted by a primary party organization within the framework of the powers granted it are not liable to be rescinded by higher party organs. Before the start of the report and election campaign, it is expedient to draw up and implement a new instruction on elections of leading cadres. Elections of all secretaries of the Central Committee and other levels must be conducted on a multiple-candidate basis, with due regard for the opinion of the organizations in which the nominated candidates work.

On the eve of the nomination and election of delegates to the 28th CPSU Congress, we believe that the procedure

for discussing and selecting candidacies must ensure the participation of every primary organization, be implemented with the maximum glasnost, and be direct and on a multiple-candidate basis. Large primary party organizations which exceed the representation norm in terms of size must be granted the right of direct delegation.

The next question, comrades, is that of the party budget. It is time at last to make the party budget open, to examine it openly, and to approve it in the future at Central Committee plenums, and to do the same with regard to budgets of lower components at plenums of the corresponding committees. Party committees with the rights of a rayon committee should be granted the right to independently form their own budget, staff schedule, and apparatus structure, as well as the right to revise the procedure for distributing the funds derived from the payment of membership dues.

We support the proposal of the communists of Leningrad—of the Izhorskiy plant—to hold the extraordinary 28th congress in two stages. At the first stage—to be held in May—it is necessary to examine the following questions: the role and place of the CPSU under contemporary conditions of societal life. Here it is necessary to make an assessment of Article 6, the multiparty system, factionalism, and many other complex questions. At the first stage of the congress, the draft CPSU Statutes and Program would be adopted and forwarded for further consideration to primary party organizations. Here, too, organizational questions with regard to renewing the composition of the Politburo and the Central Committee would be examined. Criticism has already been leveled here at our ideological corps—Comrade Medvedev; and at economists—Comrade Slyunkov. I would also like to add, comrades, criticism of our esteemed organ—the KGB. How was it possible to allow the holy of holies—our state border—to be destroyed along 137 km in just one day? Where were our chekists looking?

The congress delegates must retain their powers for the whole accounting period and be involved in work on Central Committee commissions. And another proposal from our plant's communists: The Central Control Commission should be reinstated, independent of the Central Committee, and be elected at the congress.

Comrades! Display boldness and wisdom in adopting principled decisions and persistence in carrying them out, and then every communist and nonparty person will estimate you at your true worth as communists; and then we will not have a repeat either of Volgograd, or of Tyumen, or of yesterday's disgraceful events in your Manege Square.

Report on CPSU Plenum Speakers 5 Feb

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[“At the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee; Speeches at the CPSU Central Committee Plenum”—TASS headline]

[Excerpts] Moscow 6 Feb (TASS)—At the CPSU Central Committee Plenum which opened here on Monday [5 February], debates on the report by Mikhail Gorbachev on the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress were continued in the second half of the day of 5 February. B. M. Belousov, minister of the Defense Industry, spoke first and stated his disagreement that the CPSU Central Committee platform being discussed should be political. Socioeconomic and political problems motivate and stimulate each other.

This is felt especially in industry, including in its most well-organized, balanced and qualified section, which is the defense industry. [passage omitted]

In conclusion the speaker said that in the proposed draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee for the 28th party congress, in the section “for an efficient planned market economy” aims and tasks are set correctly. All of these years the country has been going toward these boundaries. But this has not been done comprehensively, taking into account the necessary optimal combination in the transitional period or the old [and new] economic system when getting the new one in operation. Therefore, it is essential in the political platform to clearly define the ideology of the transitional period itself, taking into account the realities of the present period and the program of the government that was approved by the Second Congress of People's Deputies.

V.I. Brovnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and ambassador of the USSR to Poland, shared the opinion of those speakers who said that the the document under discussion is hardly acceptable in its present form, and needs serious revision. Its excessive slogan-mongering, and even a degree of shrillness, the inaccuracy of the evaluations it contains of the past and particularly of the present, its ideological eclecticism and lack of theoretical clarity mean as yet that it cannot claim the role of a keynote document of the party. The impression is being created that it is of a pragmatic character and designed to satisfy the current demands of our politics.

The document contains enough eulogies to perestroika, criticism of the distant past and generous promises to the future, the speaker continued, but there is practically no evaluation of the present, or of the mistakes made, not at some time in the past, but during the period of perestroika. Recently we have somehow started to set more store by not our own evaluations of our own work, but by the way in which gentlemen in the West evaluate us. And we have not avoided this in the platform either.

We are somehow trying to prove all the time that the people are in favour of perestroika, but allow me to ask: What kind of perestroika? Surely not for that which has, in the space of less than five years, thrown the country into the abyss of crisis and brought it to the point where we have come up face to face with an outburst of anarchy, the degradation of the economy, the ugly face of general destruction and collapse in morality? To assert

that the people are "for", that all this pleases them, is, at the very least, politically dishonorable. The people are against it, and are saying so louder and louder.

Incidentally, the concept of "perestroika" is exploited with equal success by the true supporters of revolutionary changes and by reactionaries, by the friends of the Soviet Union and by its enemies, by those who favor socialism and by those who have fought it frenziedly all their lives. All of this is the result of our hypertrophied ambition and the personal mistakes made by the leaders of our party and state.

The ambassador cited as one of these mistakes the declaration of the total democratization of society without having established discipline and order in the country. Discipline without democracy will survive, but democracy without discipline is unthinkable, for it will inevitably turn into, or rather degenerate into, social and political chaos.

This is well understood by the Western leaders who are so busily praising us, who act toughly and decisively back at home, when the tiniest threat to their state or their class interests appears. In so doing, these same Bush and Thatcher pay not the least attention to what people will think of them. Examples of this are Panama, the crushing of the strike movement in Britain, and many other things.

In such cases we counter this thesis with the explanation that "we cannot return to Stalinist methods...." It would be madness to push people toward that—to call for that. But every power that respects itself and its state should compel respect for its laws. We are substituting an activeness we have all grown tired of in words for our passivity in actions and are presenting our indecisiveness and helplessness in putting an end to anti-state, anti-social acts and even to crimes as tolerance of dissidence and of pluralism of opinion and even of action.

The speaker also described as an error the adoption of hasty laws. By way of example, the anti-school legislation and the law on cooperatives. Having ranged from shashliks to tanks it is giving an effect quite the opposite of the one promised. Other laws and decisions—on enterprises, on leasing, on individual labor activity—are they really working in the way they were intended?

We have been as sudden in giving up the idea of acceleration as we once were bold and decisive in proclaiming it. We were right, for in economics there are no miracles or instant transformations. But if this is how things are, then in politics too, including in the legislative area, running on ahead and lack of prudence leads to melancholy results.

We hope that the democracy that has been raised to an absolute will put everything in its place in the political sphere, and the market will do so in the economy. But if so far everything is turning out just the opposite, then, do you see, it is not the leaders at the center who are responsible, but the executors in the localities. At best it

goes: But we didn't think that it would all turn out like this. A strange position for top level people. But most of all it has become fashionable here for us to put down all our misfortunes to the "accursed past." But for a long time now we have been swallowing not the days-old soup of yesterday's stagnation, but porridge boiled up today out of the products of perestroika.

The speaker considers that the members of the Central Committee and the deputies need to answer for all of this, each in his own post—to answer for what is now being done in the country. The Communist Party members expect this of us. Our tragedy today is that we are quite unable to give up personal power in the state and party. We frequently run affairs by intuition, incompetently, shortsightedly, concerned not for the good of the fatherland but for other, perhaps more personal ambitions.

The speaker made a proposal: To remove from the keynote document, the platform, the clause on the president, on the chairman and his deputies in the party, since the essence of the matter does not lie in these posts, nor in what new cabinet revolutions we carry out. It lies in how the party will act and what policy it will conduct, and what aims it will follow. That, too, should have been said more clearly in our platform.

We need breakthroughs toward new ideas and work to move the situation forward. We don't have sufficient political foresight, good forecasting, rapid and decisive actions and assertiveness in carrying out what we intend to do. This is the opinion of P.K. Luchinskiy, CPSU Central Committee member and first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee. It is indecisiveness, procrastination and delay in tackling any issues that are the sources of many of our troubles, he stressed, and he illustrated what he had said with specific examples from Moldavian political life.

Cadre reshuffles have been carried out in the republic in an atmosphere of real sociopolitical crisis. Unfortunately, the expression "the storm hasn't broken yet" has become a customary one. The speaker thought that the processes taking place in Moldavia are very closely related to the general political situation both in the country and in Europe. Describing the CPSU Central Committee draft platform for the 28th party congress as a considerable step forward in analyzing the situation and elaborating the party's further strategy and tactics, the Central Committee member noted that the document did not contain clearly expressed positions on the acute factors now being experienced by our society. Unfortunately, we assess the true significance of events most frequently only in retrospect.

On the multiparty system, the speaker said that, in essence, it is already developing within the CPSU and in society. Why have we been forced to integrate under the authority of the party opinions and ideological aspirations which are not only disparate but at times even contradictory, as well as tactical approaches which lie at

opposite poles? Lenin's credo—first define the boundaries and then unite—continues to be an objective methodological strategy, he believed. The experience of those countries where a two-party system in operation also merited attention.

The first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee called for a detailed discussion on the theme: "Whose interests does the party express?"

The question of the president is not a formal issue. It is connected with the strengthening of legality and the prospect of the election of a president by the whole people.

The wording of the part of the draft concerning Article Six of the Constitution, in the speaker's opinion, is more of a hindrance than a help to communists, since it imposes on society the supremacy of the party, which inevitably causes protest. It is the Central Committee plenum which should unambiguously call for the exclusion of the party from the basic law, because the fate of the party should be decided primarily by the party itself.

The report proposes much that is positive on the question of the autonomy of the communist parties of the union republics, the speaker continued. The reality is that it is necessary to embark more boldly on the formation of a union of communist parties of the republics on a single ideological basis. As for the fate of the federation, here, he declared, there is only one way out: A union [soyuz] of sovereign states on the basis of a new union treaty. It is only necessary to define clearly the circle of problems whose solution the republics will delegate to the center. These may be questions of the defense of the country, transportation, communications, power engineering and certain others. Apart from a union treaty, the appropriate protocol must be signed, reflecting the specific peculiarities of the republics. This, in the speaker's conviction, will strengthen alike the link with the center and trust in one another.

Dwelling on economic problems, he stressed that their acuteness required, perhaps, the introduction of emergency measures. One is also alarmed by the circumstance that people have lost confidence in the future, they are living in fear. It is a matter of ensuring elementary public order. It is proposed to create in the country a kind of public parliament, a round table, to which representatives of all movements, fronts, unions, representatives of the leadership of the country should be invited. A dialogue is needed with all forces, to ensure calm and exclude violence and mass disorders.

In the opinion of B.V. Gidaspov, first secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee [obkom], in the era of glasnost and democracy, however paradoxical it may sound, what people lack most of all is truth about the real situation in the country, about where we are heading, who is leading us and what we can expect even in the coming months.

With every passing day, he said, the stabilization of the situation in the political and economic sphere is increasing, and the draft platform, too, forecasts no rainbows. There are many reasons for this, but the main one is that in practice, the mechanism of executive power is completely out of order, governability by the state is declining rapidly, and the ministries are totally rooted to the spot. The local soviets do not for now have power either *de jure* or *de facto*, the methodical removal of the party from leadership is taking place, and there is no political assessment of the laws being adopted by the Supreme Soviet. A reorganization of the party apparatus has been carried out, and the industry-by-industry principle for party leadership has been rejected. Instead, we have amorphous and essentially faceless structures in which nobody is responsible for anything. The role of the primary party organizations is only proclaimed. In the conditions of election to posts, a most important lever for the party has also been weakened—that of *cadras*. Last year, for the first time, industry in Leningrad barely coped with the plan target, and January was a flop, the obkom first secretary noted. Analyzing the problems, he stressed that recipes for recovery of the economy and for normalization of the state of affairs in agriculture and industry which are based on half-measures do not provide and cannot provide results in the foreseeable future. The lack of a scientifically based program of conversation [of defense plants] will also have a negative effect on the national economy.

Look at the clock, the speaker said to those attending the plenum, we still have a little time. Awareness of the need to avoid a national catastrophe stirs people to untraditional actions. If we do not enhance right away the prestige and mobilizing role of the CPSU in society, then we shall lead it into total chaos.

The Central Committee of our party must state clearly and definitely in its platform, unlike the way it is at present, that only the CPSU can act as the constructive, consolidating basis of our state and as the guarantee of a socialist path of development. We have no other acceptable choice or other alternative. It is only energetic creative activity of the party—from Politburo to primary party organizations—that is capable of stabilizing the situation.

We are aware that it is primarily we who bear full responsibility for the state of affairs at local level, the speaker went on to say, but the party as a whole is losing the initiative and the Central Committee and obkoms, including that of Leningrad, are losing ground. We face an urgent need for renewal in all leading units and structures of the CPSU. For complete, radical and immediate renewal—on this I am in complete agreement with the theses of M.S. Gorbachev.

The obkom first secretary reported a proposal from Leningrad's Communists to convene the 28th Congress of the CPSU in March or April giving pride of place to internal party and cadre issues and then to hold a report-back and election campaign. While not objecting

to the second version, we believe that it is impossible to delay a party report-back and election conference in Leningrad longer than March or April, 1990, he stressed. It will be either the party obkom or other structures that conduct it. Many thousands of communists and dozens of primary party organizations are in favor of their not being satisfied with the actions of the party obkom although this is the case, it is rather a matter of the objective necessity for profound changes and the involvement of new people, elected by democratic means. In the situation that has come about, a congress of Russia's communists is quite simply essential prior to the 28th congress. We have to reinforce our ranks and to tackle the leadership issue of the Russian Communist Party.

After dwelling on economic problems and on ways out of the crisis, the speaker stated the need really to stop all channels for economically unfounded issue of rubles, by which he meant the revocation of many articles of the laws on the state enterprise and on cooperation.

He put forward proposals to carry out monetary reform, to introduce economically justifiable prices, to monitor strictly compliance with production plans and to introduce a state ration-card system on basic foodstuffs throughout the Soviet Union and rigorous inventory and control of our more than modest resources.

It is essential, the obkom first secretary believes, to apply measures of party and political accountability in places where traditional state measures are ineffective.

We are talking about the leading role of the party, not for the sake of the leading role itself, he said in conclusion, and will not fight for it for the sake of our own ambitions. Only the correctly understood and objective interest of the working people, reflected in our ideology, will permit communists to look people honestly in the eye. [passage omitted]

Regarding the situation which has come about in the republic, A.N. Mutalibov, first secretary of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan Central Committee stated that everything still has to be fully investigated. People must know the truth and they will know it. In his opinion, the events of January must not be looked at without taking elements of cause and effect into consideration. The conflict, which started on the first crests of the perestroika wave in Nagorno-Karabakh [Autonomous Oblast, NKAJ], grew into a tragic confrontation between two peoples, confrontation which has never before known such a measure of alienation and open hostility. In effect, there is a civil war going on and not even the army can stop it. Today, continued the speaker, nobody can be left in any doubt that the reason behind the events lay in claims to the territory of the NKAJ. Clearly the aim was at all costs to become part of Armenia and to do everything to force all kinds of changes in economic ties with Azerbaijan which have proved to be worthwhile, even after destroying them. Describing this fact as unprecedented in the history of

the Soviet State the speaker expressed regret that from the very outset a principled party and state assessment of it was not made and that the appropriate decisive measures were not taken. Nobody has the right to violate a republic's sovereign rights or to engage in any kind of outside interference. This is guaranteed by Soviet legislation to which we shall strictly adhere.

The address expressed the idea that the inability of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan to guarantee to protect national interests and the deep-rooted practice of appealing to the center have done serious damage to the prestige of the republican party organization and have left a vacuum between it and the people. For a time this led to the virtual paralysis of political power.

All kind of scum has been flushed to the surface. But, the head of the republic's communist party [Mutalibov] stressed, the adherence to the Azeri people to socialist ideals should not be called into question. Speaking about the need to establish order, he noted that the measures being taken today and the improvement that has taken shape will help to put things right and avoid further confrontation. In his view, what happened in Azerbaijan, in spite of its acute and unprecedented nature, is the result of the pain of establishing democracy that is so typical of our society.

At the same time, the speaker drew attention to the fact that in conditions of democracy some forces feel excessively free-and-easy, while others are subjected to defamation. In his words, a paradoxical situation has arisen in which the political system, which is reforming itself in the direction of establishing law-governed relations, is compelled to resort to the use of methods of force from the arsenal of command-based and administrative rule.

Acknowledging the fact that in a number of the country's regions so-called informal movements have in practice already become parallel bodies of power, he concluded that this has become possible not only because of the weakness and tactical errors of party organizations, but also because, to date, the activity of these movements has not yet been legislatively regulated. Most importantly, the first secretary of the communist party of Azerbaijan Central Committee believes, the CPSU has failed to work out a clear political policy with regard to these new forces and to define their place and role in the revitalized political system. Thus, genuine democrats and fervent nationalists, advocates of perestroika and separatists, are in practice measured with the same stick. Clear, Leninist accents, characteristics and guidelines are needed in the political struggle.

Speaking about certain points of the draft platform, the speaker found in it much that was contradictory. In particular, the right of nations to self-determination right up to secession is confirmed on the one hand, while on the other, the draft speaks of the duty of the party to persuade them of the inexpediency of such a choice. The speaker believes that there is a need here for clear and

unambiguous expression. The draft points out, he continued, that the role of the party is to be the democratically recognized political leader, but there is no uncertainty that the party will maintain its leading role in society against the background of the immense social problems which, evidently, are not going to be solved for some time yet. In his view, the emphasis contained in the draft to the effect that the party will strive for the implementation of socioeconomic programs requires amplification. After all, there is in it a detailed enumeration from economy of resources to conversion. But none of this is the exclusive preserve of the party's upcoming activity. The desire to improve the economy merely using planning and market methods of economic management, without radically resolving the problem of ownership or without ensuring the necessary discipline, seems half hearted. [passage omitted]

[Platonov is the speaker] It is very important for communists to know the position of certain members of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo on specific issues to have a correct understanding of causes and to assess the competence of this or that leader. Complicated and difficult processes are underway in the economy but Comrade Slyunkov, Central Committee secretary and Politburo member, has nothing to say about this issue. We don't know his position. We don't know Comrade Medvedev's position on many ideological issues but we would very much like to. The silence of Comrade Razumovskiy, Politburo candidate member, on the crisis processes underway in a number of oblast party organizations is incomprehensible. Universal bewilderment is caused among communists and nonparty members as to why, when not infrequently there is wholesale criticism and denigration of the party at the Congress of People's Deputies, Politburo members and the communist deputies who represent the CPSU within the supreme body of power are silent. Finally, it is completely incomprehensible why Politburo members remain silent when they are harshly criticized in the press. How much has been uttered with regard to Ye.K. Ligachev: After all, it is certainly not for the good of the cause. The Central Committee should either back him with its own authority and sweep unfounded accusations aside or reach organizational conclusions since publications of this sort cast a shadow over the entire party. [passage omitted]

On behalf of his party organization, whose point of view is shared by many communists in Chelyabinsk Oblast, the speaker asked that the Central Committee submit the question of altering Article six of the USSR Constitution to the third session of the USSR Supreme Soviet. [passage omitted]

Is the CPSU remaining the ruling party, the political vanguard of the people? Does it stand firmly as before in the positions of the communist ideal or is it listing in the direction of social democracy? Does it fully foresee the social and political consequences of the coming into being of a market economy? Will the society of social justice, which was chosen by the people in October 1917

be formed on that basis, or will there be something else? Behind these questions, said N.I. Ryzhkov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, lie the main reasons for the difficulties which the CPSU is experiencing. The answers should be sought, in his view, not outside the party, but within it. The resolving of them lies not behind, but ahead—on the road of radical renewal of the internal life and work of the CPSU.

The party which is renewing itself must, thinks the speaker, at its own initiative, very clearly and honestly dissociate itself from negative phenomena committed in the past: Terror must be called terror. De-kulakization must be called illegal actions against society, the struggle against imaginary enemies—a crime against one's own colleagues. Against this background everything positive that has been done by generations of communists over decades will stand out more sharply.

The speaker [Ryzhkov] dwelt especially on the question of a multiparty system, noting that it is already too late to discuss whether a multiparty system is necessary or not. To all intents and purposes it already exists. In such conditions, the party, in its platform, should express its view clearly, reveal its position with regard to this extremely topical question which can change the whole course of the history of the development of our society. Communists cannot avoid giving a direct answer here. Communists, thinks the speaker, have to go through a difficult lesson of learning to work and live together with other public and political formations. Of course all of this must have a reliable legal base which prevents the emergence of all possible kinds of "pseudo" and "ultra" movements, which can bring, and in point of fact are already bringing harm to both society as a whole and to individual citizens in it. Here we need clarity and lucidity.

It is time for the bodies of people's power to determine their position with regard to all public and political movements in the country and to tell the people where aims of real democracy are being pursued, and where, in place of progress, destructive actions prevail.

The speaker stressed that in paying great attention, very well-founded, to the creation of laws in the socioeconomic sphere, we are getting work underway extremely slowly to create acts of law that regulate social relations in the country. Many of the ills of recent years are connected, in the speaker's view, with the fact that the process of delineating the functions of party, soviets and economic management organs is proceeding slowly and in a contradictory manner. While the party committees have begun to depart from traditional methods of direct management, by injunction, of the socioeconomic development of the regions, the soviets and their executive committees have proved, in essence, incapable of taking on everything that should be organically inherent in their nature as real organs of state power. This is not the least in the whole complex of causes which have led to a situation in which control of the national economy has

become sharply enfeebled in the recent period and has started to have an extremely negative effect on its development.

The difficulties here, in the view of the head of government, lie in the fact that we have as yet simply not properly figured out how the party should act as a political leader. Rayon, town and oblast party committees continue to engage in economic affairs, duplicating the soviet bodies in the localities.

Why is it that many correct, fine decisions by legislative and executive organs of power at the center and in the localities are implemented with such difficulty—or remain on paper? The main reason now, in the opinion of the speaker, lies in the lack of the necessary powers on the part of the soviets and their executive organs. The fault does not lie here, as some people state, with the party organs which allegedly do not want to part with their spheres of influence. The whole point lies in the system of the party and state governing mechanism which has taken shape over the course of half a century. It is impossible to solve economic, social, and other problems, while the country is being shaken by inter-ethnic explosions and illegal strikes, when republics consider themselves free from the need to fulfill union laws purely on the basis that they are not to their liking.

Hundreds of thousands of refugees, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers said in conclusion, have been deprived of their homes, accusing the state of being incapable of securing the safety of their person and property. There are laws on liability for inflaming inter-ethnic strife, but they are not being applied.

There are laws to combat crime but their effectiveness has been lowered because the law-enforcement organs have found themselves literally crushed by the tide of impetuous criticism. In a word, all this has also become one of the first and foremost tasks today. However, these days any attempts by executive authorities to ensure order even within the framework of the existing laws pretty often are qualified as assaults on democracy, an attack on glasnost. At the same time people are justly indignant about the organs of authority not taking decisive actions to stop the growing unlawful activities. The situation is so tense that the way out of it the government sees is in firmness, in the consistency of action of all the organs of authority, in using the legal means of the state for defending the rights of the country's citizens. The speaker is sure that society will support such a course.

It is a good thing that they have started heeding the voice of primary organizations in the Central Committee, I.I. Melnikov, secretary of the Moscow State University party committee, noted. This should become the norm. Today it is naive to try to convince anyone to favor democracy, since general democratic theses are shared by the majority, but specific questions remain. How are delegates to the congress to be elected; when are the elections in party organizations to be held; how and when should the congress itself be held? Or this question:

When will we finally find out the point of view of members of the Central Committee, of its secretariat and Politburo, not as summarized by the Foreign Ministry spokesmen, but from them directly? After all, what we want to see in the Central Committee is not a portrait gallery, but a collection of living people who experience things together with us, argue, and perhaps, make mistakes, but seek solutions to the most difficult, fundamental issues.

Is the Central committee fulfilling the resolution of the 19th party conference "on glasnost?" An answer to this question will have to be given to the congress.

Why is there such persistent talk in the primary organizations about the need for direct elections, the speaker asked. Through this the people elected will be those whose standpoint is closer to the rank and file communists. There is also another reason—we want to have trust in the people who will be determining the destiny of the party and the future of the country. The question of trust is a question of the life of the party. We will not avoid analysis and assessment of every leader. Therein lies a cleansing of the party.

Apropos, the proposal has been made at the university that every party leader should render account not in the apparatus's party organization, but in one of the bigger primary organizations. [passage omitted]

The leader of the university's communists criticized the document under discussion for a lack of precision, conciseness, and clarity in some formulations. It is just, these qualities, in his opinion, that are lacking for the draft to become the basis of the work of communists in the future until a new CPSU program is worked out. [passage omitted]

Finishing his speech, the speaker agreed with the opinion of many communists that the Central Committee's reaction to events in the country is often belated and not in line with the importance of these events. The absence of political evaluations is particularly perplexing. The solution of these important matters must not be postponed, they must be resolved today.

A very complicated dialogue with veterans and young people is being conducted in the labor collectives and by place of residence on the eve of the plenum and in the course of preelection meetings, said M.A. Knyazyuk, member of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Ivanovo Okkom. People are directly asking the question, what is going to happen in the country and in the party tomorrow—split or consolidation, stability or pogroms, collapse or advancement along the path of socialism? They ask anxiously: Does the party, does the government have the strength to hold the country back from chaos and to lead forward, both in politics and in the economy?

In the speaker's opinion the aggravation of the political situation in the country is linked not only with the fact that destructive political forces have placed the unity of

the party under threat and that some of Lithuania's communists have already broken away. The reasons lie in the fact that the rules of the CPSU are ceasing to operate in party organizations and that program provisions adopted by the 27th congress are not being fulfilled. The CPSU platform on the nationalities question is not working. Factional activity is effectively in existence in the party.

Among communists there are both those who by their labor move perestroika forward and take upon themselves responsibility for its results and those who are striving to remove the CPSU from the political arena, to separate it from the state and anathematize Marxism-Leninism. This, he considers, is no longer pluralism of opinions but ideological disorder, struggle within the party for influence upon communists. Particularly worrying is the fact that mass meetings and spontaneous action are becoming characteristic of this struggle.

For the purpose of strengthening the link between the Central Committee of the party and rank-and-file communists, between the government and the people, the speaker [Ivanovo] proposed that the plenum adopt a decision so that all members of the CPSU Central Committee and Politburo and members of the government should report back in the primary party organizations and in the labor collectives about their activity and the work of the CPSU Central Committee and relevant bodies, that they should explain the CPSU Central Committee platform, and that the opinions and proposals of the communists should be placed at the foundation of the draft documents of the new congress of the party. In many party organizations it is considered that it is only after a thoroughly prepared congress of the party, at which the main party documents will be worked through and the most important political directions of the party at the present stage will be precisely defined, that it will be possible to hold reports-back and elections in the party organizations.

Events in a number of republics, including Azerbaijan, have shown utterly convincingly that there are political forces operating in the country that have openly launched a struggle for power and for the right to control and command the minds and destinies of people and of peoples, which have set about redrawing the socialist system itself, the speaker continued. Duality of power has been established in a number of territories. It is ordinary people, women, children and the elderly who are suffering from this. In his opinion it is time to tell the people the whole truth, to name the political forces that must share with the CPSU responsibility for creating a socially tense and explosive situation in a number of regions, to expose the true goals that they pursue, and to dissolve nationalist and extremist organizations. Working out a law on a mechanism for the withdrawal of a union republic from the USSR and also laws and mechanisms for the economic responsibility of the republics for the fate of refugees should be speeded up.

Dwelling on the decisions of the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania, the speaker said that following the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the meetings between Mikhail Sergeyevich and the communists and working people of the Lithuanian republic there was some hope that reason and the sober forces of the Lithuanian people and the communists would not permit centrifugal forces to build up. However it must be frankly admitted that an effective dialogue did not result and the actions of the CPSU Central Committee were too late.

The speaker expressed the conviction that at this difficult hour the CPSU Central Committee plenum and the Central Committee Politburo must direct all their strength into preserving the integrity of a single, all-union political party. He proposed that the situation in the CPSU be assessed as one that has arisen in real terms, that those communists who remain on the CPSU platform should not be pushed aside, that their right to participate in perestroika and to carry out political work among the masses within our party should be recognized, that they should be supported, that help should be given in convening a congress and electing leading bodies, and that material resources should be reserved for that party.

The speaker went on to express opinions about what the party itself should be like, where it should operate and what it should make as the target for its members—the organization of the working masses, the specific result, responsibility for implementing party policy, or permanent discussion and empty words.

It was precisely the level of organization and the high level of political maturity of the workers that brought to life the prototype of Soviet power, the Ivanovo-Voznesenskiy citywide soviet of workers' deputies, he stressed. It is precisely cohesion, militancy, political activeness of the highest level, and the closest links with the masses that have enabled the party organizations to hold on to Soviet power in the most difficult periods of history.

The speakers put forward the proposals that the concept of the self-management and independence of the party organizations and the freedom of argument and of discussion should be set down in the new party rules. He responded critically to the thesis about freedom to leave the party, which in his opinion could turn the party into a place people use to pass through.

The party leader of the Ivanovo Oblast expressed the opinion that in reforming society they got carried away by the superstructure to the detriment of the basis. Sluggishness and inconsistency in implementing radical economic reform have increased inflation and shortages and have reduced the living standards of the population.

In his opinion the March plenum of the CPSU Central Committee declared a program for uplifting agriculture but did not make it possible in full measure to improve the position of the collective and state farms, which still remain in a financial vice. The speaker dwelled on the

difficulties that have arisen in the supply of cotton for the oblast's textile enterprises, the ill-adjusted nature of the mechanism for economic cooperation between the oblast and the union republics, particularly Uzbekistan, and other issues of the economic reform.

Program speeches from the UN platform, the European Council, "Finlandia" hall, and free contacts with information media and with masses of people from foreign countries have been extending the range of approval and support for perestroika, stressed A.G. Kovalev, member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission and first deputy minister of foreign affairs.

We have heard a lot of half-hints about deviations from the sanctity of theory. Whether it is according to Marx, Engels, or Lenin it must continually be in the process of creative development, take into account reality, and be up to the challenges of the era. Accusations about "slander" and a barely concealed longing for a firm hand, which were well known in the bad times, have again become fashionable. In the speakers' view, those who are attacking the ideological and theoretical work of the party are most frequently those whose minds the new thinking has simply slipped by or those who will not accept new thinking or pluralism of opinion in society and the party.

There is a subject that cannot be avoided, namely the use of force. Above all it is necessary to define the line that cannot be crossed between what is arbitrary and what is compulsory. If a decision to use force is made in circumvention of the Constitution and law and order then it is inevitable that conclusions prompted by conscience and proper policy will have to be faced.

When all other possibilities of stopping excesses, crimes, and terror have been exhausted then the use of force, including military force, becomes the direct duty of the state. The norms of international law say that the use of force is permissible but that it should be commensurate with a legitimate aim. Of course, we are aware that if there is an orgy of violence perestroika might become a victim of states of emergency [chrezvychaynye polozheinye].

During the years of perestroika the image of the Soviet Union as an enemy has almost been destroyed in the outside world, the speaker continued. A tremendous amount of colossal efforts, political valor, and of a heightened feeling of responsibility for the fate of the country has been required. In crucial talks, above all at summit level, all this was demonstrated by the Soviet side in a consistent, decisive, and worthy manner. A lot of people in our country, too, have learned to look upon the Western countries, including the United States, as partners. The worst thing at present is manipulating the image of the internal enemy by creating him according to national characteristics, his type of job, or level of education.

The speaker is of the opinion that the form the self-expression of nations and nationalities takes—either a

federation that also permits confederative elements or something original inherent only in our own country's state structure—is not so important for the future of our homeland. In his opinion it is high time there was a new all-union treaty regulating these problems in a flexible and differentiated manner. The proposition not for the unified but for the varied nature of the ties between the parts and the whole is vitally important. [passage omitted]

In the opinion of the speaker it is necessary to have a barrier against adopting laws and decisions that run counter to the supreme interests of society. The right of "veto" might be one such barrier. The chairman of the Supreme Soviet is not simply the chairman but the embodiment of supreme state power in the country. The full and complete attributes and powers of such an authority are necessary. In this context the speaker supported the idea of creating the post of head of state in the form of a president. The need for this is indisputable and urgent. [passage omitted]

The draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee is a document of hope which may also resolve the country's fate, including its culture. I would like to say "will resolve" but I consciously say may resolve—because the main thing with which the party may be reproached today is the almost traditional disparity between words and deeds, N.N. Gubenko, the USSR minister of Culture stressed. [passage omitted]

The speaker drew attention to the contradiction in the draft platform, which promotes as one of its main tasks the increase in spending on the development of the whole sphere of education, enlightenment and culture and supports public initiatives and sacrifices in the interests of the development of education and culture with laws which will be adopted at the next session of the Supreme Soviet. Aytmatov's commission [on matters of development of culture, language, national and international traditions and the protection of historical heritage], Ryzhkov's committee [on science, public education, culture, and upbringing], all of the creative unions, and the Ministry of Culture are conducting a battle with the Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission of the Supreme Soviet for the sums allocated for philanthropic aims and for the gratuitous financing of culture, art, and architecture not to be taxed. [passage omitted]

The attitude of many people to the party, said V.V. Kozlenkov, secretary of the party committee of the Kyubyshev "Progress" works, is determined nowadays by the empty shelves in the shops, raging crime, falling living standards and conflicts between the nationalities. [passage omitted]

Where is there any party-style assessment of omissions, errors, and even breakdown in work. Who has borne the punishment personally? Why do we "pin all the blame" on the deceased and on those who have gone into well-earned retirement? Can it really be that most of the current thriving members of the Central Committee and

Politburo didn't have a hand in it? At the same time, there are certain members of the Politburo and Central Committee, as well as secretaries of obkoms and other party officials who have allowed and continue to allow serious shortcomings in their work, going into honorable retirement. But who has answered for the failure of decisions taken during the years of perestroika?

Talking about the conversion which has started in industry the speaker noted, in particular, that for a long time huge sums were invested in defense enterprises and now they are technically equipped and staffed to a higher level and that the scientific and technical potential which has been accumulated must be used to the full in producing complex domestic equipment, but not to the detriment of the workforce. What actually happens is quite different. Unique equipment is put out of commission, highly skilled cadres are lost and an already tense situation on the shop-floor is complicated further. [passage omitted]

The debate on M.S. Gorbachev's report continued on the morning of 6 February at the CPSU Central Committee plenum.

Ye.P. Velikhov, member of the CPSU Central Committee and vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, touched on the question of confidence in the party. It seems to me that we must look at this question somewhat differently, he said. For before perestroika it did not arise. The party and society were aligned differently. It is only in the new situation, as a result of perestroika, that this question has indeed arisen.

The issue of confidence, this is the result of enormous creative activity on the part of society and members of the party. Confidence is a most important item of political capital, which has to be earned. This is a very great labor. The basis of confidence is truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. We have complete grounds for believing that society will have confidence in the reformed party, the new party. It asks a second question, too, about the monopoly of power. It is known historically that monopolism always gives birth to stagnation, both in the organization that implements monopolies and in society. This is a very serious question. We have already discussed and adopted certain measures—these are primarily the length of time for which one can stay in elective posts—but naturally the issue can be decided in different ways. The speaker expressed doubt about there being any other forces or strata in society in our country today realistically capable of claiming to compete with the party. If the party acts dynamically and effectively then it has every chance of preserving its influence and importance.

What will happen in the future? Answering this question the speaker expressed the supposition that life could lead to a situation in which two communist parties came into being. This, no doubt, is a very distant possibility and life has to demonstrate where things will go to. I would prefer, he said, for there to be two communist parties,

standing upon the same socialist platform, than for there to be yet another party of some kind competing with the communist party. Take the United States. None of us can distinguish in essence between the platform of the Democratic party and the platform of the Republican party. That is how the issue of monopolies can be resolved. Whether it is worth our while resolving it in that way or not will be shown by life, but it is no doubt necessary to discuss this question.

Touching on problems of developing pure sciences, the vice president of the USSR Academy of Sciences drew attention to the need to support first and foremost competitive principles in developing the sciences. In the Soviet Union these have been lost to a considerable degree.

Competition is an enormous driving mechanism. One of the important tasks in the economy is the development of competition and enterprise and risk. For this we have to develop the market. History shows that those cultures that have rejected competition have become degraded, even if they had very good initial conditions.

We have been given the first historical chance of being able to let people have an opportunity to develop. We must not let it slip. For this, of course, it is necessary that all our decisions, including those on regional questions, should have as their aim the development of competition, the development of Soviet enterprise. We must enter into competition on world markets and support in every way those who are capable of embarking upon such positions. [passage omitted]

In conclusion the speaker said that as a result of the new course in foreign and domestic policy we have started to earn the most priceless capital, the trust of the whole international community. Trust is the only basis upon which the nonviolent and nuclear-free world of the 21st century can be built. Trust has arisen as the result of consistent policy, backed up by real actions. It is precisely the development and the building of mutual trust between peoples, states, and all people on earth that must be the most important element in the political platform of the party.

V.I. Vorotnikov, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic [RSFSR] Supreme Soviet Presidium, noted that the draft platform basically does what it was intended to do—it gives initial guidelines for pre-congress discussion and ensures the constructive and creative nature of it—then dwelled on one of the central questions, the powers of the authorities. Democracy and freedom are indisputably indispensable conditions of perestroika. They are the aim of it, but they are not a boundless sea. Democracy has its shores, namely the state and the law. However, the law is being ignored, the authorities' institutions are being rejected, and the foundations of the state are being subjected to siege.

I think, said the speaker, that the idea put forward in the platform that envisions introducing the institution of a

president of the country is a correct decision which will make it possible to strengthen state power and defend democracy. I must self-critically admit that I myself at one time did not support this idea, but now I am convinced that presidential power is essential.

In the speaker's view, to speed up the country's emergence from the economic crisis monetary reform ought to be speeded up. We need to review wholesale, procurement, and obviously, retail prices on certain types of goods so that they more accurately reflect the level of socially necessary essential expenditure, and also the quality of output and services so they more actively stimulate scientific and technological progress and resource-saving, and promote strengthening the cost-saving regime. At the same time, naturally, a corresponding state subsidy for the poorly provided for layers of the population is essential.

Finally, we must not delay the reform of taxing citizens. Those who own property and those who receive high earnings ought to pay higher taxes.

Then the speaker touched on attitudes to private property. Of course, he stressed, from the point of view of the scale of our economy, small elements of private property will have a certain effect. That is so. But how will society as a whole react to the introduction of private property, which will bring with it a different social and psychological climate and different relations between people? These circumstances need to be worked through and considered very thoughtfully.

We must say clearly, the speaker noted, that we are building a just, humane, socialist society, that is, a society of equal opportunities, equal rights and obligations, a society where the status of a person and his material prosperity are determined by his work contribution.

What we have already done in our history, all the mistakes and things that have not been seen through to the end notwithstanding, already represents a colossal step forward in the development of world civilization. Due to various reasons we have been delayed on our way and it is now necessary to catch up with what we have let slip in an accelerated manner. Our socialist choice should, however, be invariable.

One must proceed from the fact that the period before the congress will not only be a period of discussions and of examining the program issues. To an ever greater extent it will be a period of sharp political struggle. A struggle of this kind is already underway. Despite all the past blinkers and prohibitions, our society has not become inactive or devoid of identity and has not lost the main guidelines and values of life. Now this is making itself felt everywhere, including Russia, although some people try to accuse its people of political passiveness.

Here an active role of ideological establishments is of great importance. Unfortunately, while criticizing, and

justly so, our economic structures, we pay less attention to the big defects in ideological work. Here, too, there is still much by way of ingrained attitudes, routines, old schemes, and an inability to bring home to the masses the party's ideas and policies. A qualitative change for the better is particularly needed on this front.

[Vorotnikov is the speaker] A rapid process of social and psychological changes is getting under way in the Russian Federation. Moreover, the development of the self-awareness of the Russian Federation (particularly Russian self-awareness) is to a significant extent taking place as a process of realizing that one is being encroached upon and passed by. The problems of the economic independence of the RSFSR, the political sovereignty of the republic within the composition of the union, of the position of individual national-territorial communities within the structure of the Russian Federation itself are debated ever more hotly. The working class is getting the struggle for its interests off the ground, thus willy nilly facilitating the activation of Russia's national consciousness. As a result, the destiny of a majority of the working class in the USSR is being combined more and more tightly with solving the fundamental social, economic, and national problems of Russia. Hence the prospect that a clearly defined class approach to socialism both in Russia and in the union may reemerge.

Numerous political groupings, from "left wing" extremists to conservatives are currently endeavoring to play their own "Russia card." There is a danger that extremist currents can also be carried on the crest of national sentiments in Russia. The signs of this already exist. It is extremely important to do everything to seize the national "card" back from these forces.

In the speaker's view, the setting up of the Russian bureau of the CPSU Central Committee was a justified step, although it was indeed formed without consultation with the republican party organizations. It is no coincidence that various views are expressed on whether a strictly Russian Communist Party is needed or not and how the bureau ought to have been formed.

The speaker came out in favor of convening a Russian party conference before the 28th congress to examine the issue of the structure of party bodies of the Russian Federation.

Many communists are awaiting the plenum and the CPSU Central Committee platform in order to decide finally where they stand, said Yu.A. Gankovskiy, secretary of the "Nizhnevartovskneftegaz" production association party committee. [passage omitted]

Turning to M.S. Gorbachev the speaker said, among other things: Mikhail Sergeyevich, while you occupied only the post of general secretary—and I shall say this completely without flattery—we felt that new ideas were being born in the party and that work was in hand to reform and scrap what was obsolete and outdated. Now you occupy four posts and the impression is forming that there are those who do not want the general secretary to

succeed in any of them but want him to scatter his forces. I think that these matters need to be discussed and resolved. [passage omitted]

Our plenum is of exceptional significance for all communists in the Soviet country, for the world public and for every Soviet person, V.I. Vyalyas, first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia, noted. Life itself, stormy and contradictory, urges us to speed up perestroika both in the country and in the party. Everyone is expecting that the party can and wants to transform itself so as not to become a formal, but a real political vanguard in society which has a mandate of the people's confidence.

At the present crucial stage when the foundation for tomorrow is being laid, continued the speaker, all this not only requires is to be maximally circumspect, but decisive in a revolutionary manner as well, to throw off the ossified postulates and the customary elements of the obsolete model of barrack-room socialism.

Having agreed with the fact that the draft platform proposed for the 28th CPSU Congress corresponds to today's demands and tasks, side by side with the bold positions emanating from the new realities in the world and the country, he discovered in this document quite a few declaratory tendencies. In the speaker's opinion, there is on hand a striving for radical transformations and simultaneously a desire not to give up the old principles, thereby creating some kind of universal draft that suits all the main forces. Is it not in this duplicity, he inquired of those gathered, that there lies the reason why our perestroika does at time so timidly approach a radical solution to the key issues in the life of the country? This evokes uncertainty and dangerous tension in society.

Evidently, the central issue in perestroika is the renewal of our federation, of our party, the interpretation of the state status of the republics, the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Estonia stated. The centrifugal tendencies in the country had intensified the delaying of its solution. Unfortunately, he admitted, there are these tendencies in our republic, too.

After recalling that less than two years ago Estonia and its Baltic neighbors posed the question of the need to conclude a union treaty, the speaker expressed satisfaction that these, in his words, sensible and calm proposals are now accentuated in the draft platform.

The CPSU Central Committee platform, he thinks, recognizes many things which only yesterday were "seditious," including the right of nations to defend their mother tongues and cultures. It declares that our ideal is not unification but unity in diversity. If this sort of understanding and recognition had come earlier, the speaker stressed further, if there had been no opposition to the live processes or the deliberately created image of the enemy in the person of the reemergent national democratic movements, we would now have been rid of many tensions and tragedies.

The talk of the necessity to decentralize economic management has been going on for a long time now. There is a bit more progress here, but all the same, almost every step of the government of Estonia, despite the fact that we have been granted economic independence by the Supreme Soviet of the country, is actually received with equivocation. Thus, according to the leader of the republican Communist Party, the fact that a bottle of vodka went up by two rubles in Tallinn became an event almost of all-union significance. At the same time he noted that modern economy, as is justly noted in the platform for the congress, cannot do without the center, but a center that functions on a macrolevel. Having called for a resolute decentralization, the speaker pointed out that what is also needed is a clearcut separation of rights and duties between the center and the republics. For example, a republic cannot have independence if its land or mineral resources do not belong to it. All this, he stated, reinforces our desire to seek out genuine guarantees of sovereignty and independence of the republic. Naturally, the present-day integration process in our union is a reality and no one intends or is able to negate it.

We know each other strikingly little and have almost no contacts, said the speaker in conclusion. Without this there can be no real party integration and party trust. There can be no unity without trust, respect, and the right to act independently, in a manner commensurate with specific conditions. In the platform's chapter about the party we support precisely the postulate that a correct resolution of the independence of the Communist Party's of the union republics acquires a special political significance. The tutelage exercised over them by the CPSU's central bodies was unacceptable.

The speaker supported the proposal to elect at the congress a chairman and his two deputies. In his view the principle of making the party as democratic as possible should be inalienable. This is the main path along which we ought to be proceeding. Perestroika within the party itself represents a natural and sole condition that guarantees us success and people's trust. We have already had very many declarations and the time for concrete action has arrived.

Communists and nonparty members in the localities link the failures with specific names in the Politburo. The names mentioned are Ligachev, Medvedev, and Razu-movskiy, regardless of any differences there may be in their positions. I support the proposal that it would be expedient for Politburo members and Central Committee secretaries to go to the localities before the congress and report on the areas of work for which they are responsible [passage omitted]

The oblast [Sverdlovsk Oblast] party organization proposes that the plenum should suspend Paragraph 44 of the regulations as one which holds in check the democratic nature of elections of delegates to the party congress and should take a decision to hold direct, secret

ballot, multicandidate elections according to party district. We consider this to be a fundamental issue. Otherwise, I propose putting the issue of direct elections to a general party referendum. We know that several party organizations have already made a similar statement to the Central Committee. Proposals have also been made as ultimatums. For example the party organization at "Uralmashzavod" considers that transfers of party subscriptions may be suspended if the February plenum fails to heed these proposals. [passage omitted]

We are having to discuss the platform for the 28th congress in a sociopolitical situation that is strained to the limit, and in fact, at the crossroads of our fatherland's destiny. V.A. Ivashko, member of the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee and first secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party, emphasized, recalling that, in Lenin's lifetime, during that tense period when the political situation and the balance of forces were changing before one's very eyes, party congresses were held every year, and party conferences were convened as well in the intervals between them. In today's conditions, too, we should, he thinks, return to Lenin's practice and considerably intensify the work of the highest party bodies, and not just the highest ones alone.

Will the CPSU survive or not? How are we to preserve our multinational fatherland? How are we to bring about a real breakthrough for the better in all spheres of life, and to ensure stability in society? These are the questions people today are expecting the party to answer. It is precisely this that is behind communists' demands that the timing of the holding of the party congress should be brought forward. If we don't find such answers, there will simply be no time, and no one either, to carry out the suggested platform, and this must be said plainly.

The implementation of the aims and tasks formulated in the Central Committee's draft platform under discussion will require considerable time. Yet the position within the country and society is difficult. Quite a few problems have to be solved urgently today. The speaker thought it necessary to supplement the Central Committee's draft platform with specific political directives for stabilizing the situation within the country, primarily in the sphere of the economy.

After describing the position in that field as deteriorating, the speaker explained this by saying that economic anarchy had become established within the country. The old methods of running the economy have been abandoned, the market is not yet functioning, and for these reasons, production has not been supplied with the minimum necessary resources, but during this time, the shadow economy has been growing richer at full speed. The cooperative "ANT", now well known to everyone, had the idea of selling 5 million cubic meters of timber abroad this year. At the same time, in the mines of Donetsk, miners cannot work, or can only work by violating the safety regulations, because there is no wood, no timbering.

Giving other examples, also, of the selling off abroad of what is of vital necessity for the country, the 1st secretary of the Ukraine Communist Party Central Committee came out sharply in favor of the use of authority. Not one state in the world, he noted, exports what it itself needs.

Speaking further of the balancing of finances, he drew attention to the fact that the issue of money ran to over 18 billion rubles. This is 7 billion more than in 1988. This issue would be nothing terrible in itself, if goods were behind it. However, there are no goods. Where has this money gone? On the growth of wages? Yes, this is the case. However, in the main, the issue was needed because our banking system is not fulfilling its supervisory [kontrolnyi] functions. So-called non-cash [beznalichnyi] money, that is, mere writing on paper, is now being turned without ceremony into ready cash which smart operators in the shadow economy and other sharp [lovkii] people are putting in their own pockets. In affirmation of this, the speaker gave the following curious example: A psychotherapist was intending to go to the city of Mariupol. Everybody wanted to visit him, therefore several Mariupol enterprises immediately transferred a clearing of 545,570 rubles to the cooperative for the psychotherapist. The logic is such: It is not mine and it is not from the wages fund, so it does not have to be spared. How much ready cash has already gone like this, and also through credits which nobody returns, for the purchase of equipment from private individuals, which is being smuggled and also not smuggled across the border? This revelry has to be stopped today, the leader of the Ukraine Communist Party concluded.

In his view, Comrade Ryzhkov, Ivashko went on to say, put forward at the congress the only true program of economic improvement. It is well-considered, but it has to be started, it has to be fulfilled. Why are we slow and not going over to a regulated economy, for instance, from the market sale of a number of goods, naturally, not items of popular consumption. Well, for instance, from time to time we raise the price of gold and thereby only increase the treasures of those smart operators who have gold. While what is needed is to set the free market price at once, in one fell swoop, on gold and on other such things. Let it be 20, even 40 times dearer, but, first, the state will take the money, and second, treasures become meaningless, because the nominal price will rise, but they will not go into circulation, no sensible person will go and buy from private individuals what is in the shop.

According to the speaker this could be done without delay. This also applies to other luxury goods, anything which is not a vital commodity. This is also a step toward a regulated market economy.

Inadmissible, from the speaker's point of view, are decisions hindering the fulfillment of the food program. This year the Ukraine has fulfilled everything provided for by the state order for plant-growing products, but at the same time the center for pig-rearing complexes and the poultry industry has failed to provide 1.2 million

tonnes of forage for 1990. This means that Comrade Nikitin and his purchasing commission will not be receiving 120,000 tonnes of meat from the Ukraine. There is no place for miracles here; you can't fatten pigs and chickens on fresh air.

It seems to us, the first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee said, that a correct balance must be found in the platform and in the new statute. In the first place, we believe that the statute should not be large, cumbersome, and full of small details. It should determine merely the principle of the construction of the party, and everything else is down to democratization in the party. In this connection I believe there should be a special section in the statute on the status of the communist parties of the union republics, which, finding themselves in positions of a single program and statute, and basing themselves on Lenin's principle of internationalism, should be autonomous in solving issues of their own activity, including the working out of a political policy that meets with local conditions.

We must urgently submit a draft platform, augmented and amended with regard to the discussion at this plenum, to the party, but the main thing is to embark on tackling painful issues right away. The people expect this of us.

A.P. Myasnikov, an excavator driver of the Korshunovo ore-enriching combine in Irkutsk Oblast and member of the CPSU Central Committee, called for complete frankness and honesty. We have reached a boundary of perestroika, he said, when, taking into consideration the events in a number of countries of socialism. It is time to raise the question directly and unambiguously of the future of our party and of the choice of socialism as a whole.

The renewal process of society is proceeding painfully and is accompanied by a rise in destructive phenomena in the economy. There is a build-up of energy toward a social explosion with unpredictable consequences. The situation is being exacerbated by the escalation of interethnic conflicts. We have an unclear and paradoxical situation. On the one hand, the propaganda boom over the idea of a law-governed state and, on the other, the legal impotence and inability of state bodies to defend the elementary interests of the state and individual. [passage omitted]

Acknowledging the fairness of criticism of local party bodies, it should be noted at the same time that the Central Committee and its Politburo have been slow to evaluate events and lack decisiveness in carrying out practical measures to stabilize the situation in the country and party. [passage omitted]

The party leadership lapses into old approaches in appraising its own activity. It is evident that mistakes and miscalculations exist. But why then, at Politburo sessions do we only hear the formula "approve" with regard to its members? [passage omitted]

The CPSU Central Committee platform should clearly define the place and role of the renewed party in the political structure of society. Looking at things realistically, we will come both to a review of Article Six and to a multiparty system. The question is when this will take place. I am convinced that the country is not yet ready for the move to a multiparty system. It would sharply aggravate social tension in society and the struggle for power. [passage omitted]

In the opinion of V.G. Anufriyev, second secretary of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee, preparations for such an important plenum were made in a great hurry. [passage omitted]

In critically appraising reforms, the speaker expressed the idea that in conditions of an advancing crisis in the economy the leadership has lost confidence. There have been compromises leading to ambiguous decisions and half measures. Confusion and a naive faith in appeals and addresses have aggravated interethnic conflicts and strikes. Political reform began with the removal of party structures from the management of the economy without any new structures being created in the soviets. This led to control of the economy being lost. The lack of experience and even, on the part of some leaders, of competence to control these processes had its effect. [passage omitted on need to develop the independence of primary party organizations]

In rejecting the principle of federalism, he [Anufriyev] continued, communists on Kazakhstan are insisting on a significant expansion of the rights of communist parties in resolving organizational, cadre, financial, and other issues within the framework of the program and regulations of the CPSU. Republican party organizations should be granted the right to formulate their own program of action, to determine dates for convening congresses and conferences and holding referenda and to establish interparty ties. Relations between the CPSU Central Committee and communist parties and their central committees should be built not on party diktat and the pressure of strong will but on the basis of jointly formulated decisions, mutual respect, and support. In this connection, the second secretary of the Kazakhstan Communist Party Central Committee proposed changing the work of the territorial sections of CPSU Central Committee departments which should represent the interests of the communist parties of central committees here and be made up of their own delegated representatives. Attempts to impose cadre decision, such as sending party leaders, even if they are very able, from the center without consulting the communist party involved at all should be utterly eliminated. [passage omitted]

According to him it is undoubtedly necessary to bring forward the date of the congress because the current Central Committee and Politburo do not have sufficient prestige to make decisions which shape our destiny.

In conclusion the speaker drew attention to the need to be demanding of those who are responsible for the collapse of party unity, for ideological failures and for events in Eastern Europe.

He called for light to be shed on the question of economic aid to foreign countries, in particular, Angola, Ethiopia, Nicaragua, Vietnam, and Cuba and also for people who have made a mess of things and disgraced the party to be expelled from the Central Committee.

I listened with great interest and attention to the impassioned and sincere speech by Comrade Brovnikov, our ambassador to Poland, said A.A. Belyayev, member of the CPSU Central Auditing Commission, and editor in chief of the paper SOVETSKAYA KULTURA, when he appeared at the rostrum. I share his judgement on the fact that there cannot be democracy without discipline, without strict observance of the laws, without selfless work by the law and order enforcement bodies. All this is absolutely right. But in one place in his speech, it seemed to me his accents were misplaced. [passage omitted]

Noting that good relations with the world must be further developed, the speaker supported the clause in the draft platform on the decisive rejection of ideological blinkers, dogmatism, and intolerance of others' views.

Concerned voices have been heard frequently at this rostrum speaking of the loss of the people's trust in the CPSU, he went on, and of the profound crisis in our party. Yes, the situation in society has worsened in the extreme. It is not by chance that the well-known Sovietologist and anti-Sovieteer Brzezinski is already shouting about the collapse of communism. But the party has not lost the people's trust. Don't the elections to the Supreme Soviet say something? More than 80 percent of the deputies are communist party members. Don't the elections now, to the republican and local soviets, when more than 80 percent of the candidates put forward are from among the communist party members, show that it is precisely among party members that the people look for those who are worthy? [passage omitted]

We are returning to the Leninist idea of socialism. It is Lenin who is now being subjected to mass attacks. Alas, in our own press, not in the foreign one. In some publications he is portrayed straight out as a tyrant. It was Lenin who unleashed the terror, they say, and who created the concentration camps. In a word, he was not the leader of the working people, but the devil incarnate.

The reasoning in the books of Solzhenitsyn and Grossman help to confirm such views, and other publicists, historians, and writers have, one would think, been dumbstruck. It is only recently that RODINA and PRAVDA have for the first time given a weighty critical analysis of the views of Solzhenitsyn on October and Lenin, and analyzed the composition by V. Soloukhin "Reading Lenin". The speaker called for the ideological guarantee of the new stage of perestroika to be brought up to date, for Lenin and Leninism, liberated from Stalinist dogmas, to be skillfully defended.

The last thing on which the speaker dwelt: It seems to me, he said, that the proposals for the immediate creation of an autonomous RSFSR Communist Party, have not been thought through to the end. Yes, certainly, Russia must receive its sovereignty and its state and other ruling institutions. But I cannot imagine the CPSU without the communists of Russia, the republic which is the backbone of our power, of our multinational state.

Expressing his attitude toward the draft platform, V.V. Nikitin, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee and first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, drew attention to several new concepts contained in the document. For example, our ideal is humane democratic socialism. What is this? The description given in the draft is so all-purpose that it will apply to any modern society, even to those with a nonsocialist orientation. The supreme final goal of the party's activities must be clearer to the present generation of people, who are familiar with different definitions of socialism. And then what is to happen to communist ideals? They must not, apparently, disappear without trace.

New concepts are introduced later—"Labor private," "group," "proportional and share ownership," "self-governing communities," the "self-governing society," "genuine autonomy," and the "fraction with its internal organization and discipline." In the speaker's opinion not all of them are needed in the party document.

Some of the platform's tenets are, in his view, incorrect. For instance, "the interests of all the country's people are equally dear to communists who are loyal to internationalism". It follows that there are "disloyal communists". Or: "Communists may monitor not the work of the administration as such, but its leaders as party members." This can be taken to mean: A leader must necessarily be a party member; if not, there is no point in monitoring him.

Finally, it is hard to understand why, especially in the conditions of the democratization of the party, why the Russian bureau has to be elected at a Central Committee plenum. The representational composition in the Central Committee from Russia is not regulated, and only some of the Central Committee's members will have an interest in these elections. Are the Russian not to have the right to decide for themselves? They will probably not agree with this approach.

The speaker shared his impressions of meetings with communists in Lithuania. Yes, there is much extremism there, and separatist sentiments run deep, he noted. A massive propaganda campaign is in progress, aimed at Lithuania's withdrawal from the composition of the USSR. The achievements of Soviet Lithuania are being belittled, the republic's development is portrayed in a negative light, and the bourgeois Lithuanian state is idealized. Everything is being done to see that the broad strata of the population do not possess objective information about the possible consequences connected with

changes in the socioeconomic development of the republic if it leaves the union.

All that has been cited is densely intertwined with the people's dissatisfaction with the pace of perestroika. Honest people who know how to work well, wish to rid themselves of artificial difficulties, the lack of compulsion and assiduousness, and inefficiency. All this is linked with the diktat of the center. Whether most Lithuanian Communists return to the CPSU platform, or whether people in other republics follow them will depend on real-life steps and actions, including the kind of platform that is devised.

The draft platform, the speaker continued, contains individual aspects of party policy as regards the development of the agroindustrial complex. Support is confirmed for developing all forms of economic management, for solving social issues in the countryside, retaining priorities for the agrarian sector of the economy, and strengthening the material-technical base for the processing and storage of food products.

All of this is very important and is being repeated not for the first time. It is difficult to keep one's balance on any platform with an empty stomach. It is necessary, in the final analysis, to find a possibility for the materialization of the policies proclaimed. People sometimes cannot force themselves to believe high decisions, as they are often not carried out. Examples corroborating this thought have been cited.

One more topic was touched upon. Today, six months after the formation of the State Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers for foodstuffs and purchases, many hasty appraisals of its work can already be heard from offices of the most diverse of levels. It is early to "smother" the commission, its chairman said. This is more than the 20th form of agricultural management in the country during the Soviet period. Objectively, it was simply not in a position to show either its advantages or its shortcomings. Time is needed to understand what should be added and what taken away from it. It is already good that it is not capable, under the conditions of the republic's independence, of hindering the development of initiative in the localities.

In conclusion it was stressed that people want and can work much more effectively. They are capable of providing a high standard of living for themselves. People are even ready to go through the many difficulties of the collapsing market. They understand that the sooner they pass through the painful measures for its stabilization, the smaller their loss will be later. But they do not wish to stand endlessly in degrading lines, to go shopping with passports or ration cards, and to see the social injustice of the distributive mechanisms and the amorphous nature of attempts to assert the discipline and order of life.

Although, according to the existing rules, the primary party organizations are the basis of the party, even today they are assigned the role only of executives, V.A.

Vylegzhanin, secretary of the party committee of Kama Association for the manufacture of heavy trucks [KamAz] pointed out. How does the structure work? Central Committee—obkom—gorkom—economic manager. And even the payments to party officials at enterprises, although they are paid from the party treasury, are fixed as a percentage of the pay of an economic manager and not of a secretary of a town committee or rayon committee of the party.

How can the primary party organization today really influence decisions taken at the level of the CPSU Central Committee? Discuss the draft, send its proposals—and that's all. The primary organization does not have its representative in the Central Committee. Members of the CPSU Central Committee are not attached to specific party organizations. There have been no meetings of party leaders with secretaries of major party committees, rayon committees and town committees on questions of internal party work in five years of perestroika.

As of 1 January 1990 the party organization of KamAz numbered in its ranks 11,725 members and candidate members of the party. Two hundred sixty-eight communists were excluded from the party in 1989.

Among those excluded at their own request long-time party members, very competent people who were sincerely devoted to the cause of the party. So why did they surrender their party cards?

The first reason is dissatisfaction with the progress of perestroika. And the second reason was expressed in the request to the CPSU Central Committee from someone who had been a member of the CPSU since 1963: "I ask you to consider me removed from the ranks of the CPSU from November 1989 at my own decision and in view of my disagreement on some issues of the CPSU program and CPSU practice in the past and at the present time. Considering the absence of opportunity for the rank-and-file communist to influence the solution of questions given the existing internal party 'democracy,' I consider it inexpedient for me to remain in the ranks of the CPSU any longer."

In the opinion of the speaker, the party is going through a profound crisis, and it needs cardinal actions of all communists, and not just the leading bodies of the CPSU, to get it out of the crisis. In 1989 in the party organizations of KamAz there started party discussion of the role and place of the party in society, the development of internal party democracy. The aim, of the discussion was to draft the platform of KamAz Communists for the 28th party congress and draft rules of the CPSU.

Today the drafts of these documents have already been drafted and will be discussed in the primary organizations together with the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee.

The KamAz party organization considers that the immediate prospect for the development of society is democratic socialism. On fundamental issues the draft platform of the Communists of KamAz is in harmony with the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Communists of KamAz have sent an appeal to the party Central Committee saying that only a renewed party is capable of getting the country out of the crisis. The Central Committee plenum is asked to adopt the decision to hold the 29th all-union party conference in April 1990, at which the progress of discussion of the draft platform and rules of the party should be examined. After the 28th congress an exchange of party cards should be held, and a report-back and election campaign should be held on a renewed ideological-political basis. [passage omitted]

In his words, there are now effectively several parties within the party. The ideological foundation has been eroded. The draft platform has now been drafted. And however hard it may be, whoever does not agree with the fundamental provisions of the platform, must decisively dissociate himself from it after it has been adopted at the party congress.

The floor is given to S.G. Arutyunyan, first secretary of the Armenian Communist Party Central Committee. The bitter reality today is such that the party that began perestroika is increasingly starting to be represented as a conservative force. Moreover, the very concept of "perestroika" has gradually started to be alienated from the party. If it is true that one ought not to overdramatize the situation in the country, then it is just as true that it should not be simplified. In our region, the situation today is not simply dramatic; it has passed the critical mark. Evidently, the contradictions of today's restructuring processes have manifested themselves in a more painful manner in our region. The whetted social expectations of people clashed with the maladjusted state of mechanisms for the democratic government of society. The expression of the will of the Armenian population of the NKAO brought to life by perestroika was perceived as an infringement by the Armenian SSR on the territory of the neighbouring republic. But the NKAO issue is not a territorial dispute. It was posed not by Armenia, but by the population of Nagorno-Karabakh itself, and its essence lies in the self-determination of a people.

The mass pogroms of Armenians in Sumgait turned the question of the interrelationships of autonomy and union republic into an interethnic conflict. The economic blockade of Armenia turned the interethnic conflict into an interrepublican one.

An unprecedented phenomenon—refugees in time of peace—have entered our life as a result of the Sumgait syndrome. To put the events in Armenia and Azerbaijan on the same level, as some mass media are doing, is to mislead public opinion. Notwithstanding all the interconnections of the processes taking place in the two neighboring republics, one cannot fail to see they differ

substantially from each other. What has become possible in Baku, Nakhichevan, Lenkoran, and other places cannot be explained or justified by conflicts with neighbors.

The republican party organizations, its leaders continued, must undertake desperate efforts to prevent an explosion of emotions and the situation from getting out of control. Due to the blockade, the republic has been practically in a state of siege for many months now.

When the people are in a state of shock, one cannot manage to keep everything under control.

[Arutyunyan is speaking] So the law enforcement bodies did not succeed in preventing the seizure of weapons.

We do not to any extent justify these illegal acts. But the whole truth must be seen. A natural reaction of self defense gained through the bitter, historical experience of the people and dictated by the realities of the present day was operating here. But when people felt the protection of the Army, they began to actively support the servicemen's actions and to voluntarily submit the weapons seized.

We do not identify the extremists with the Azerbaijani people and are in favor of dialogue between the republics and of the search for paths towards a mutually acceptable way out of the crisis. However, it is clear that the road towards interethnic accord will be difficult and long. But we are ready to cover our part. In the situation that has taken shape, the realistic route for the prevention of further confrontation is the temporary removal of Nagorno-Karabakh to subordination to the center. I think that it is essential to make the whole set of problems connected with the situation in the region, including the issue of the autonomous oblast, the subject of special consideration at the forthcoming session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The speaker supported the opinion on the necessity for bringing forward the time of the holding of the 28th CPSU Congress. The situation that has taken shape in the party and the country as a whole demands this, he said.

The clause on the fact that the republican communist parties should have the opportunity to elaborate their own program documents and have the right to participate directly in the resolution of very important issues in the life of the whole party, was fundamentally correct.

It is valuable, the speaker said in conclusion, that the draft platform reaffirms the party's adherence to Lenin's principle of the right of nations to self-determination. The lessons of recent years convince us that it is only the consistent realization of this principle that will enable us to solve the complex problems of inter ethnic relations.

The draft platform notes that the CPSU will fight to maintain its position as the ruling party and to obtain the people's mandate to form bodies of power at all levels. This acknowledges the fact that political structures have

already formed in society which are capable of disputing the CPSU's monopolist position in society. We must say this bluntly and register the fact that the formation of a multiparty system in the country has already begun, and to envisage the possibility of the CPSU being part of a bloc with the more pregressive of these organizations in order to achieve common goals. I believe it would be correct if the party itself takes the initiative to review Article Six of the USSR Constitution. Let us be frank: maintaining it in its present form does nothing to help the prestige of the CPSU.

We need a strong democratic authority which is capable of leading society out of the crisis and of ensuring its dynamic development. World experience shows that the democratic structures of social administration can work effectively in optimum harmony with a form of presidential rule. It would appear that the country needs a president who is invested with broad powers.

In the view of A.I. Seleznev, first secretary of the Kursk CPSU Obkom, the draft platform contains much that is new and democratic. This will make it possible for the party to change substantially and to be in keeping with its role as the political vanguard of the working class. At the same time the draft unjustifiably passes over in silence the issue of the foundations and forms of the union between the working class and the peasantry. [passage omitted]

Having noted that the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum played an important role in resurrecting the Leninist approaches toward work with cadres, the first secretary of the Kursk obkom at the same time drew attention to the fact that practical experience brought to light the fact that a number of new social mechanisms have not been sufficiently thought through. [passage omitted]

Discussion on the report continued during an evening sitting on 6 February.

Economic

Conversion Blamed for Arms 'Black Market'

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["Commentary" by A. Dyatlov: "The Tanks Did Not Pass"]

[Text] As we have already reported, a train carrying 12 tanks and guarded by two civilians arrived in the port of Novorossiysk on 22 December. The recipient of the shipment was not military: the interdepartmental state-cooperative concern "ANT." Cooperative tanks?!

The news was startling: Its gist was too frightening—combat vehicles were snatched from under the control of the state and were traveling around the country under the "protection" of two workers from Uralvagonzavod [Ural railroad car plant]. How?! Where to?!

The story is strange, improbable even for our unpredictable time. It was a mixture of everything: negligence of the economic managers and the laudable aspirations of their enterprises for economic independence, a craving for money and a fascination with big names and generals' ranks, and meaningful innuendoes from "above...." The USSR Council of Ministers studied all of the facts of this affair.

As TASS reported yesterday, on 29 January the USSR Council of Ministers examined the circumstances relating to the participation of a number of officials in this affair. The meeting was conducted by N.I. Ryzhkov.

The interbranch state-cooperative concern "ANT" was created for purposes that are a priority today for the development of our society: With its participation, it was contemplated activating efforts and broadening capabilities to saturate the consumer market with high demand consumer goods, including making use of privileges and implementing barter operations—of course, within the framework of the law.

However, the concern took the path of illegal actions and deception of the state. The evidence of this is an extraordinary event with tanks... The first and decisive step in ensuring the concealment of this illegal operation, it was emphasized at the meeting, was taken by V.K. Dovgan, general director of the scientific production association [NPO] "Vzlet" of the USSR Minradioprom [Ministry of the Radio Industry], who assisted in the acquisition of tanks by the concern, and who was counting on receiving part of the profit from the deal for the NPO. V.S. Seryakov, the general director of a defense plant, approached the question on the sale of the tanks absolutely irresponsibly. Senior workers in the USSR Ministry of Defense Industry also did not take the necessary measures.

Also demonstrating an intolerable lack of principles were officials of the Minaviaprom [Ministry of the Aviation Industry]—the co-founder of the concern "ANT," which granted "ANT" the right to conduct export-import operations on its behalf. An unforgivable lack of concern was also shown by some officials of the USSR Minoborony [Ministry of Defense] who did not stop the train.

It was observed at the meeting that unconscientious persons from "ANT," in violation of existing procedures for commercial transactions with military equipment, exploited instructions relating to granting the concern a number of privileges in buying up products cheap and selling dear; the instructions were signed, according to representations of senior workers of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the Council of Ministers, by V.K. Gusev, deputy to the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers.

For gross violations of legislation in force concerning the export of arms and military equipment and the approval of the illegal charter of "ANT," which was the basis for the illegal operations of the concern; A.G. Bratukhin,

first deputy minister of the aviation industry, was discharged from his position. Also discharged was V.K. Dovgan, general director of "Vzlet."

It was noted that V.S. Seryakov, general director of the production association Uralvagonzavod of the USSR Ministry of the Defense Industry, also deserves being discharged from his position. But taking into account the fact that he has been in the position of general director only a few months, he was severely reprimanded. Also severely reprimanded were USSR Minister of the Aviation Industry A.S. Systsov, USSR Minister of the Defense Industry B.M. Belousov, USSR Minister of the Radio Industry V.I. Shimko, Deputy Minister of the Defense Industry M.A. Zakharov; Yu.A. Pekshev, deputy chairman of the State Foreign Economic Relations Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers; the first deputy chief of the department of this commission, V.S. Grinev; and others who to some extent participated in the illegal activity of "ANT."

Our Commentary

It is not necessary to open secret safes to convince oneself that our country, like many others, sells arms abroad. For example, these are just published data (unfortunately, they are not from the USSR Ministry of Defense, but from Swedish economists who are handling similar problems): Of the total of more than \$30 billion of world shipments of basic systems of conventional weapons, our country's share comes to about one-third. The U.S. share is 20-25 percent. Also, while the shipments of American arms, according to the same data, constituted about six percent of the total volume of U.S. exports several years ago, the index for our country was then 17.5 percent. And while all state arms exporters delivered to the countries of the "Third World" 12,898 tanks (for the years 1982-86), our share came to 4,345 vehicles. Of 3,079 combat aircraft, 1,545 were Soviet; and of 1,750 helicopters, more than 900 were Soviet.

One can argue about the moral aspect of the arms trade between states in general, but, in any case, it should be under the control of the state.

Or is it necessary now to say that it was under the control of the state?

I spoke with many participants in this private "trade operation" with tanks (except for the management of Uralvagonzavod). They, however, are also mentioned in official reports.

Unquestionably, a key role in this was played by documents signed at the very highest level—all the way to the deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Statements that are scattered in letters, the ANT charter, and permits are in themselves harmless. But when they came together on the desks of the general directors of the NPO "Vzlet" and Uralvagonzavod, they formed a password for permission to purchase: A provision from the ANT charter that it can buy armaments items is a government mission—permission for plants of the

defense branches to sell ANT above plan products and inconvertible stock (it was explained to me that in ANT they had "peaceful" above-plan production in mind, but it turned out to be tanks); a letter on a foreign trade level permitting part of the freight of ANT to be transported abroad without licensing (there are also no arms on this list, but the principle is important!), but the main thing is that the Minaviaprom organized the concern jointly with ANT specifically in order to have—even if in the future—its own channel for the direct sale of its products on the foreign market, including aviation systems.

If this folder of documents is multiplied by the fact that the intermediary in the story was an enterprise of the Minradioprom and, besides, of a like "defense" profile, then one can appreciate the "negligence" of Uralvagonzavod, which was pinning its hopes on "high recommendations."

Undoubtedly, a vicious role was also played here, on the one hand, by our interminable striving to attain maximum economic independence, and, on the other hand—to earn more money.

Look at how the action of this "ruble accelerator" is formed: At the end of the year, Uralvagonzavod (only it?) has nothing with which to meet the 13th payroll, and there is a mass of other financial problems, but then 14 "surplus" tanks are taken. And there is no haggling over price. And the purchasers are their own, not off the street, but from the domestic "defense establishment." True, I was unable to clarify which one of the triple alliance was victorious in precipitating the transfer of money—they are all blaming each other. But a fact is a fact: On 30 November, a draft was drawn up by which ANT transferred 4.494 million rubles [R] to Uralvagonzavod through the USSR Vneshekonombank [Bank for Foreign Economic Activity].

"It is true," I was told in ANT, "the sum was set too high... about R120,000 for each "prime mover." But they explained: "This covers expenditures for disassembling tank equipment."

"And further?"

"Silence... And later we were informed from the port: 'The tanks have arrived!' But we did not go near the train," one of the ANT directors set a package of cigarettes edgewise on the table, as if barricading himself from the specter of 12 "T-72" tanks still standing in the port of Novorossiysk. "There is no delivery and acceptance documentation, and we do not know the full composition. And you yourself know all of the rest, and what was on the platforms. Only someone wrote that there was also a basic load of ammunition there—there was none..."

I almost added "fortunately."

I do not know how events will unfold in the future. It is not excluded, for example, that the extraordinary event

will be exploited for a new campaign against cooperatives in general—what an excellent cause! And we have already learned how to make the most of causes, sorting out neither the innocent nor the guilty.

It is likely that the question of the extraordinary event will have to be heard not only in party organs, but also in sessions of the Supreme Soviet. This would be logical: The independence of an investigation of this complicated affair is a guarantee that, nonetheless, we will get as close to the truth as possible, and that we will answer the question: If this was not, as I said, simply a chain of absurdities and coincidences, then who needed this extraordinary event?

There are very many questions.

But among the dozens of these questions and problems, one of them can get mislaid.

It seems to me that we have fallen into euphoria from conversion.

I agree that we, the journalists, also had a hand in this—at times we gave the impression that we no longer had a defense industry, and that henceforth it will be engaged only in the output of sewing machines and coffee grinders.

I am not asking that the necessity for conversion be doubted; I simply want one thing not to be forgotten: So long as arms are produced, they remain arms.

But here is a newspaper report

"Workers in the oil and gas industry have long been using 'demobilized military equipment.' For example, 100-mm guns are puncturing holes for field research, and they are hammering anchor ties into the ground... Now the mortar has mastered a peaceful profession... The mortar is being readied for battle again. But it is loaded with water, and not with a mortar shell. There is a volley—and a fountain shoots up over the silver firs, and new data appear on the instruments... The conclusions of an interdepartmental commission: The mortar is performing its task in good working order. The first "battery" can be dispatched to the seismic prospecting party..."

We read in another newspaper that a general reports: "The Pioneers are even buying tanks from us for pedestrians!"

But there are other reports from the "hot spots": Extremists employed cloud-seeding [protivogradovyye] antiaircraft artillery guns, and members of volunteer militia employed mortars, machine guns, and assault rifles... At weapons collection points, as was reported in one telecast, even two howitzers were turned in.

In fact, today a black market in arms exists in the country. Many of us are fully familiar with prices for them: A pistol is R200-R500, a bulletproof vest is from R30 to R1,000, an assault rifle is R1,300, and a steel

helmet—in the area of about R100. This equation will not be a surprise: Since weapons are being bought, it means they are being sold. And if there is a report about the fact that a malefactor has been arrested with 100 pistols, then this is not an episode on the order of "a rayon office of the militia was attacked, and two pistols and 10 training assault rifles were seized"—in any language this is called **many weapons**.

Weapons are moving about the country like commodities. And I fear that conversion in the form in which it is now occurring—with poor control, minimal expenditures, and the search for advantages first and foremost—can aggravate the situation. It has already been aggravated by removing the responsibility from the shoulders of the Ministry of Defense and the armaments producers for cloud-seeding guns and antiavalanche [protivolavinnye] missile launchers.

Even prime movers are still tanks, but with armaments removed.

Incidentally, if the purchase of 12 "prime movers" had taken place quietly, ANT would have bought about 100 of them in the future.

Look at how many people are scurrying around the "defense establishment": customers (from the Ministry of Defense structure), its military representatives, a whole system of military transport communications that transports freight, plant representatives, inspectors, employees of the "first departments [republic KGB]..." But the tanks leave the plant quietly...

It is appropriate to say that, in the story with the tanks, Uralvagonzavod was the least "suffering" party. The Presidium of the Council of Ministers, taking into consideration that V.S. Seryakov, its general director, had held his "operational post" for only a few months, gave him a severe reprimand only. I do not crave a general reprisal, but a fact is a fact: It was to Uralvagonzavod that the tanks were dispatched, and it was there that the gates were opened for this armored cargo, and where the train was looked for...

In such a state of affairs associated with arms in the system of the Minoboronprom, there is no certainty that all arms that are moving around the country today, were stolen from depots or taken from the Army or Militia. You see, these are commodities, alas, that enjoy a heightened demand.

And, therefore, I do not now end my commentary with a period, but with three periods.

Consumer Demand Unlikely To Be Met in 1990

904D0054A Moscow TRUD in Russian
24 Jan 90 p 2

[Report on an interview with G. Kiselev, chairman of the Commission on Consumer Goods, Trade, Municipal,

Consumer, and Other Services of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by TRUD correspondent N. Dorofeyev: "You Cannot Hide Shortages Behind a Plan"]

[Text] The growth of consumer goods production stands at the center when it comes to the solution of the problem of how to strengthen our economy. This subject like no other touches upon the interests of millions of people; it affects the moral and political climate in the country and, in the long run, it affects the success of perestroika. What is happening today in the production of consumer goods? That was the subject for discussion between G. Kiselev, chairman of the Commission on Consumer Goods, Trade, and Municipal, Consumer, and Other Services of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, and TRUD correspondent N. Dorofeyev.

[N. Dorofeyev] Gennadiy Nikolayevich, one can say without any exaggeration that your commission deals with one of the most "explosive" areas of perestroika. Last year became remarkable for all of us by the fact that most foods and manufactured goods moved from the store shelves onto the list of rarely available merchandise. What is your estimate of the situation with consumer goods production facing the country now?

[G. Kiselev] The opinions of our commissioners, as well as my own, are no different from what everyone thinks. The situation with the majority of consumer goods can be qualified as an emergency, and with the rest of the goods the situation borders on emergency. I do not think there is any need to list the unavailable goods here.

Any hitch in the work of an enterprise or in the supplies schedule causes disruption of the consumer market. A minor decrease in the amounts of goods in the stores breeds what we call panic buying when the people start buying everything in sight whether they need it or not, just in case. It is especially dangerous for our poor, unbalanced market because panic buying of one type of goods leads to the increase in demand for other types.

As we have learned from reality, we should produce more goods than required under normal conditions if we want to stabilize the market in the conditions of multiple shortages.

[N. Dorofeyev] Now this concept seems like very distant future. What is in store for us this year?

[G. Kiselev] Our commission showed its support for the 1990 plan of consumer goods production which was introduced by the government. It is very intensive: Only manufactured goods should increase by 20 percent compared to the amount of last year.

But we understand, of course, that there is a huge distance from a decision, even a government one, to full store shelves. We also learned from the experience of the past year when the stores and, therefore, the buyers received fewer manufactured goods than planned to the sum of over R10 billion. The plan failed mainly because

it had not been balanced against the present labor and material resources and industrial capacities.

Unfortunately we are not entirely convinced that the mistakes of the past were taken into account and that the 1990 plan has been balanced in all aspects. As became known after an examination, enterprises and trade failed to sign contracts for the supply of planned goods to the sum of almost R13 billion. Out of that sum 6.3 billion would be taken by consumer goods.

Today we have shortages of several hundred different kinds of merchandise and our main task is to diminish this number rather than increase it. It is possible in theory but requires extraordinary measures which are being taken. The USSR Government, for instance, decided to cut down the export of raw materials which are required by our consumer industry. At the same time they expanded by hundreds of millions of rubles the purchases of the raw materials for this industry in foreign countries.

The year 1990 will see a considerable growth in production volume, but in spite of that we probably will not be able to satisfy the demand for television sets, refrigerators, sewing and washing machines, and vacuum cleaners. It will be difficult to buy cars, furniture, wallpaper, and lumber.

Such is the status of some manufactured goods. As for foodstuffs, this is a complex situation. The market allocations planned at first for 1990 did not allow for the increase in supplies of such things as flour, cereals, vegetable oil, sugar, and baby food. For certain categories the would-be amounts even dropped below the level of the last year. The situation is becoming critical in respect of meat and dairy product resources. These problems were discussed in the government in the last few days and steps were taken to increase the funding for practically all of the foodstuffs I just named.

[N. Dorofeyev] Does this mean, Gennadiy Nikolayevich, that the government plan is good but not quite realistic if you have to prop it up with some emergency measures that early in the year?

[G. Kiselev] That is not quite correct. The plans and government orders can be completed. But to solve this problem we have to provide all the necessary conditions. One should also remember that the new economic laws will not bring noticeable results in 1990. But we have to ensure that the consumer market begins to improve.

First of all it is necessary to distribute among the enterprises all the government orders for consumer goods. The resources for these orders are to be provided by the USSR Council of Ministers, by the governments of union republics, and local authorities.

As we hear from some locations, certain traditional partners refuse to supply products in the sum of dozens and even hundreds of millions of rubles. For that reason we render our full support to the government suggestion

to introduce penalties for enterprises refusing to comply with the government order for consumer goods, their components, and raw materials.

[N. Dorofeyev] Could you determine which of the country's regions is in the worst situation as far as consumer goods supplies are concerned?

[G. Kiselev] This is difficult to believe but there is an impression that Moscow has become the capital of shortages. The situation with consumer goods is very serious here. The reasons for that are well-known but there must be one more: The administrative-command system in trade is showing silent resistance and create artificial shortages. I cannot categorically say it is true because it is very hard to uncover any concrete mechanism, or to find a concrete culprit. However, the circumstantial evidence is serious enough and we will look into it. By the way, your newspaper could do a lot in this respect, as well as in respect of consumer goods production control. You could publish a report, based on the results of every three-month period, about how consumer goods production plans are being met. And the results should not be given in rubles, but in types and names of goods, and you should give the names of the culprits. I think this might be a good form of checking how the most important social problem is being resolved.

Roundtable on Joint Enterprise Zones

90U10341 Moscow PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK in Russian No 2, 28 Jan 90 pp 10-11

[Roundtable discussion with D.A. Beskurnikov, department head of the USSR Council of Ministers Foreign Economics Commission; V.A. Leushkanov, head specialist of the RSFSR Council of Ministers Foreign Economic Ties Department; I.P. Faminskiy, director of the Scientific Research Institute of Foreign Economic Ties of the USSR Council of Ministers (?Main) Foreign Economics Commission; Yu.V. Yakovets, professor at the academy of the National Economy under the USSR Council of Ministers; V.A. Fedoseyev, department head of the Northwestern Branch of the Central Scientific Research Institute under the RSFSR Gosplan; L.N. Vasilyev, sector chief of the Institute of Planning and Norms under the USSR Gosplan; and A.S. Gruzinov, deputy department chief of the Leningrad Oblispolkom, in Moscow: "Joint Enterprise Zones;" date not given]

[Text] Do we need to create them at all? How do we use this form in our country? What goals should we set for them? When can we expect results? These and other questions are discussed by participants in the roundtable discussion in the editorial offices of PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK.

Joint enterprise zones... They are also called free, special, and particular—more than 30 different names have been registered for this economic form in the United Nations. They refer to a special territory of the state on which special economic conditions have been created in order

to solve concrete economic problems through joint enterprise. Interest in this form has begun to increase sharply in our country. But there are different assessments of its acceptability under our conditions. Some see in the zones unique testing grounds for working out new management methods, a base for moving forward in the mastery of new technologies, and they regard them as starting points for the development of the territory. Others think that the creation of these zones will lead to a sellout of our national resources and will accelerate the process of foreign culture and customs penetrating into our life.

This kind of popularization of opinions shows that the creation of joint enterprise zones requires in-depth study and careful accounting for all the diversity of various factors. We were convinced of this again when we gathered scholars and specialists working on the development of this problem at the PRAVITELSTVENNYY VESTNIK roundtable. Participating in the discussion were D.A. Beskurnikov, department head of the State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers; V.A. Leushkanov, head specialist of the department of foreign economic ties of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers; I.P. Faminskiy, director of the Scientific Research Institute of Foreign Economic Ties of the (?Main) Foreign Economic Commission [GVK] of the USSR Council of Ministers; Yu.V. Yakovets, professor of the Academy of the National Economy under the USSR Council of Ministers; V.A. Fedoseyev, department head of the Northwestern branch of the Central Scientific Research Institute under the RSFSR Gosplan [State Planning Commission]; L.N. Vasilyev, sector chief of the Institute of Planning and Norms under the USSR Gosplan; and A.S. Gruzinov, deputy department chief of the Leningrad Oblispolkom [oblast executive committee].

D. Beskurnikov: Yes, the interest in this form is increasing. The government is receiving a multitude of proposals from various regions of the country. A number of oblispolkoms and gorispolkoms [city executive committees] are suggesting organizing "free" and "special" zones, and so forth. The State Foreign Economic Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers now has more than 30 applications. But, as analysis shows, the majority of them do not have any solid economic basis.

Naturally, we have begun to study attentively the possibility of creating the kinds of zones they are talking about as one of the forms of integrating our economy into the world economy. They have been given the name "joint enterprise zones." By mid-1989 two basic viewpoints had emerged. Some are in favor of the development of the entire concept of zones, which would be considerably different from the principles of operation of the existing economic mechanism and would have its own economic legislation and banking system and, possibly, its own monetary circulation. In this case it would be necessary to have very serious development requiring much time and effort on the part of scholars and specialists and

discussion in the commissions and committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet. In a word, there is a long road ahead.

Others are in favor of taking advantage of the already existing benefits and incentives granted to joint enterprises which could be grouped on a particular territory in order to solve key problems. Leningrad Oblast (Vyborg) and Primorye have come closest to this variant.

Yu. Yakovets: Let us look at the problem in broader terms. What do we end up with from the loudly proclaimed new approaches to foreign economic ties? We have been introducing them for more than two years and we have created more than 1,000 joint enterprises. But is the return from them appreciable? Have we obtained from them a serious contribution to the social reorientation of the economy? Probably not. Have we achieved a breakthrough in the technological area or drawn Western advanced technology into our economy? Here, probably, the successes are fewer than were promised. Were we able to achieve an increase in our export potential or increase the output of competitive products? In this sphere, in my opinion, the result has not been large either.

So what is the matter? In my view, the reason is that we have not clearly defined our priorities for joint enterprise. Joint enterprises are still foreign bodies in our economic organism, which rejects them, then they are dispersed, and the effectiveness of their efforts is extremely small.

Hence one is faced with the conclusion: If we want to achieve an effect from joint enterprises, not by the end of the century but considerably sooner, then we must raise the class of foreign economic cooperation. What do I have in mind? First we must unite the groups of domestic related enterprises and organizations which are prepared to enter into alliance with groups of Western firms in order to solve large sociotechnological and export problems. We must look for nontraditional paths here. We must take the path of creating consortiums in places where it is possible to achieve a real effect rapidly. For example, an agreement is being prepared to create the "Treasures of Art" consortium which will be based on the Russian museum. Here we are trying to unite high culture with high technology and thereby achieve an economic effect. And, according to calculations of specialists, it will be provided: It is possible to include in immense volumes videodisks and videocassettes on which are recorded the treasures of world art from the domestic museum. We have proposals from the French and the Italians first to produce videodisks, videocassettes, and albums and to create banks of pictures. This local project could grow into a national one. A large effect could also be produced by creating a consortium in the sphere of tourism.

And, finally, a higher level than that of the consortium is the formation of zones for joint enterprise which make it possible to create a denser infrastructure and to have

better trained personnel. We need to turn abruptly in the direction of projects which make it possible to concentrate the conditions, the infrastructure, and the personnel in particular regions and to produce an effect in the near future.

We must also take into account that foreign businessmen are still unwilling to make contacts with us. It is difficult for them to enter into our economic system; they are encountering resistance. Therefore it is extremely important to create zones in which the barriers would be removed. This cannot be done without making adjustments to existing legislation.

And therefore there is a need to prepare a unified law on joint enterprise. Two draft laws are now being prepared: On joint enterprises and on zones for joint enterprise. But then there arises the question of where the consortiums should be located. Perhaps there is some point in preparing one law that encompasses all forms and letting it be tested before it is brought up for discussion. For one must take into account that there is a struggle revolving around the joint enterprise zones—not everyone perceives them in the same way. We questioned 2,100 people in Vyborg: 25 percent were against creating the zone and 65 percent were in favor of it, either completely or partially.

And therefore it is necessary to clarify to people which goals are set during the creation of the zones, under which conditions they will operate, and what effect they will produce. Incidentally, in Leningrad, Vyborg, Primorye, and Novgorod the attitude toward the zones might be one of the key issues in the election campaign. But the law on joint enterprise must be prepared now, in parallel, since specific plans depend on it. The government also needs to take a stand regarding this issue. Passions rage "below" and "above" they are silent. The lost of time leads to a discrediting of the goal itself.

D. Beskurnikov: It seems to me that we must not see in joint enterprise a panacea or all our ills and a way of solving all of our national economic problems. This form now occupies a insignificant place in foreign economic ties and, apparently, will not be able to exert an appreciable influence on them in the foreseeable future. But nonetheless, according to available data, during nine months of last year joint enterprises produced more than 600 million rubles' [R] worth of products. Half of the products that made their way to the domestic market were consumer goods. On the whole this sphere is directed toward social needs. Therefore we must not be too critical and unequivocal toward the contribution of joint enterprise to this cause.

Of course, there is much that is negative here: There has been both speculation and other things. But we must look at this as a reflection of the processes that are taking place in our economy. For joint enterprise is the market segment of the Soviet economic organism. This is what we shall encounter on a larger scale in the next few years. Therefore the problem deserves serious attention and

attitudes, particularly through the prism of the economic laws that are being prepared. Until we have a law that clearly defines the proprietor and until we have a tax law, we cannot expect any large investments of foreign capital.

As concerns considerations to the effect that the time has come to put into a coherent legislative form all the existing decrees on joint enterprise, work is being done in this area. The conventional title of the future document is the law on economic activity in the USSR with the participation of foreign corporate bodies. But its appearance will depend again on the package of basic laws which the USSR Supreme Soviet has not yet had time to adopt.

I. Faminskiy: First of all we should clearly determine which problems we wish to resolve by enlisting foreign capital. Depending on the answer to this question we will be able to say which zones it would be expedient to organize and where. Apparently they are needed in places where, in the first place, it is necessary to force the development of production and contribute to the advancement of productive forces. For instance, we must arrange extensive upgrading of raw materials and considerably expand the output of consumer goods. A zone for this could be, for example, Nakhodka: After all, the productive forces of the Far East require accelerated development and the local capabilities are insufficient for this.

In the second place, the zones could contribute to acceleration of scientific and technical development and more rapid assimilation of innovations. The Vyborg zone was conceived precisely for this purpose: To use the scientific potential of Leningrad and produce the kinds of products that are not produced not only here but even on the world market.

There could probably be other variants as well: The zones are needed for rapid development of tourism and the utilization of our cultural wealth.

But, on the other hand, the creation of these zones also causes problems. For example, how will Soviet enterprises operate under these conditions and how will our workers feel? We were in Vyborg recently and talked with the leaders of the city and certain enterprises. In general they were in favor of it, but they ask: "How will we feel in the new situation?" If special conditions are created for foreign capital and wages at the joint enterprises are higher, the work force will go there...

In this regard I cannot fully agree with Dmitriy Alekseyevich Beskurnikov: We are not likely to be able to create a law on the basis of all the decrees that have come out. And this is hardly necessary. For even if we create conditions for foreign capital in certain places, it will not go there. And here I shall return to the question of these conditions.

For example, is a tax reduction a significant factor for businessmen? I think not. And we have already been

convinced of this: Tax breaks were introduced in the Far Eastern region but this did not produce any special results. If we extend the same benefits to other regions the effect will be the same. More significant for foreign firms is a change in the overall structure of our economic life and the general atmosphere for business activity in one region or another.

Apparently it is also necessary to think about questions of management in the zones and the creation of the necessary mechanism for this. It should be based on the fact that Soviet power is still a decisive factor in leadership. But we will also need special organs like the committee for joint enterprise, associations, and corporations for the development of the zone, companies for material and technical supply, foreign economic ties, and so forth. And, of course, we need a banking system. We cannot do without banks for keeping internal accounts just as we cannot do without insurance organizations.

L. Vasilyev: I should like to draw attention to the fact that we must extensively inform the population of the possibilities provided by the joint enterprise zones. Sometimes people get an incorrect idea of them, that they mean the sale of our resources and raw material to foreigners, that they are a private market, and so forth. Such ideas are absolutely wrong. We must honestly say that the zones give us the opportunity to resolve comprehensively the radical problems of restructuring our economy, to attract foreign investments, to create preconditions for changing the internal mechanism of our economic system, and to introduce new technical equipment and technology.

We cannot develop apart from the world economy. We need to find our niche in international division of labor and occupy it. The creation of free zones on the territory of the USSR is the most direct path to integration of our economy with the world economy. In our propaganda work for the creation of zones we must show that this is the only way we are able to create sufficiently free working conditions for our enterprises. The zone can be essentially a testing ground on which new elements of the economic mechanism are tried out.

I support the idea that now it is too early for us to create legislation concerning the zones. That would disturb the process of the formation of new relations and limit the possibilities of alternative solutions to a number of fundamental problems. Normal legislation always follows practice.

D. Beskurnikov: I do not think we have any disagreements. I too am in favor of doing the work and then having the law and not creating a theoretical concept and then forcing life into it. We are speaking about something else: What ways we have of developing approaches—through branch consortiums or territorial ones, which I support, or with the help of more extensive regional economic accountability. These are three possible variants...

Yu. Yakovets: But if we adopt this law now, after the basic laws go into effect—on the land, ownership, and so forth—it will be considerably more difficult for us to obtain the necessary privileges for the zones. We will be too late. Delaying with legislation will make our work more difficult. We should probably include at least the basic problems in it.

L. Vasilyev: We must be very cautious with the laws. Western businessmen tell us that they are afraid to come to us since we are always violating the rules of the game; we introduce our decisions with one hand and revoke them with the other. At the same time I agree that we need to have the GVK of the USSR Council of Ministers establish the basic legal and economic principles for activity in the free enterprise zones. For the zones are the formation of the critical mass of enterprises that are capable of working under the conditions of the new production relations which we can develop with precisely these new formations and allow for the influence of the world market while retaining principles of centralized state control. We are familiar with the experience of China and other countries and it is time to draw practical conclusions from it.

In our opinion, we should already be creating a new mechanism and forgetting about slogans. At first we must begin with small, realistic projects, being prepared for their not being self-supporting at first.

From this standpoint the process of forming the Leningrad zone could take place on the basis of individual centers. One of these points could apparently be the region of Imatra-Svetogorsk where both Soviets and Finns are already practically working in one zone, they bake bread for it jointly, they have joint municipal services, and the municipalities of the two cities work together in harmony.

We should apparently begin with a small territory in the Vyborg region as well. The capital investments would be less. For this would be a matter of self-supporting zones, and we cannot count on centralized sources. In a word, the creation of free economic zones should be a matter of territories, international commercial banks, and foreign capital.

V. Fedoseyev: In Leningrad we have a large group of specialists who deal with all problems of the zones. The CPSU obkom and oblispolkom have created a work group and enlisted quite a few institutes and enterprises which have direct access to foreign firms and would like to work in the zone. They have been preparing for more than a year—both economically and sociologically—and they are polling the population and doing preplanning work. We have enlisted planning organizations in order to develop various variants of the production-social infrastructure.

The Vyborg zone has been considered from various sides: both as a territory and as a region which has a particular production profile. We have discussed a minimum of eight variants, beginning with the small area

directly adjacent to the Saymenskiy Canal and the Finnish border. Ultimately we came to the conclusion that the zone should be enclosed by administrative borders. At the same time within the framework of this territory, the zone must develop from two or three industrial site-centers which must be fully prepared from the standpoint of engineering and housing facilities. The Vyborg zone should include science-intensive joint enterprises for the output of high-technology, principally new products which we can put on the world market.

That is, we are already working out fairly carefully all the problems related to preparing for the creation of the zone. As concerns the attitude of the population, they are basically in favor of the zone. But the longer we take to make a final decision, the stronger the "information famine" among the people will be, the more hitches of all kinds there will be, and the more advocates of the zone we will lose.

A. Gruzinov: Why did we choose to organize the zone in Vyborg? Because it fully meets the requirements placed on this kind of activity throughout the world. Judge for yourselves: Its territory is well provided with transportation and communications, better than any other in the Northwest. There is a commercial port here and a train goes through to Finland, uniting the Scandinavian countries with all the European territory of the Soviet Union, and there are several international class highways.

Vyborg itself is the oldest European city with a 700-year history. Its enterprises have developed contacts with Finland and foreign economic ties. In the city and the region there is a considerable reserve of engineering support and a certain economic potential.

Western firms know that we have already been thinking about a zone here for a long time. Accustomed to a businesslike style, they are waiting for this decision. Time is passing and nothing is being done. There are no decisions that could lay a basis for serious agreements and therefore the interest of the foreign partners is waning.

V. Fedoseyev: Our partners are thinking approximately this: For the first time we are considering investing capital in a territory where there are no laws to protect our interests. This is the first thing that bothers us. And the second thing is the turbulent changes that are taking place today. Privileges and other economic problems are secondary for our partners, and therefore it seems to me that we should have a law on foreign economic activity, including the question of zones. It is another question what might arise after the enactment of the basic laws which are being considered by the Supreme Soviet.

D. Beskurnikov: The guarantees about which you are speaking cannot be provided by laws. We already have bilateral agreements with a number of countries which protect investments. Obviously you have in mind credit guarantees. But this is some kind of property guarantee. And this issue must be resolved on a unionwide scale.

According to existing laws, socialist property cannot be mortgaged. Therefore for the time being we must speak about limited possibilities.

And we must not forget that between the producers in the zone there must be wholesalers and intermediaries. That is, functions that are strongly restricted in joint enterprise in the USSR. Let us smooth all this out in the zone.

L. Vasilyev: Right. After all, we must begin to form the mechanism. And we are making a mistake by focusing mainly on economics and the enterprises while forgetting about forming the market infrastructure.

I. Faminskiy: There are all kinds of proposals about zones now. At the Congress, for instance, they discussed Kazakhstan. We should probably be thinking about whether or not we should go in this direction. For they are speaking about a concrete plan for extracting and refining oil. But in this case it would be better to enlist foreign capital with the help of a consortium.

Another example is Armenia. We are speaking about zones that are relatively small in size which create special conditions for foreign capital. But could these conditions be extended to all of Armenia?

D. Beskurnikov: We should probably create certain opportunities for Armenia, which has suffered from the earthquake. But here we must immediately find a mechanism for stimulating foreign capital investment. In general our concept of a zone is very hazy. Thus we could call all of the Far East a zone—a zone of regional economic accountability. There will be both industrial and customs zones. Thus the concept of zones entails an entire complex.

I. Faminskiy: Obviously we must keep all this diversity in mind. Take China's experience. There they have zones and special regions. In practice, by giving the Far East special privileges we have created a similar region. Therefore perhaps we should think about this for Armenia as well. Thus in addition to zones we could have rayons, regions, and so forth...

V. Leushkanov: It seems to me that in Kazakhstan we should not create a zone but let the deposits out on concession. That is precisely the situation in the Far East. It has actually been declared a special region but capital will not go there until adequate conditions have been created for it. And without concessions this is not likely to be achieved. Incidentally, when decrees on expansion of foreign economic activity in the Far East were being prepared it was stipulated that those mineral deposits which cannot be developed by central departments because of the shortage of funds could be turned over to the local authorities which could develop them by bringing in foreign capital. Therefore we are faced with the question of concessions.

Yu. Yakovets: There are certain conditions without which zones are impossible. One of them is the social direction

of the transformations. Whether one is speaking about raw material, or science, or tourism, in any case the population of the zone must actually feel that their life is getting better.

The financial side is also important. Only if we create a modern commercial infrastructure in the zones, and with the participation of foreign banks and foreign specialists—only then will we achieve modern, effective commercial service for the projects we are preparing.

Now about hard currency. In any case there will be two kinds of currency in circulation in the zone. There has been a great dispute about the following: Is it possible to issue some of the wages in hard currency? At some point we shall come to this. But we have not managed to agree on it yet. We also need credit cards with which local residents can acquire goods in the zone.

We must also find ways of solving the problem of management. In my opinion there is no need to create any committee for the zone or any union organ. This should be an economic association that operates according to principles of self-financing and self-management and is under the jurisdiction of the local soviet, the republics, and the union organs to the extent to which this is necessary.

D. Beskurnikov: Our roundtable has shown the multifaceted nature of the problem under discussion. At the same time we have been able to reveal a unified approach and the desire to continue the work that has been started, especially in places where there are already stockpiles of it. And therefore I think that the appearance of the first zone is not far away.

Joint Venture With Japanese Reported

*LD2601234790 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1247 GMT 26 Jan 90*

[Text] Moscow, 26 January (TASS)—For the first time since joint enterprises have been organized with foreign firms, a Soviet-Japanese enterprise is being created in the machine-tool industry. Those taking part in its establishment on the Soviet side are the Stankoservis Production Association, the Moscow Technical Servicing Center, and the All-Union Stankoimport Association. Those taking part on the Japanese side are the firms of Fanuc and Mitsui Bussan. In this way, the TASS correspondent learned today at the USSR Ministry of Machine-Tool and Instrument Making, the efforts of one of the world's largest producers of numerical program-controlled devices and robot equipment (the Fanuc firm) and Soviet machine-tool organizations are being pooled. The partners intend to carry out the technical servicing of machine-tools, the training of their users and, in addition, to organize the production and sale in the USSR of various products made from plastic. These include disposable syringes, instrument panels for motor vehicles and consumer goods.

A joint enterprise is being set up for the first time with a Swedish firm and has set about designing and manufacturing of purification equipment. Litstankopreyekt of the USSR and the Swedish firm (Galvour) are involved in it. There are also prospects for creating new joint enterprise with Italian and West German partners, with whom negotiations are being held.

Agricultural

Ligachev Discusses Agricultural Problems

PM0602105390 Stockholm SVENSKA DAGBLADET
in Swedish 1 Feb 90 p 5

[Report on interview with Yegor Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, by Aasmund Willersrud; date of interview not specified; first paragraph is editorial introduction: "The Soviet Union's Farmers Live in Poor and Miserable Conditions"]

[Text] Moscow—Those people in the Soviet Union who want to privatize state and collective farms meet with opposition from Yegor Ligachev, who in this interview with SVENSKA DAGBLADET's Moscow correspondent, Aasmund Willersrud, admits that there is a serious shortage of foodstuffs in the country. In a part of the interview published earlier Ligachev, who is a member of the ruling Politburo and is considered to be among Mikhail Gorbachev's opponents, warned of a crisis in the Soviet Communist Party if a solution is not found to the conflict with the Lithuanian Communists. The 69-year-old Ligachev was elected to the Politburo in 1983 and is responsible for agricultural questions in the Central Committee.

[Willersrud] How much time does the Soviet leadership have to solve the food supply problem before the people's discontent ends in open rebellion?

"Not just a year or two, but quite a lot longer," Yegor Ligachev, said in an interview with SVENSKA DAGBLADET in Moscow. "The food situation is acute, but you exaggerate the seriousness of the situation," he said.

Ligachev confirmed his view of collective farming as the superior form of agricultural enterprise. He considers that it would cost far too much and take far too long to turn all unprofitable sovkhozes and kolkhozes into private farms. For that both a special industry and a special infrastructure would be needed. He described himself as a "realist" and not as a "conservative," as many critics claim.

First he reminded me that it is necessary to look back at history in order to assess the situation in today's agricultural sector. One factor is that in the last war the Soviet Army was a peasants' army and the losses were enormous. Another is that in the thirties the best methods were not always chosen. There were obvious and gross deviations from Lenin's cooperative plan.

"I remember that time very well," the 69-year-old Ligachev said. "That was when forcible methods ruled within the agricultural sector. The results were ignorance about the land, a change in the psychology of the peasant, reduced working efficiency, and very slow development of agriculture in the Soviet Union. But now to today's agriculture." Yegor Ligachev spoke with great openness when he described the situation in the agricultural sector and life in the countryside.

"The life of the Soviet farmer is poor and miserable, and it is correctly said that 'civilization took a long detour around our rural areas,'" he said. In social terms people in the countryside are four or five times worse supplied than town dwellers, and the wages of workers in the countryside are 25 percent lower.

"Today the situation of the population in the countryside is our greatest problem. We are trying to give them good working and living conditions, and we realize that satisfactory conditions in the countryside also benefit the towns."

This is, as it were, the external framework of the difficult situation in the agricultural sector. Its products make up 70 percent of internal trade but are nevertheless far from able to satisfy people's needs.

However, Ligachev firmly rejected claims that the country is threatened by famine, that the supply situation is in a blind alley, and that the whole socialist economic system should be abandoned and the road of capitalist development taken.

"Is the country facing famine when each person consumes 65 kg of meat, 360 liters of milk, and 80 kg of vegetables per year? Decide for yourself," he said—admitting, however, that production must be increased by 25 percent if nutritional norms are to be met.

What then are the direct causes of today's acute food shortages in the Soviet Union, one of the countries of the world with the greatest resources? Ligachev listed them rapidly:

- One, poor technical equipment and the Soviet farmer's low level of social conditions;
- two, stagnating production in the agroindustrial sector;
- three, an enormous shortage of agricultural raw materials.

"This last is both an economic and a moral problem," he went on. "It is bitter to have to say it, but the fact is that we have losses of 30 percent during production. To produce one unit of end product we have to use 30 percent more raw materials.

"Our agricultural policy is today directed entirely toward improving production conditions on the basis of new mechanisms such as economic accountability, land leasing, cooperation, and the new technical advances," Ligachev said. "We have already gotten rid of a number

of limitations in the old command administration system, and many kolkhoz leaders say that it has become much easier to work now."

But he expressed a new optimism and linked this directly to parts of the military industry which are now being transferred to the food industry.

"If it had not been possible to do this, we would never manage to realize the plan to guarantee the people a stable supply of basic foodstuffs before 1995. Within the space of eight years we will create a completely new food industry. Well respected manufacturers of arms, tanks, missiles, and aircraft are being brought in to create food-producing machinery. And then there will be results," he said.

"I was not joking when I said to representatives of the Swedish Alfa-Laval company at the Lianosovo dairy combine that in a few years' time we will be coming to them and selling equipment," Ligachev smiled broadly and optimistically, and told me that a ministry that had had the responsibility for building strategic missiles had been given the task of developing equipment for the sugar beet industry.

"Last year the Soviet Union had a very good beet harvest of 300 tonnes per hectare. Of the total harvest all of 4 million tonnes were lost. The reason? The sugar content of Soviet beets is the same as that of West European beets—16 to 17 percent—but Soviet industry is only able to extract 10.5 percent, while the West extracts all of 14.5 percent. Last year we lost 4 million tonnes of sugar like that.

"The Soviet farmer's equipment is at about the same level as the U.S. farmer's 40 years ago," Ligachev said as he continued his review of the reasons for the food shortages. "In the United States they have several million small tractors; last year we produced only 1,000 such tractors."

In other words—in Ligachev's argument—if the Soviet collective farmer had had equipment and tools corresponding to those that exist in the United States and the countries of Europe, the Soviet Union would have been self-sufficient in food.

"I belong to the realists," Ligachev said with a broad smile. "I am often called a conservative, but I am in fact a realist. Those who are drawing us onto a different road of development—in relation to the question of private ownership—it is they who are the real conservatives," he said.

Ligachev sniffs at those who say: If the kolkhoz and sovkhov system cannot feed the nation, change to the capitalist method of private agriculture.

"In the United States big farms, which only account for four percent of the total, are responsible for half of all agricultural production.

"Historically here in the Soviet Union a huge industrial and commercial complex has been created on a completely different foundation: social ownership of the means of production in the form of state and cooperative enterprises. I support this position," Yegor Ligachev said.

"It is necessary to give all forms of ownership equality, but they should be socialist forms of ownership. You can have as great a pluralism as you like as far as forms of ownership are concerned, but a responsible leadership must identify the most important.

"In the Soviet Union social ownership must be the prioritized form in the agricultural sector. But it will be integrated with individual property or so-called family farms."

This is a phenomenon which is typical of the Soviet Union.

"We produce a total of 24 percent of foodstuffs on private plots of land, 74 percent on sovkhovs and kolkhozes, and two to three percent on enterprise farms.

"That is why public property must be integrated with the family farms. We have 36 million of them in the Soviet Union! Comprising only three to four percent of all cultivated land, the privately owned plots of land produce 24 percent of foodstuffs. But the secret lies in the fact that they are integrated with sovkhovs and kolkhozes," Ligachev said.

"They fatten calves and pigs, but where do they buy them? At the kolkhoz. Who helps to plow the land? The sovkhov with its tractors. Where do they sell their production? To the kolkhoz. Separate these farms from the kolkhozes and they will not be able to develop normally. That is elementary," Yegor Ligachev explained.

"Some people say: Let us set free the 2,000 kolkhozes which are operating at a loss or with low profits. We have calculated that getting them on their feet again and making them profitable will cost 24 billion rubles [R]. To form family farms from these kolkhozes would cost all of R84 billion.

"Everything must be done on an economically reasonable and voluntary basis. People's free will is the most important thing. Lenin once said: 'No one can give orders to the farmers.'"

He shook his head a little and summed up his long description of agriculture and its problems.

"The most important thing now, regardless of what form of enterprise we accept—state, cooperative, or private small farms—is that if we do not build up the processing industry, storage, and transport resources, the whole thing will operate with no result. The shortcomings are much too great."

Food, Agriculture Organization Status Discussed

AU0302105990 Paris AFP in English 0214 GMT
3 Jan 90

[Text] Rome, Feb 3 (AFP)—The Soviet Union is considering active participation in the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) for the first time ever, Konstantin Ovchinnikov, head of a Soviet mission here to reevaluate its current "observer" status, said Friday evening.

The country was among the founding members of the United Nations agency in 1945, but never participated in any projects, insisting that capitalist countries tended to make off with key posts for their own benefit. Active membership would necessitate a 30-million-dollar yearly contribution.

Mr. Ovchinnikov, vice-president of the department of international economic organizations at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, stressed that "The question of our return to the FAO must be seen within the framework of our politics of integration into world markets. The objective is to raise the efficiency of our economy."

He noted that a decision could be reached "before the end of 1990."

The mission of the eight high government officials, here for 10 days, is "to determine to what extent our investment in the FAO would be economically justified and how our agricultural enterprises would benefit," he continued.

Observers here note that the Soviet interest comes at a time when the United States has cut its FAO financing to the minimum required to keep a vote, thus further depleting its reserves.

However, the return of the Soviet Union to the organization "would have nothing to do with the tensions between the FAO and the United States," Mr. Ovchinnikov stated. "On the contrary, we want to eliminate all confrontation with the United States, including any over the FAO."

The Soviets would be interested in three fields handled at FAO: technical assistance, statistical information on agricultural production, and scientific and technical data banks.

"We underutilize our national resources," he explained, "and use of the organization's data bank would give us access to discoveries in the West and help us to avoid duplicating research already carried out there."

Observers believe that the Soviet Union, the largest grain importer in the world and the third-largest producer, should no longer shun publicizing its statistics, traditionally kept secret or exaggerated. Modern satellite reconnaissance also facilitates gathering precise harvest information.

"The Soviet Union is not seeking large-scale projects from the FAO," the chief of the Soviet delegation confirmed, "but rather pilot projects."

He carefully stressed that the Soviets "were not looking to take international funds from the Third World and give them to Eastern Europe," but remarked: "No wording in the charter specifies that the FAO must work exclusively for developing countries."

Scientific

'Mir' Crew Replacement Scheduled for 11 Feb

LD0602194490 Moscow TASS in English 1917 GMT
6 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 6 TASS—Soviet cosmonauts Aleksandr Viktorenko and Aleksandr Serebrov, who have been on board the orbital Mir complex for five months, are preparing for their return to earth on February 19.

The cosmonauts have left their craft five times to service the complex and conduct experiments in outer space. Specialists say their main achievement was to test a new "space motorbike". The device took them to a record 45 meters away from the Mir complex.

The cosmonauts also tested new space suits. Specialists say they have completed the programme of work in outer space.

A series of experiments in space technology has been carried out. The Gallar installation was used to study materials and obtain high-quality semi-conductor crystals.

Medical and biological check-ups were conducted on a regular basis, the Tsirtseya measuring device controlled the radiation background in the residential quarters.

The Maria spectrometer was used to make a series of measurements of elementary high-energy charged particle flows in near-earth space.

The cosmonauts carried out a series of regular astrophysical observations using the Kvant module. Continuous long-distance instrumental probing and optional observations of the earth's surface were also conducted.

In Baykonur, two new crews are now preparing for work on board the Mir complex—Anatoliy Soloviev and Aleksandr Balandin, and Gennadiy Manakov and Gennadiy Strekalov. One of these crews will replace the present crew on board. The replacements are expected to set out on February 11.

Ship Expedition Leaves for Antarctica

LD0502134890 Moscow TASS in English 1212 GMT
5 Feb 90

[By TASS correspondent Kiril Strzhizhovskiy]

[Text] Port Louis February 5 TASS—The scientific ship Professor Zubov with the 35th Soviet Antarctic expedition aboard left the port of Port Louis, capital of Mauritius, today, heading for the Antarctica.

The Soviet polar explorers were given a warm welcome in Mauritius. At a news conference held aboard ship speakers dwelt in detail on various aspects of international cooperation on Antarctica, problems of environmental protection and prospects of utilisation of the regional marine resources.

The Professor Zubov carries television equipment for the French national television company Antenne-2 which will transmit live the completion of the international Transantarctic expedition via a Soviet artificial earth satellite early in March this year.

Six men from six states of the world left in dog-drawn sledges last August 1 for a precarious journey over the continent's ice cap. They will cover a total of 6,000 kilometres. The expedition members are Soviet scientist Viktor Boyarskiy, French physician Jean-Louis Etienne, well-known American traveller Will Stinger and also British, Chinese and Japanese polar explorers. The seventh official number is, in everybody's unanimous opinion, an Eskimo dog, called Soyev.

The passage through Antarctica is expected to end at the Soviet polar station Mirny on March 1.

'Cosmos-2059' Satellite Launched

LD0702090190 Moscow TASS in English 0853 GMT
7 Feb 90

[Text] Moscow February 7 TASS—The Cosmos-2059 artificial earth satellite, the next in turn, was launched in the USSR with the help of the Cosmos carrier rocket on February 6, 1990.

Scientific equipment is installed on board the satellite for continuing space exploration.

The satellite was put into orbit with the following parameters:

- initial period of revolution—110.2 minutes,
- maximum distance from the earth's surface (in apogee)—2,292 kilometers,
- minimal distance from the earth's surface (in perigee)—191 kilometers,
- inclination of the orbit—66 degrees.

Aside from scientific equipment, the satellite is fitted with a radio system for the accurate measurement of elements of the orbit and a radiotelemetric system for beaming to the earth the data on the functioning of instruments and scientific equipment.

The equipment installed on board the satellite is functioning normally.

The coordinating computer centre is processing the incoming information.

Military

General Mikhail Moiseyev on Defense Changes

PM0702154090 Paris L'HUMANITE in French
2 Feb 90 p 13

[Interview with Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of general staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, by Jean-Pierre Ravery in Moscow—date not given, first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] Moscow—A group of French journalists who are experts on military questions has just made a one-week visit to the Soviet Armed Forces. In the absence of Defense Minister Dimitriy Yazov, who had gone to Baku to supervise the peace-keeping mission entrusted to the military, it was his immediate deputy, General Mikhail Moiseyev, chief of general staff of the USSR Armed Forces, who answered their questions.

[Ravery] What is the position on the defensive redeployment of Soviet forces?

[Moiseyev] This task is being carried out consistently and according to plan. It consists of implementing the principle of "defense sufficiency" while maintaining the military and strategic balance. In the framework of the unilateral reductions and additional measures adopted with a view to ensuring the defensive structure of formations and units, our Armed Forces have already been reduced in 1989 by 265,000 men, 9,321 tanks, 5,052 artillery pieces, 835 fighter planes, and 40 battleships, notably submarines. In addition, we have eliminated the commands of two military districts, of two combined armies, and four army corps, 21 combined arms divisions (13 mobile infantry divisions, and eight armored divisions) and a series of formations and units with other armaments.

...In addition, also in 1989, we withdrew from central Europe, three armored divisions, three armored training regiments, four landing and assault units, a series of air formations, and bridging units, and a large quantity of military equipment, including 500 warheads for tactical nuclear missiles. I would like to specify that the armored divisions withdrawn have been disbanded. In addition, three other armored divisions will be withdrawn and disbanded this year. The structure of the troops is also acquiring a defensive character. With regard to the combined arms formations remaining on our allies' territory, a large number of tanks are being removed: 40 percent of the total in motorized infantry divisions and 20 percent in the armored divisions. The operational training of troops and their combat training have been adapted to the defensive doctrine. Exercise and training manuals and the programs of our military academies have been revised.

[Ravery] Can you give us details about the cuts in USSR's military spending?

[Moiseyev] From 1986-90 we cut our military spending by around 30 billion rubles compared with the provisions of the five-year plan. For this year alone, our military budget has been reduced by 8.2 percent over last year and it is less than 71 billion rubles. This policy of reducing military spending will be continued. Moving toward disarmament, we intend to reduce the proportion of the national income devoted to this spending by between one-third and one-half by 1995.

[Ravery] What progress has been made in converting some Soviet arms factories?

[Moiseyev] As you know, arms and military equipment production has fallen by almost 20 percent in the framework of the unilateral reduction of our Armed Forces by 500,000 men. Since last year, we have halted a large number of projects and programs connected with the production of strike weapon systems. This year the proportion of civilian production in military enterprises will reach 50 percent and in 1995 it will exceed 60 percent.

During the period 1989-95, we intend to implement two conversion programs. One aims to produce advanced technology equipment for the processing industry. Some 345 factories and 205 research bodies and design offices are participating in its implementation.

The other relates to the production of new consumer goods: stereo color televisions, food processors, refrigerators, freezers, vacuum cleaners, compact disc players, video recorders, video cameras, personal computers, and so forth. A total of 140 types of new products are involved in this project.

Of course, conversion is a complex matter which requires carefully considered approaches, coordinated efforts, precise planning, and major investments. It is only on that condition that the economic yield of conversion can be significant. Soviet economists assess the increase in the country's national income resulting from measures already implemented at less than 1.8 billion rubles. It is obvious that the increase in this indicator will be directly determined by what the Western countries do in practice—primarily the United States and the other NATO member states in the sphere of conversion.

[Ravery] Do the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic alliance still have a future? If so, on what conditions and with what purpose?

[Moiseyev] In our view, we are already witnessing the creating of favorable conditions in Europe for a constructive dialogue between the Warsaw Pact and the Atlantic alliance, for the establishment of relations between them which rule out confrontation.

With regard to more long-term prospects, the position of principle held by the Warsaw Pact member states on the subject of the future of military blocs in Europe remains

unchanged. We advocate the abolition of military blocs in Europe and the simultaneous dissolution of the two alliances.

As long as the Warsaw Pact and NATO remain, we must develop more intensively the civilian orientation of their activity, move toward their gradual transformation into political and military organizations turning them into tools of political cooperation. This will have beneficial effects not only on the pledges made within the alliances, but also on the European process as a whole.

In my view, such a development of the Warsaw Pact and NATO is perfectly realistic. It can be stimulated by the political processes now taking place in Europe and by the success of the Vienna negotiations. At all events, in my view the vital precondition for the elimination of the military and political blocs is consistent disarmament by both sides on the basis of parity, reciprocity, reasonable compromise, and identical security. The objective is clear: It is a reliable and sound peace in Europe and the whole world.

[Ravery] Is a complete withdrawal of Soviet forces deployed in the GDR conceivable? If so, when? On what conditions?

[Moiseyev] The Soviet Union is advocating the total elimination of foreign military bases and the return of all troops to their national territories. The settlement of this problem is one of the aims of our military doctrine. Back in 1980, we unilaterally reduced our troops in the GDR by 20,000 men and 1,000 tanks. Last year, also unilaterally, we withdrew from the GDR 11,620 men, around 2,000 tanks, 247 artillery pieces, 126 fighter planes, and a large quantity of other armaments. In accordance with the plan, two armored divisions, a series of units and subunits with their equipment and armaments will be withdrawn this year.

The presence of our troops on GDR territory, like the presence of U.S., French, and British troops on the FRG's territory has a legal basis in a series of joint documents drawn up by the allied powers which won World War II. In addition, the temporary presence of Soviet troops in the GDR is regulated by the Treaty on Relations between the USSR and the GDR (1955) and several bilateral agreements signed by the two countries' governments.

Clearly the very fact of raising the question of the withdrawal of troops implies taking all these documents into consideration, and its solution is only possible on a reciprocal basis. In other words, we are prepared to immediately and completely withdraw our troops from the GDR's territory if those of the United States, Britain, and France are withdrawn from the FRG.

[Ravery] Do you think that Franco-Soviet bilateral cooperation is satisfactory? How could it be developed?

[Moiseyev] Franco-Soviet cooperation has good traditions.... During the last war, we fought together against

fascism. In the sixties and seventies the meetings of representatives of the Soviet and French high commands, the visits of ships and squadrons of the armed forces of our two countries have become regular. Last year, for the first time after a long break, French Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement visited the Soviet Union. The USSR defense minister will visit France shortly.... We attach great importance to the exchange of views on the nature of our military doctrines, the structure and training of the armed forces, confidence-building measures and measures to increase openness in the military sphere.... The further development of Soviet-French cooperation in the military sphere could be ensured primarily by a development of contacts, not only between top military officials but also between officers of intermediate and junior grades, soldiers, military scientists, troupes of amateur artists, sportsmen, and so forth. A dialogue conducted on many problems in mutual respect is, I am convinced, in the fundamental interests of the Soviet and French peoples and the peoples of the whole world.

General Lizichev Addresses Komsomol Forum

PM0702143190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 6 Feb 90 Single Edition p 2

[Report by Major S. Popov: "Authority Is Returned by Deeds"]

[Text] The All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol] conference of the Western Group of Forces lasted 12 hours but the keenness of debates on the questions submitted for the agenda did not decline until the very last minute. What is the place and what are the tasks of the Komsomol in the renewal processes which have affected the life of the Army and the country and along what paths should it advance further in resolving tasks of the communist education of young people in the Army—these problems in the report delivered by Captain A. Trushin, assistant to the chief of the group of forces political directorate for Komsomol work, were discussed in detail in the speeches delivered by Lieutenant Colonel F. Pugachev, Senior Lieutenant Ye. Poleyev, Sergeant K. Tkachenko, Private A. Ktoyan, and others.

There was support for the proposal from Senior Lieutenant S. Fedorov and Captain S. Leonavichus on the elaboration of the draft proposals from the Western Group of Forces Komsomol members into a common platform with which the Army and Navy Komsomol will come to the 21st Komsomol Congress.

A runoff election (the first did not provide the necessary number of votes for all candidates) elected members of the council of ground forces Komsomol organizations and delegates to the 21st Komsomol Congress and the First Congress of Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Komsomol organizations.

Army General A. Lizichev, chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate, addressed the conference.

Noting all the complexity and contradictions of the processes taking place today in the country and Army, he paid special attention to the unprecedented polarization of forces and positions and opinions in society.

On the one hand there is serious thought about the tragic consequences of the social deformations of past years and the breakthrough to democracy, glasnost, and humanism. On the other there is spite and the persistent, inventive defense of the old bureaucratic-edict system.

On the one hand there is sincere love for the motherland, devotion to the ideals of socialism and internationalism, the desire to consolidate all healthy forces of the fraternal peoples of our multinational state. On the other there is the desperate, heedless phony innovation of dilettantes, the renunciation of the path which has been traveled, speculation on people's difficulties and feelings, the stoking of nationalist emotions, and the fueling of separatist passions...

In this connection, Army Gen. A. Lizichev noted, we can clearly see the aim of those who have launched a fierce attack on the Komsomol: demoralizing young people, wresting them from the party, and separating the Komsomol into national apartments and professional shops. A blow is being struck against the ideological foundations of the Komsomol, its political essence is being eroded and that in which our country's young people can rightly take pride is being defiled and trivialized and all moral and spiritual sources are being trampled and sullied. They are seeking to leave young people without ideals, faith, and moral guidelines.

Of course, with a consideration for all this the question of what the Komsomol should be like becomes in many ways a key one. In saying this the speaker recalled that in September last year the participants in the conference of the Army and Navy Komsomol expressed themselves in favor of the Komsomol's future as an independent and politically active organization ideologically loyal to Lenin's teaching. The conference also expressed itself in favor of the formation of a Komsomol organization of the USSR Armed Forces with the rights of a republican youth league within the Komsomol. And on 11-13 February this year there will be the first plenum of the all-Army council of Komsomol organizations.

Great hopes are pinned on the councils of Komsomol organizations. Their creation is aimed primarily at expanding the rights and responsibility of the primary Komsomol organizations and emancipating the creative activity of the Army and Navy youth.

Nonetheless, it must be admitted that the Komsomol is restructuring itself extremely slowly. That is why it is losing prestige. The Komsomol committees are only feebly mastering new methods of work with young people and often let the political initiative slip from their

hands. The activity of many Komsomol workers is infected with sluggishness, intellectual flaccidity, and ideological lack of will. They give in to the keen questions of present-day life, avoid the problems by which young people live today, and surrender one position after another...

Yet it is precisely integrity and the uncompromising nature of ideological and moral convictions that are a guarantee of success in work and that are the strength of the prestige of the Komsomol activist. Lack of principle and the vagueness of positions repel young people like nothing else. And if someone feels that today's tasks are beyond him, if the demands are immoderately great, he must step aside and give way to someone who is ready and able to assume the load of Komsomol cares and problems. Someone who sees a way to resolve them. And the main thing here is to place a specific person at the center of one's work. Here we must know how to work under conditions of a keen political struggle for the minds and hearts of young soldiers and officers and rebuff manifestations of nationalism, chauvinism, and extremism. And to be frank they are already creeping into the soldiers' barracks and the sailors' quarters...

Authority can only be returned through deeds. The Komsomol has reserves, they merely have to be brought into operation. And there is no need to wait for a blessing from somewhere "from the top ranks" for this. It is a matter of honor for every Komsomol member. The Komsomol is living through what is perhaps the most dramatic moment in its biography. And to emerge strengthened and confident from this complex situation, every real Komsomol member, a member not because he holds a membership card but because of his convictions, at the call of his heart, must take the most committed part in its destiny.

The conference was addressed by Army General B. Snetkov, commander in chief of the Western Group of Forces. Major A. Reshetnikov, assistant to the chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate for Komsomol work, and S. Krechetov, responsible worker of the Komsomol Central Committee, took part in its work.

Seminar on World War II Anniversary Ends

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[Report by unidentified correspondent: "Seminar Has Completed Its Work"]

[Text] An all-union seminar devoted to topical problems of the Soviet people's patriotic and international education during preparations for the 45th anniversary of victory in the Great Patriotic War has ended its work in Moscow.

For three days prominent Soviet military leaders, veterans of war and labor, army and navy political workers, lecturers from the All-Union "Znaniye" Society, and propagandists held a keen discussion on the state of affairs in military-patriotic work, propaganda of the Armed Forces' heroic legacy, and the need to step up this activity in every way possible.

There was a sharp discussion about this in particular during the "roundtable" conducted by Colonel General G. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the Soviet Army and Navy Main Political Directorate. Frontline soldiers and scientists took part in the discussion of problems. The question of progress in preparing the 10-volume work by the Institute of Military History entitled "The Great Patriotic War" and of publishing an all-union book of remembrance was discussed.

There was also a substantive discussion on the subject of "Society and the Army in Perestroyka Conditions." Army General M. Moiseyev, chief of the USSR Armed Forces General Staff, talked about Soviet military doctrine in the conditions of the new political thinking. Army General P. Lushev, USSR first deputy defense minister and commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, talked about the Warsaw Pact Organization in the new conditions. Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin, commander in chief of the Navy and deputy USSR defense minister, and Marshal of the Soviet Union S. Akhromeyev took part in the discussion.

Army General D. Yazov, candidate member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR defense minister, spoke at the seminar. He stressed that the beneficial effect of the great victory is also being felt in the revolutionary perestroyka of society which has begun. At the same time the positive changes in the country's life are occurring more slowly than one would like. And in these conditions particular significance is attaches to propaganda of the lessons and results of the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet people's heroic past, and their valiant Armed Forces.

L. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, also spoke at the seminar.